



The Hyperreality of Identity Politics on Social Media

Didik Hariyanto^{1*}, Ferry Adhi Dharma², Ishak Yussof³ & Fajar Muharram⁴

^{1,2,3} University of Muhammadiyah Sidoarjo, ⁴ University of Kebangsaan Malaysia

*didikhariyanto@umsida.ac.id

ABSTRACT

Religious-based identity political content is widespread on social media, raising voter polarization and social conflict. This research revealed the religious commodification of political buzzers for political identity and the hyperreality created on social media to attack their political opponents with identity politics. It used a qualitative commodification perspective by Jean Baudrillard. The data source was identity political content produced by buzzers from 03 October 2022 to 03 May 2023 or since the NasDem Party declared Anies Baswedan a presidential candidate. The results suggested that political buzzers coordinatedly use religion as a political commodity to build hatred through the Kadrun hashtag. In the 2019 elections, this hashtag successfully created a radical stigma among groups supporting Prabowo-Sandi and is now used to attack Anies supporters. Besides, the hyperreality created by the buzzers is the symbolization of Arab Islam to label Anies and his supporters, and indigenous Islam to describe cultural Islamic groups or native Indonesian Islam. Through social media, Arab Islam is simulated as a group full of conflict and supporting the caliphate while indigenous Islam is a peace-loving and nationalist group, which leads to widespread social disintegration, not only among Muslims in the country but also sentiment among Arab descendants in Indonesia. The impact of extreme identity politics can encourage radicalization and violence, especially when there are narratives that manipulate feelings of injustice or threats to the identity of certain groups.

Keywords: Hyperreality; Political Identity; Social Media

INTRODUCTION


With social media, political contestation has become more dynamic because there are no longer barriers of time and space in political content dissemination. Additionally, political costs on social media are relatively cheaper than the conventional ones, making it one of the main options for sending political communication messages to groups or individuals affiliated with political organizations or religious and other community organizations.

According to the Ministry of Communication and Information [Kemenkominfo \(2022\)](#), Indonesian people have switched to using social media as a reference source, so social media ranks first as a medium for information search

in Indonesia, beating electronic media, print media, and other communication channels. In the last 3 years (2020, 2021, 2022), social media has remained a source of reference or information for the public. The Ministry of Communication and Information stated that in terms of accuracy, people trust national television media more than social media because it is difficult to identify fake news or hoaxes on social media.

The development of hoax content in Indonesia is worrisome, with 1321 false political content eradicated by the Ministry of Communication and Information as of January 4, 2023 (Irso, 2023). The hoaxes widely spread on social media are mostly about identity politics and disputes against one another. This identity politics is contrary to the principles of nationalism because it often brings up issues of entity, religion, and locality (Widyawati, 2021). Political identity exploitation on social media also causes social disintegration, especially among young and first-time voters. They are neophytes vulnerable to disruption by political issues because of the opposition dichotomy built based on identity politics. In addition, young and new voters are the largest social media users in Indonesia.

According to Kemp (2023), social media users in Indonesia have reached 167 million people or 60.4% of the current population of Indonesia. Of this number, 79.5% are aged 18+ years who already have the right to vote in the 2024 General Election. Active social media users are dominated by those aged 18-34 or who in this case fall into the category of young voters and beginner voters. In the voter education guidebook published by the General Election Commission (KPU) of the Republic of Indonesia, ages 18-34 are strategic voters, within which there is a category of beginner voters, 17-21 years old (Manik et al., 2015). In the demographic map of voters, the 2024 election is also dominated by young voters as in the following figure:



Source: (Widjajanto, 2023)

Figure 1. Voter demographic report by the National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia (Lemhannas RI)

The above data shows that the projected largest number of voters in the 2024 election are young voters, particularly the millennial generation, generation Z, and first-time voters. In Indonesia, these three generations are the generation with the most social media users, thus the role of social media in the 2024 Election is strategic as a political campaign and marketing medium. Considering the age, the most relevant social media is Instagram, which is mostly used after WhatsApp (Kemp, 2023). Even though WhatsApp is the most widely used and most popular, it does not offer social networking features like Instagram because it only focuses on interpersonal and group interactions while Instagram features support mass distribution of information through Feed, Story, IG TV, Instagram Business, and Reels.

The political polarization hashtag movement on Instagram, during the research process, had reached more than 2 million viewers with 3 trending hashtags: #Kampret (2.5 million hashtags), #Cebong (2.7 million hashtags), and #Kadrun (almost 3 million hashtags). The Kadrun hashtag was viral on Instagram after the polarization of the 2019 election with the hashtag Kampret as a supporter of Prabowo-Sandi, and the hashtag Cebong as a supporter of Jokowi-Ma'ruf. Hashtag Kadrun then appeared to label Prabowo-Sandi supporters from Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and 212 demonstration participants (Hayat & Nurhakki, 2022). Hashtag Kadrun was then used as a strategy to label Muslim opponents and strengthen religious identity in Indonesian politics. According to Ronaldo & Darmaiza (2021), the political identity narrative most frequently encountered in 2019 was the issue of religion. Religion has become a tool of doctrine, propaganda, and campaigns, and is disseminated via social media.

The most widely used objects of identity politics are religious and ethnic symbols (Frenki, 2021). In fact, several studies found that identity politicization is the main strategy for winning local political contestation (Nikmah & Suhardiyanto, 2021; Pradana, 2020). In this case, the credibility of the legislative candidate is no longer a measure but rather the focus of the legislative candidate upon grabbing voters' attention by symbolizing religious identity. It is undeniable that the role of religious figures in Indonesian political contestation in various regions is dominant. Therefore, leaders can not only increase political participation but also bring about identity bias in society (Dharma, 2018).

Apart from religious and community leaders, are of the vital elements in building opinions in society. The phenomenon of political buzzers is of concern because they are typically neglectant to ethics when creating political content and thus misleading leaders' opinion, especially those related to religion. The buzzer industry has shifted from the realm of business to politics (Sugiono, 2020), for that reason, this research aimed to reveal the religious commodification by buzzers which rose political polarization, leading to identity politics on social media with

the commodification perspective by Jean Baudrillard.

Academics have taken a different focus in exploring the phenomenon of identity politics in Indonesia. Several studies have found the causes of the identity politics trend, such as religious and ethnic hegemony within Indonesian society (Fauzan et al., 2024; Mahadian et al., 2023). Political elites compete to portray themselves as pious people in a particular religious context (Karman et al., 2023), like Anies Baswedan whose Twitter content, now X, is a dominantly pious motive (Achfandhy et al., 2024). Besides, the low digital literacy of the Indonesian people causes the rise of identity politics on social media (Syahputra et al., 2024). To deal with this, legal solutions are the ones most often offered by researchers, such as the ratification of a law on religious harmony (Ritonga et al., 2024), and the election law regarding the use of social media as campaign media (Martitah et al., 2023).

Therefore, this research investigated the efforts of political buzzers to commodify religion as a political instrument to bring out the hyperreality of identity politics on social media. Additionally, it utilized Artificial Intelligence (AI) to detect producers of identity political content that threaten the stability and peace of society so that it can be used as a reference by the government upon developing strategies for preventing and dealing with identity political content in Indonesia.

This research collected data related to the religious commodification process on social media to build political identity and voter polarization. It was directed in qualitative form or detailed information from content analysis of Instagram social media #kadrun, #cebog, and #kampret to describe the building process of political identity based on religion, nationalism, pluralism, strengthening identity and its influence on democracy through social media from 03 October 2022 to 03 May 2023 with AI.

Religion has become a commodity as a logical consequence of the convergence of conventional preaching into digital. Preachers use cyber networks to expand the reach of their *da'wah* and increase their popularity. Likewise, at political moments, preachers are typically involved in political activities through preaching content or testimonials that lead to calls to vote for a particular candidate or party.

According to Piliang (1999), commodification can present hyperreality through simulations in the media. Simulation is an intellectual strategy, carried out by people with certain expertise. Hyperreality is a reality that is more real than the actual reality. The era of hyperreality, according to Baudrillard (1983), is marked by the loss of signification and metaphysics of representation, the collapse of ideology, and the bankruptcy of reality because it has been taken over by the duplication of the creator's fantasy. Dharma (2018a) argued that the reality that appears as hyperreality has undergone a long process of exploitation for economic

interests.

This research was conducted on Instagram, the second largest and the most favourite social media after WhatsApp. It is also most widely used by the younger generation, especially the millennial and Z generations, who in 2024 will become potential voters in the General Election 2024. According to [Saad et al \(2023\)](#), the intensity of the young generation in Indonesia in accessing political information on social media is proportional to their level of participation in elections. Therefore, the more intensely they search for political information on social media, the higher their participation in political affairs.

Primary data in this research was obtained through content analysis of Instagram posts related to identity politics. This data was supported by relevant literature studies, reports from the Ministry of Communication and Information, the General Election Commission, and previous research related to identity politics and the use of social media.

Data processing through AI aimed to detect and analyze patterns of identity political content on Instagram. AI simplified the process of content identification and classification. These contents were analyzed thematically to identify the main patterns in the commodification of religion and the formation of the hyperreality of identity politics. To ensure the validity of the research findings, data from content analysis and secondary literature was compared and combined with previous research because the use of AI in research required layered verification.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Religion as a Political Commodity

The spread of content containing identity politics returned massively on social media since Anies Baswedan was announced by the NasDem Party as a 2024 presidential candidate on October 3, 2023. The polarization of identity politics on social media has once again used religion as a content commodity, repeating the 2019 Election phenomenon, bringing up Hashtag Cebong and Kampret on social media, and followed by hashtag Kadrun to attack groups considered to be counter-government and affiliated with radical Islamic groups. Within 7 months or in May 2023, each hashtag reached more than 2 million users on Instagram with the following distribution:

Table 1. Hashtag Development on Instagram

No	Hashtag (#)	Follower Reach	Amount of Content	Engagement Total
1	Kadrun	2.990.870	886	43.504
2	Cebong	2.734.080	303	7.926
3	Kampret	2.529.764	428	15.212

Source: Research Data Processing Results

The table shows that hashtag Kadrun ranks the first place in terms of reach of followers, number of content, and total engagement or content that generates the most interaction between content creators and followers. This shows that netizens pay more attention to the hashtag Kadrun, initially created to attack FPI, 212 groups, and intolerant groups, but then developed to attack anyone who was considered to be against the government by associating these individuals or groups with radical Islamic groups. From a total of 886 content that included the hashtag Kadrun, the top 5 buzzer accounts with similar forms and total uploads were identified as follows: @bukankadalgurun, @kadrunbahlul, @dekokratzy, @kadrun_logicc, @sisimalam_kadrun.

Buzzers on Instagram media consistently includes the term Kadrun in their account name, except for one account, @demokratzy, to insinuate the Democratic Party for supporting Anies' candidacy as a Presidential Candidate. Kadrun, originally an abbreviation from *Kadal Gurun* (Desert Lizard), is generally interpreted as a person who is narrow-minded and exposed to Middle Eastern extremists and radicalists. Therefore, the content disseminated by buzzers is often provocative, such as the content uploaded by the accounts @bukankadalgurun, @kadrunbahlul, @dekokratzy, @kadrun_logicc, @sisimalam_kadrun together on May 2, 2023:



Source: @sisigelas_kadrun (2023)

Figure 2. Buzzer Identity Politics Content

Figure 2 is a video clip of a speech delivered by the general chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU) Executive Board, Yahya Cholil Staquf, the source of which is not referred to. The video cuts to Yahya explaining the reasons why AR Baswedan founded Al Irsyad in Indonesia. Abdurrahman Baswedan or AR Baswedan is Anies Baswedan's grandfather. Therefore, with this video clip, the buzzers link Anies Baswedan to an Islamic group that seems to be anti-Habaib Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). This identity politics content could bring back voter

polarization as in the 2019 election, where NU followers ultimately affiliated with Jokowi. In the exit poll results, the NU majority indicators, other traditional Islamic groups and 97% of non-Muslims chose the Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin candidate while modernist Islamic voters chose Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno (Ardipandanto, 2020).

Content that contains elements of negative and black campaigns is often produced by buzzers with alter accounts because the messages conveyed are detrimental to other parties and may lead to a conflict with the law. Despite this, the buzzer industry is not always negative because there are also buzzers who work to build political images, discuss strategic issues, and reinforce the content of certain messages from politicians overtly (Dewantara et al., 2022).

According to Moslehpour et al (2024), in Indonesia, religious factors especially Islam, greatly affect voters' behavior; therefore, they are often used as political marketing content on social media. The exploitation of political identity that uses religion as a commodity potentially threatens social disintegration, especially among first-time and young voters who dominate the use of social media Instagram. They are beginners who are vulnerable to disruption by political issues because of the opposition dichotomy built based on identity politics, which in the 2024 elections becomes potential voters. Young voters may take for granted the content announced by buzzers without investigating the validity of the information and informants.

Identity politics is often modified to the extreme to show the level of similarity of identity with potential voters, thereby creating resistance to other identities on various social media platforms (Soenjoto, 2019). The way out to fight identity politics is to distribute political content that strengthens the public interest (Nasrudin & Nurdin, 2019). This is important to ensure political maturity because identity politics can raise prolonged social conflict in society (Mubarok, 2018).

Identity is distinguished from traditions, social roles, and a collection of other roles called the norm structure of an institution and social organization. The broader identity in influencing a person's behavior depends on the negotiation of individual, institutional, and organizational roles. Identity originates from the meaning of oneself, and it is oneself who constructs it through processes in each individual. In a broader sense, the construction of an identity always takes place in the context of markets and entrenched power.

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba define political culture as the political orientations and attitudes toward the political system and our roles within it (Almond & Verba, 1984). In line with Almond's perspective, political culture is the totality of political views such as norms, patterns of orientation towards politics, and outlook on life in general (Budiardjo, 1977). As in Indonesia, which Clifford Gertz perceives as politics and culture at the same time, political unity in

Indonesia is also a cultural issue. There is an inseparable unity between political, cultural, and economic matters (Budiardjo, 1977). In the context of the New Order's political culture, which emphasized Javanese culture, Clifford Gertz views it as complex, not deterministic (simple), viewing politics and culture as colonial tools that bring about change and are developed in the New Order's political culture. This identity politics has become increasingly stronger after reform, shaping public opinion, influencing voter behaviors, and cornering other politicians (Istianah & Saehudin, 2023).

Religious and cultural identity politics are also strong assets in politics that are prone to commodification. Several researchers in Indonesia have taken various academic positions in looking at this phenomenon. Sugiyanto (2015) stated that media has played an important role in this matter. Several talkshows are specifically modified with political content, so they become an indirect means of political campaigning and marketing. In several regions, religion is the basis of identity politics for winning, especially in local contestations, for example in Sukabumi which prioritizes religious approaches over kinship and regionalism (Istianah & Saehudin, 2023), then in the political contestation of the Governor Election (Pilgub) in Special Capital Region (DKI) Jakarta between Anies-Sandi and Ahok-Djarot, where Anies-Sandi is represented as a native Muslim, while Ahok-Djarot is represented as a non-Muslim from Chinese ethnicity (Nasrudin & Nurdin, 2019). In other research in Makassar city, ethnic Chinese took a different way in the elections, specifically by adaptation because it was considered exclusive and less profitable if they used identity politics (Bareilly, Kambo, & Muhammad, 2022). However, the results of this research are different from the political communication strategies used by Chinese politicians in Medan. They use a dramaturgical strategy. Chinese identity is presented to certain voters who are of the same ethnicity or religion to ensure that they will fight for the interests of their voters (Hidayat, 2019).

Nationally, identity politics is acknowledged to exist, especially the polarization in the 2019 elections between Jokowi-Ma'ruf and Prabowo-Sandi voters. However, until now there has not been much research on the commodification of political identity or the commodification of identity politics as a research subject. Commodification can obscure the true meaning. In the process that Karl Marx called "*commodity fetishism*", the appearance of commodities sold on the market hides the origin of the creation of these goods which must go through various processes of exploitation at the level of production, including the production of political identity. (Piliang, 1999).

Anies Baswedan's religion and ethnicity are the focus of Buzzer's political identity building. In Figure 2, Anies Baswedan is identified with the radical Islamic religion and is of Arab ethnicity of non-Quraish descent. Therefore, his political identity is an enemy of the natives and historically has been incompatible with the

Habaib in NU. Buzzers do not explain AR Baswedan's contribution to Indonesian independence and his character, which earned him the title of national hero, whose preaching was broadly supporting the indicators of national preaching, based upon Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, and obedience to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKI) (Riyadi, Priyanga, & Mustolehudin, 2021).

The Hyperreality of Anies Baswedan's Radicalism

Hyperreality creates a condition where falsehood has blended with reality. Religion which has been used as an object has undergone commodification and engineering through a simulation process on Instagram social media by political buzzers. During the 2017 DKI Gubernatorial Election Anies was a native Muslim, yet in the 2024 Election, he faced a new reality as an Arab Muslim and part of an intolerant radical group.

The role of the buzzers in spreading this reality is very central. The buzzer industry exists in not only business but also politics and is of global concern. Bradshaw & Howard in Sugiono (2020) found that 89% of politicians in 70 countries have used buzzers to attack their political opponents. They often create black campaigns through fake accounts using the method of content production and distribution. They are skilled actors who understand social media or communication media where the content is produced. Commodified societies are those who always consider everything as a commodity (Baudrillard, 1998).

In hyperreality production, everything is considered more real than reality. For example, a quick count, where respondents' answers are simulated through survey report graphs and public opinion becomes a simulacrum (Radiansyah, 2019). Concerning this research, Anies Baswedan's radical Islamic sect is a simulacrum, which is not necessarily real and is simulated through symbols considered to represent the real world in cyberspace.

Hariyanto (2018) explains that simulation has three stages, specifically counterfeit, production, and simulation; only the first order (counterfeit and production) is interpreted explicitly as a simulacrum. When something has imitated, copied, duplicated or produced something else as a model. Meanwhile, simulation for Baudrillard is a simulacrum in a special sense, which he calls a true simulacrum, in the sense that something does not duplicate something else as its reference model but duplicates itself, or "*...it is its own pure simulacrum*". In this case, copy and original, duplicate and original, and model and reference, are the same object or entity. Only a true simulacrum like this is part of what Baudrillard calls hyperreality, which in this research is the hyperreality of radicalism echoed by a buzzer as in the following image:



Source: @kadrunchahlul (2022)

Figure 3. Simulation of Anies' Radicalism and His Supporters

After the 2017 Jakarta Regional Head Election (Pilkada), Anies Baswedan was dubbed by those who were dissatisfied with the Pilkada results as the father of identity politics. The DKI Jakarta regional elections are considered by many academics to be a symbol of identity politics in regional head elections. For example, [Lestari \(2019\)](#) and [Fautanu et al. \(2020\)](#) stated that Anies-Sandi's victory was a manifestation of the strengthening of Islamic identity politics because the movement was considered as Ukhuwah Islamiyah to win Anies-Sandi, especially at that time Ahok received pressure and demonstrations from many Muslims due to the case of religious blasphemy regarding Surah Al -Maidah verse 51. Among the Muslim elements who took part in the demonstration were FPI and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) members, which were later disbanded by the Indonesian government because FPI was proven to support ISIS and HTI to support the establishment of the caliphate (Amer, 2017). With this phenomenon, buzzers simulate Anies on social media as the father of radical identity politics. Simulation space did not only occur on social media but was also supported by simulacra on other media, such as online buzzer media, YouTube, and Twitter.

In Figure 3, there are 2 online news captures written by Ade Kurniawan, where the first news is entitled, Saudi Arabia will behead the preacher of the caliphate system (Kurniawan, 2022a), and the second is entitled Anies' volunteer determination to seize power and expel anti-caliphate from Indonesia (Kurniawan, 2022b). By having 2 online news sources included in the buzzer content, the content seems to be reliable that Anies and his supporters want to build a caliphate system. To instill this hyperreality, the buzzers sent content with the same online news background 27 times within a period of 7 months, and the online news background was uploaded via 6 sites with the same news content, which were ([Kurniawan, 2022c](#)), ([Zulia, 2022](#)), ([Kurniawan, 2022b](#)), ([Anonymous, 2022](#)), ([Heryanto, 2022](#)), ([Agn, 2022](#)). However, the online news uploaded by the

6 sites was indicated as a hoax and was commented on by the official account in the news photo:



Source: Idris (2022)

Figure 4. Confirmation of Hoax Reporting on Radicalism Supporting Anies

The Twitter account of Fahira Idris is an official account verified by Twitter. It answers the accusations in the news. In the same upload, Fahira Idris also reported Ade Kurniawan for hoax news involving her. However, political buzzers often used alter accounts so their true identities were unknown. This has been proven since [Fahira Idris' response on September 12th, 2022](#), content involving her continues to be uploaded by buzzers on Instagram to this day.

Political buzzers are not only talking about Anies' radicalism but also the reality of Arab-Yemeni ethnicity which is the second identity politics after religion. In the DKI Jakarta Pilkada contestation, Anies is a representative of Indigenous Islam, yet in the 2024 Election, he is represented as an intolerant and radical Yemeni Arab ethnicity as in the following figure:



Source: @kadrun_logicc (2023)

Figure 5. Example of Ethnocentrism Simulation for Anies

In Figure 5, the buzzers commented on online media news discussing Refli Harun's statement when Anies was invited to the Haj pilgrimage by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Refli said that Anies was lucky to be invited by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and had the privilege of receiving this invitation (Kba, 2023). Responding to Refli Harun's statement, the buzzers used the reality of Anies' lineage, from Yemeni Arabs. Anies' ethnicity had previously been explained in Figure 3, which has a history of conflict with Quraish Arabs or Habaibs who joined NU.

The hyperreality that emerges with buzzer content against Anies can be seen in several actions against Anies' visit to various regions regarding issues of ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group (SARA). The hashtag Kadrun on Instagram is a source of Anies Baswedan's religious and ethnic simulacra, strengthening language such as the term Wan Abud referring to an Arab figure who is ridiculous and unfit to be a leader. There are also symbols such as the HTI, FPI flag, photos of Rizieq Shihab, and words caliphate to simulate Anies and his supporters on Instagram.

According to Radiansyah (2019), in this cyberspace era, reality in the media is considered more real than reality. It has been replaced by symbols on social media. According to the Ministry of Communication and Information (2022), Instagram is the largest source of references with young people aged 17-44 years as dominant users. The Indonesian KPU categorizes them as young voters. According to Kemp (2023), social media users in Indonesia have reached 167 million people with a dominance of 79.3% young users. With this data, the hyperrealism of identity politics on Instagram has the potential to polarize voters based on religion and ethnicity. The hashtag Kadrun became the dominant simulation space in creating a simulacrum of Anies Baswedan's identity by creating 43,504 interactions from 03 September 2022 to 03 May 2023 with the following interaction details:



Source: Research Data Processing Results

Figure 6. Total Interactions and Buzzer's Most Used Words

Figure 6 shows that there have been 886 contents or uploads on Instagram with the hashtag Kadrun from 03 October 2022 to 03 May 2023 with

a total of 41,690 likes and 1,814 comments. Meanwhile, the word most often used as a caption is "who will be the caliphate", meaning that, Anies is constructed as a figure who will change Indonesia's ideology into a caliphate. The finding of the most frequently used words in this caption follows the content uploaded by the buzzers and supports the simulation of the radicalism of Anies Baswedan and his supporters.

Nowadays, the encounter of Muslims in Indonesia with the development of information and communication technology has increased the amount of information sharing and religious participation online in Indonesia. Nevertheless, content on social media typically raises debates between religions and groups, which leads to the polarisation of identity politics (Millie & Baulch, 2024). It is common for conflicts between supporters to occur because of polarization. In the media's view, conflicts, especially those involving religion, are always interesting to the audience, so they tend to go with biased and one-sided information even hoaxes (Muhaemin & Darsono, 2021).

Rahmadhany et al (2021) stated that there are still many Indonesian people who do not understand digital literacy properly, so they are not used to cross-checking information and have a high potential to believe in the hyperreality built by buzzers. This is extremely dangerous because the spread of hoaxes mostly occurs on social media, especially Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter. Moreover, even students, as media literate generations, are not critical of hoax content on social media (Nurrahmi & Syam, 2020). Concerning identity politics in Indonesia, Mahestu & Sumbogo (2020) stated that technological progress in Indonesia is not balanced with good digital literacy. For that reason, in the 2019 presidential election, a lot of hate speech content, identity politics, and hoaxes circulated massively on social media and were used as a voter reference source.

Therefore, strengthening digital literacy is extremely needed, especially among the millennial and Z generations in Indonesia. According to Anwar et al (2023), the millennial and Z generations are the most adaptive generations, and they tend to adopt what is trending on social media.

The phenomenon in Indonesia is different from that happening in the country with people who are already digitally literate. In the United States, for example, people do not consider social media as the center of their news consumption but as a forum for discussion and opinion. Therefore, social media becomes a public space actively used for deliberation (Pentina & Tarafdar, 2014).

Apart from strengthening digital literacy acceleration programs as a preventive action for the spread of hoax contexts, the government can take repressive actions. The government can control social media, such as controlling online trolls, doxing, and hyper-partisan news outlets. Also, once necessary, they can use paid social media buzzer services to counter hoax content from buzzers,

as the government has been fighting negative news about the government (Masduki, 2021).

CONCLUSION

Buzzers make religion a commodity to attract the audience's attention. Through the hashtag Kadrun, buzzers expand the reach of the influence of content that discriminates against Anies Baswedan as a non-Quraish Yemeni Arab descendant who is linked to the largest anti-Habaib and anti-Islamic community organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama. The hashtag is also used to label Anies supporters, who are generally considered to be narrow-minded and exposed to radicalism, so the term Kadrun is also attributed to individuals or groups who are critical of government policies. Religion as the main commodity is modified to the extreme to attract the sympathy of supporters of cultural-traditional Islam and to discriminate against Islamic groups created as if they were radical.

The commodification of religion also develops into the reality of everything or hyperreality. Anies and individuals or groups of non-Habaib and non-NU Arab descent are simulated through various visual content as figures supporting the Islamic caliphate and radicalism. It leads to social disintegration in society, especially the social exclusion of non-Habaib and non-NU Arab ethnic groups in Indonesia. Theoretically, this research has implications that strengthen Baudrillard's theory of commodification in the cyberspace era by finding a new variant that can be applied to detect the role of buzzers in forming the hyperreality of identity political content on social media. Therefore, this research recommends that educational institutions help the Indonesian government accelerate digital literacy. Besides, more research is required to reveal the hyperreality of social media which leads to identity politics, especially using an ethnography approach to suppress identity political content and hoaxes on social media.

REFERENCES

- @kadrun_logic. (2023). Istimewa Apanya? Punya Keturunan Yaman Tapi Hobi Provokator dan Fitnah Pesaingnya. Retrieved July 17, 2023, from Instagram website: <https://www.instagram.com/p/CuG0nKdJiGu/>
- @kadrunbahlul. (2022). Arab Saja Menghukum Pendakwah Khilafah Sedangkan Relawan Anies Malam Mati-Matian Menegakkan Khilafah Wasapada. Retrieved July 16, 2023, from Instagram website: https://www.instagram.com/p/CpWwy5_BLRC/
- @sisigelap_kadrun. (2023). Penjelasan Dari Ketua Umum PBNU. Retrieved July 10, 2023, from Instagram website: <https://www.instagram.com/p/Cru7WDsgDwK/>

- Achfandhy, M. I., Pujiyanto, W. T., Daniyarti, W. D., & Jamiah, R. (2024). The Pre-Presidential Election 2024: Uncovering the Consistency of Religious Politicization. *Jurnal Ilmiah Islam Futura*, 24(1), 67–84. <https://doi.org/10.22373/jiif.v24i1.171103>
- Agn. (2022). Ormas Relawan Anies Baswedan Bertekad Tegakkan Khilafah di Indonesia. Retrieved July 17, 2023, from West Java Today website: <https://www.westjavatoday.com/ormas-relawan-anies-baswedan-bertekad-tegakkan-khilafah-di-indonesia>
- Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1984). *Budaya Politik (Tingkah Laku. Politik dan Demokrasi di Lima Negara)*. Bumi Aksara.
- Amer, N. (2017). Analisis Pembubaran Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Dalam Perspektif Negara Hukum. *Jurnal Legalitas Fakultas Hukum Universitas Gorontalo*, 1–15.
- Anonim. (2022). Tekad Relawan Anies: Rebut Kekuasaan dan Usir Anti Khilafah dari Indonesia. Retrieved July 17, 2023, from inharmonia.co website: <https://inharmonia.co/index.php/berita/berita/tekad-relawan-anies-rebut-kekuasaan-dan-usir-anti-khilafah-dari-indonesia>
- Anwar, R. K., Khadijah, U. L. S., & Rizal, E. (2023). Instagram and Digital Media Literacy among Teenagers in Bandung. *Communicatus: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi*, 7(2), 123–142. <https://doi.org/10.15575/cjik.v7i2.23640>
- Ardipandanto, A. (2020). Dampak Politik Identitas Pada Pilpres 2019: Perspektif Populisme [The Impact of Identity Politics On President Election 2019: Populism Perspective]. *Jurnal Politika Dinamika Masalah Politik Dalam Negeri Dan Hubungan Internasional*, 11(1), 43–63. <https://doi.org/10.22212/jp.v11i1.1582>
- Bareilly, A. M., Kambo, G. A., & Muhammad. (2022). Reproduksi Kuasa: Politik Etnis Tionghoa dalam Kontestasi Pemilihan Legislatif Kota Makassar. *Journal of Governance and Local Politics*, 4(1), 12–21.
- Baudrillard, J. (1983). *Simulations* (P. Foss, P. Patton, & P. Beitchman, Eds.). New York: Semiotext(e).
- Baudrillard, J. (1998). *Consumer Society*. London: Sage Publications.
- Budiardjo, M. (1977). *Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik*. Jakarta: PT. Gramedia.
- Dewantara, J. A., Syamsuri, S., Wandira, A., Afandi, A., Hartati, O., Cahya, N., ... Nurgiansah, T. H. (2022). The Role of Buzzers in Social Media in Guiding Public Opinion Regarding Political Choices. *JED (Jurnal Etika Demokrasi)*, 7(3), 681–694. <https://doi.org/10.26618/jed.v7i3.8103>
- Dharma, F. A. (2018a). Komodifikasi Folklor dan Konsumsi Pariwisata di Indonesia. *BioKultur*, VII(1), 1–15. Retrieved from <http://journal.unair.ac.id/download-fullpapers-bk843abeaaa8full.pdf>
- Dharma, F. A. (2018b). Managing Intercultural Interaction and Prejudice of the

- Indonesian Mengelolah Interaksi Antar Budaya Dan Prasangka Masyarakat Indonesia. *INFORMASI: Kajian Ilmu Komunikasi*, 48(2), 281–293.
- Fautanu, I., M, B., & Gunawan, H. (2020). Politik Identitas dalam Pilkada DKI Jakarta Tahun 2017: Perspektif Pemikiran Politik Nurcholish Madjid. *Politicon: Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, 2(2), 87–112. <https://doi.org/10.15575/politicon.v2i2.8146>
- Fauzan, I., Arifin, A., Dalimunthe, M. A., & Rahmadani, S. (2024). The configuration of ethnic and religious relations towards the 2024 general election: A case study in Medan, Indonesia. *Multidisciplinary Science Journal*, 6(3), 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.31893/MULTISCIENCE.2024006>
- Frenki. (2021). Analisis Politisasi Identitas dalam Kontestasi Politik pada Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia. *As-Siyasi: Journal of Constitutional Law*, 1(1), 29–48. Retrieved from <http://ejournal.radenintan.ac.id/index.php/assiyasi/article/view/8540>
- Hariyanto, D. (2018). *Komodifikasi Ibadah Umrah Di Jawa Timur Dalam Perspektif Baudrillard*. Universitas Airlangga.
- Hayat, N., & Nurhakki, N. (2022). Religion Identity And Political Polarization: How Does Labeling Make It Worst? *Palita: Journal of Social Religion Research*, 7(1), 51–66. Retrieved from <http://ejournal.iainpalopo.ac.id/index.php/palita/article/view/2715>
- Heryanto. (2022). Ormas Bang Japar, Relawan Anies dengan Tekad Rebut Kekuasaan dan Usir Anti Khilafah dari Indonesia. Retrieved July 17, 2023, from SEMARAK.CO website: <https://semarak.co/ormas-bang-japar-relawan-anies-dengan-tekad-rebut-kekuasaan-dan-usir-anti-khilafah-dari-indonesia/>
- Hidayat, T. (2019). Komunikasi Politik Etnis Tionghoa dalam Mengungkap Identitas Relasi Sosial dan Politik (Studi pada Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) Kota Medan). *Persepsi: Communication Journal*, 2(1), 70–78. <https://doi.org/10.30596/persepsi.v2i1.3936>
- Idris, F. (2022). 1. Saya Tidak Pernah Mengeluarkan Pernyataan Ini. Retrieved July 17, 2023, from Twitter website: <https://twitter.com/fahiraIdris/status/1569189402647351296>
- Irso. (2023). Jaga Ruang Publik Jelang Pemilu, Kominfo Komit Berantas Hoaks Politik. Retrieved February 12, 2023, from Berita Kominfo website: https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/46716/jaga-ruang-publik-jelang-pemilu-kominfo-komit-berantas-hoaks-politik/0/berita_satker
- Istianah, R., & Saehudin, S. (2023). Politik Identitas dan Perilaku Politik Kiai di Kota Sukabumi Menjelasng Pemilihan Umum 2024. *Electoral Governance*, 4(2), 233–250.
- Karman, Hamad, I., & Rusadi, U. (2023). Commodification of instrumental Islamic piety in Indonesian political contestation 2019. *Asian Journal of*

- Communication*, 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2023.2295871>
- Kba. (2023). Refly Harun : Anies Baswedan Miliki Keistimewaan Kerajaan Arab Saudi. Retrieved July 17, 2023, from kbanews.com website: <https://kbanews.com/hot-news/refly-harun-anies-baswedan-miliki-keistimewaan-kerajaan-arab-saudi/>
- Kemenkominfo. (2022). *Status Literasi Digital Indonesia 2022*. Jakarta: Kemenkominfo. Retrieved from https://eppid.kominfo.go.id/storage/uploads/1_3_Lakip_Kementerian_Kominfo_2021_low.pdf
- Kemp, S. (2023). Digital 2023: Indonesia. Retrieved March 12, 2023, from DATAREPORTAL website: <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-indonesia>
- Kurniawan, A. (2022a). Arab Saudi akan Pancung Kepala Pendakwah Sistem Khilafah. Retrieved July 17, 2023, from Kata Logika website: <https://www.katalogika.com/internasional/pr-1444029281/arab-saudi-akan-pancung-kepala-pendakwah-sistem-khilafah>
- Kurniawan, A. (2022b). Tekad Relawan Anies: Rebut Kekuasaan dan Usir Anti Khilafah dari Indonesia. Retrieved July 15, 2023, from Kata Logika website: <https://www.katalogika.com/daerah/pr-1444673727/tekad-relawan-anies-rebut-kekuasaan-dan-usir-anti-khilafah-dari-indonesia>
- Kurniawan, A. (2022c). Tekad Relawan Anies: Rebut Kekuasaan dan Usir Anti Khilafah dari Indonesia. Retrieved July 17, 2023, from KASKUS website: https://m.kaskus.co.id/show_post/631f0f72ef9fa85dd16cb307/?child_id=631fdc48cf023f0c1b12ffe5&ref=profile&med=post
- Lestari, D. (2019). Pilkada DKI Jakarta 2017 : Dinamika Politik Identitas di Indonesia. *SIMULACRA*, 2(1), 31–37. <https://doi.org/10.36312/jupe.v4i4.677>
- Mahadian, A. B., Hashim, R., & Hustafa, H. (2023). Articulating Islamist Sectarian Group Antagonism Memes on the Indonesian Politics. *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, 39(3), 124–144. <https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2023-3903-07>
- Mahestu, G., & Sumbogo, T. A. (2020). Marketing of Identity Politics in Digital World (Netnography Study on Indonesian Presidential Election 2019). *Proceedings of 2020 International Conference on Information Management and Technology, ICIMTech 2020*, (August), 693–698. <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIMTech50083.2020.9211242>
- Manik, H. K., Pamungkas, S., Rizkyansyah, F. K., Gumay, H. N., Budhiati, I., Budiman, A., & Ardiantoro, J. (2015). Buku Pedoman Pendidikan Pemilih. In S. Joyowardono & T. P. Wahyuningsih (Eds.), *Rumah Pintar Pemilu*. Jakarta: Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia.

- Martitah, M., Hidayat, A., Anitasari, R. F., Rahman, M. A. M., & Aini, T. R. (2023). Transformation of the Legislative System in Indonesia Based on the Principles of Good Legislation. *Journal of Indonesian Legal Studies*, 8(2), 545–594. <https://doi.org/10.15294/jils.v8i2.69262>
- Masduki. (2021). Media control in the digital politics of indonesia. *Media and Communication*, 9(4), 52–61. <https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v9i4.4225>
- Millie, J., & Baulch, E. (2024). Beyond the Middle Classes, Beyond New Media: The Politics of Islamic Consumerism in Indonesia. *Asian Studies Review*, 48(1), 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2023.2291103>
- Moslehpour, M., Schafferer, C., Lewi, S., Kurniawati, D., Pham, V. K., & Faez, S. E. P. (2024). The Influence of Social Media Marketing on Voting Intention in Indonesia. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 1–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2024.2303509>
- Mubarok, H. (2018). Demokrasi , Politik Identitas , dan Kohesi Sosial: Peluang dan Tantangan Strategi Dakwah untuk Menghalau Provokasi Politik di Indonesia Democracy , Identity Politics , and Social Cohesion : Opportunities and Threats of Dakwah Strategy in Countering Polit. *Jurnal Bimas Islam*, II(II), 365–400. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.37302/jbi.v11i2.57>
- Muhaemin, E., & Darsono, D. (2021). Komunikasi Wartawan dalam Reportase konflik Agama. *Communicatus: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi*, 5(2), 205–230. <https://doi.org/10.15575/cjik.v5i2.15026>
- Nasrudin, J., & Nurdin, A. A. (2019). Politik Identitas Dan Representasi Politik (Studi Kasus pada Pilkada DKI Periode 2018-2022). *Hanifiya: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama*, 1(1), 34–47. <https://doi.org/10.15575/hanifiya.v1i1.4260>
- Nikmah, C. S., & Suhardiyanto, A. (2021). Strategi Pemenangan H. Nuruddin Amin (Gus Nung) dengan Mengonstruksi Identitas Nahdlatul Ulama pada Pemilihan Legislatif 2019 di Jepara. *Unnes Political Science Journal*, 5(1), 26–30. <https://doi.org/10.15294/upsj.v5i1.44234>
- Nurrahmi, F., & Syam, H. M. (2020). Perilaku Informasi Mahasiswa dan Hoaks di Media Sosial. *Communicatus: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi*, 4(2), 129–146. <https://doi.org/10.15575/cjik.v4i2.9215>
- Pentina, I., & Tarafdar, M. (2014). Exploring the role of social media in contemporary news consumption. *Computers in Human Behavior*, 35(January 2013), 211–223. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2014.02.045>
- Piliang, Y. A. (1999). *Hiper-Realitas Kebudayaan*. Yogyakarta: LKIS.
- Pradana, M. Y. A. (2020). Relasi Kuasa Politik Tokoh Agama Dalam Hegemoni Pemilukada 2020. *Living Islam: Journal of Islamic Discourses*, 3(2), 417–438. <https://doi.org/10.14421/lijid.v3i2.2418>
- Radiansyah, R. R. (2019). Konsumerisme Hingga Hiper-Realitas Politik di Ruang Publik Baru Era Cyberspace (Antara Kemunduran atau Kemajuan Bagi

- Pembangunan Negara Indonesia yang Demokratis). *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik*, 3(2), 30–47.
- Rahmadhany, A., Aldila Safitri, A., & Irwansyah, I. (2021). Fenomena Penyebaran Hoax dan Hate Speech pada Media Sosial. *Jurnal Teknologi Dan Sistem Informasi Bisnis*, 3(1), 30–43. <https://doi.org/10.47233/jteksis.v3i1.182>
- Ritonga, A. D., Hadita, C., Mawardi, Al Attas, S. M., Wicaksono, B., & Masril, M. (2024). Political and Legal Improvisation on the Issue of Religious Politicization: A Study of the Forum for Religious Harmony in Indonesia. *Pharos Journal of Theology*, 105(1), 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.46222/pharosjot.1056>
- Riyadi, A., Priyangga, Z. G., & Mustolehudin, M. (2021). Dakwah Islam dan Nasionalisme: Studi Kasus Dakwah Kebangsaan AR Baswedan. *Jurnal Dakwah Risalah*, 32(1), 1–19.
- Ronaldo, R., & Darmaiza, D. (2021). Politisasi Agama dan Politik Kebencian pada Pemilu Presiden Indonesia 2019. *Indonesian Journal of Religion and Society*, 3(1), 33–48. <https://doi.org/10.36256/ijrs.v3i1.150>
- Saud, M., Ida, R., Mashud, M., Yousaf, F. N., & Ashfaq, A. (2023). Cultural dynamics of digital space: Democracy, civic engagement and youth participation in virtual spheres. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 97(March), 101904. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2023.101904>
- Soenjoto, W. P. P. (2019). Eksploitasi Isu Politik Identitas terhadap Identitas Politik pada Generasi Milineal Indonesia di Era 4.0. *Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities*, 4(2), 187–217. <https://doi.org/10.21580/jish.42.5223>
- Sugiono, S. (2020). Fenomena Industri Buzzer Di Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Ekonomi Politik Media. *Communicatus: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi*, 4(1), 47–66. <https://doi.org/10.15575/cjik.v4i1.7250>
- Sugiyanto, D. R. (2015). Komodifikasi Berita Dibalik Ideologi Ekonomi Politik Media. *Jurnal Komunikasi*, 7(1), 57–69.
- Syahputra, I., Fajar Riyanto, W., Dian Pratiwi, F., & Lusri Virga, R. (2024). Escaping social media: the end of netizen's political polarization between Islamists and nationalists in Indonesia? *Media Asia*, 51(1), 62–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01296612.2023.2246726>
- Widjajanto, A. (2023). *Pemilu 2024*. Jakarta: Lemhannas RI.
- Widyawati. (2021). Menguatnya Politik Identitas Di Indonesia Baik Karena Faktor Agama, Sosial, Dan Etnis. *Jurnal Pendidikan PKN (Pancasila Dan Kewarganegaraan)*, 2(2), 66. <https://doi.org/10.26418/jppkn.v2i2.44627>
- Zulia, I. (2022). Tekad Relawan Anies Baswedan Rebut Kekuasaan dan Usir Anti Khilafah, Demi Pilpres 2024: Mereka Sudah Teken Kontrak! Retrieved July 17, 2023, from nw.wartaekonomi.co.id website: <https://nw.wartaekonomi.co.id/read9300/tekad-relawan-anies-baswedan->

Didik Hariyanto, Ferry Adhi Dharma, Ishak Yussof & Fajar Muharram

rebut-kekuasaan-dan-usir-anti-khilafah-demi-pilpres-2024-mereka-sudah-
teken-kontrak