Hasan al-Banna and Ikhwanul Muslimin's Da'wah Movement in Egypt

Setia Gumilar[1*] & Firman Maulana Noor[2]

[12]UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, Indonesia

*setiagumilar@uinsgd.ac.id

ABSTRACT

This study aims to explain the ability of the Ikhwanul Muslimin in mobilizing and framing their da'wah movement. The research was conducted by analyzing the concept of Hasan al-Banna's da'wah movement and its impact on the existence of the Ikhwanul Muslimin's da'wah movement. This study uses a qualitative method with a Social Movement Theory approach. This research seeks to explain the ability of the IM in mobilizing and framing its da'wah movement to maintain its existence against various resistances. The results of this study indicate that three important factors have caused the IM to maintain its existence until now, namely Internal Organizational Solidity, External Community Support, and the Moderation of the Ikhwanul Muslimin. With these three factors, the IM has become a modern Islamic organization that can withstand various pressures both from within the country and from outsiders.
Keywords : The muslim brotherhood; Islamic organization; da'wah movement; Hasam al Banna; Islamic thought.

INTRODUCTION

The political situation in the Middle East after the Arab Spring has changed drastically. The rulers in various countries must submit to the power of the people who want change. With the fall of authoritarian regimes in Arab countries, it has become an opportunity to act for various organizations that were previously silenced by the government, one of which is the *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (IM, Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt. During the authoritarian regime, this organization moved secretly.

Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM) has experienced ups and downs in its history. Various attempts were made to move the organization so that it has broad support from the community. However, this effort was not easy, because there were several factors that hinder its movement. However, when the political situation changed, the IM quickly took advantage of the situation

to achieve various goals that had been aspired to by its founder, Hasan al-Banna.

IM is an Islamic organization that is very influential in the modern Islamic world. Several concepts from the IM movement have become references for other Islamic organizations. Inevitably this makes the IM an Islamic organization that can be considered successful in maintaining its existence. This can be seen from the journey of the IM from the beginning of its formation.

The dynamics of the struggle of the IM cannot be separated from Egypt's political history. The IM has experienced several repressive measures, especially during the reign of President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Some of its members often experience acts of terror, intimidation, detention, exile, and even the death penalty. In addition, the IM was prohibited from carrying out all its activities and was even disbanded in 1954.

Even though there was a confrontation with the government, the IM was never completely eradicated. This has made the IM a modern Islamic organization capable of surviving under an authoritarian government. This has caused many other Islamic organizations to imitate or even become branches of the IM. Among them are *Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islami* a political party in Jordan, *al-Haraka al-Dostiruya al-Islamiyah* in Kuwait, and the *Ikhwanul Muslimin* in Syria (Wickham, 2013). Several organizations are not formally a branch of the IM, but whose movements are influenced by IM ideas, such as the *Parti de Justice et Development* (PJD) in Morocco, *Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi* (AKP) in Turkey, and the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS). in Indonesia (Bubalo et al., 2012).

Many scholars have written about the IM. They study the IM movement from various aspects and different approaches, such as group ideology, activism, history, social and politics. In the Study of the ideology of the IM, there is Barbara Zollner's writing about the thoughts of Hasan al-Hudaybi (Zollner, 2009), there is also the writing of Khalil al-Anani who looks at the IM from the aspect of identity politics (Al-Anani, 2016). A comprehensive historical approach to the IM was carried out by Victor J. Willi (2021). Apart from that, there is also an article by Mariz Tadroz who sees the IM as a democratic force (Tadros, 2012). A study on the Communication Strategy of the IM was written by Noha Mellor (2018). The discussion on the Evolution of the IM movement was written by Carrie Rosefky Wickham (2013). However, the writings concerning the role

of Hasan al-Banna's thoughts on the existence of IM's post-Arab Spring da'wah movement have not been widely studied

This paper attempts to analyze the existence of IM's da'wah movement using qualitative methods and a social movement theory approach. The first application of social movement theory to Islamic groups was carried out by Quintan Wiktorowicz (2012). A social movement refers to collective action based on the networks and resources that help sustain its action against political opponents. For a movement to be successful, it needs to leverage its network of resources. By using social movement theory, this paper attempts to explain IM's ability to mobilize and frame its da'wah movement to maintain its existence in Egypt's authoritarian political system.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The IM is a Sunni Islamic revivalist movement. They do not only focus on the da'wah movement but also in terms of social and political reform. The IM's commitment to non-violence sets them different from Hamas, Hezbollah, or al-Qaeda. IM's participation in practical politics also differentiates it from the Salafi-Wahhabis.

IM was born by a charismatic activist and organizer, namely Hassan al-Banna. The genius of al-Banna lies in his ability to articulate the thoughts of Muslim reformers such as Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Rasyid Rida into a concrete organizational movement to be able to create a method that can actualize the ideology of these Islamic reformers (Al-Anani, 2013).

Hasan Al-Banna was born on 25 Shaban 1324 Hijriyah or coincides with 14 October 1906 in the Dhuha area in Mahmudiah, Buhariah City, Egypt. His full name is Hasan Ahmad Abdurrahman Al-Banna and is the son of Sheikh Ahmad, a hadith scholar who once studied with Imam Muhammad Abduh. He is a figure of service, the most prominent figure in the history of Islamic civilization in the 14th century Hijriyah because his preaching has shaken his generation in Egypt and the Middle East region as a whole.

Al-Banna is a Muslim intellectual who can transform exclusive Islamic rhetoric into a populist political ideology. According to al-Banna's view, it is very difficult to revive an Islamic missionary movement without involving Muslims. Al-Banna seeks to spread debate about the Islamic movement in the public sphere. Therefore, Al-Banna is very preoccupied

Setia Gumilar & Firman Maulana Noor

with the idea of reforming the entire society towards a more Islamic direction.

Al-Banna tried to form a movement that can reformulate the norms, values, and practices of society to become more Islamic. For al-Banna it is very important to create a movement that can embody Islamic values and ideals in everyday life. Efforts to revive Islamic identity will not only protect Muslims from Western influence but will also provide them with an alternative system in social, political, economic, and cultural life. Therefore, Al-Banna wanted IM to preach from the bottom up (bottom-up).

Four things form the basic concept of Hasan Al-Banna's da'wah politics, namely: *'Urubah* (Arabism), *Wathaniyah* (Patriotism), *Qaumiyah* (Nationalism), and *'Alamiyah* (Internationalism). Despite denying the concept of *qaumiyah* (group fanaticism), Arabism has its place and a significant role in Hasan al-Banna's preaching. The Arabs were the first nation to accept the arrival of Islam. He is also a chosen nation (Rahman, 2020). However, the concept of Arabism promoted by Al-Banna is quite different from the concept of Pan-Arabism promoted by other figures in the Middle East. Arabism according to al-Banna is the unity of language. Islam, according to him, has never risen without the unity of the Arab nation. Geographical boundaries and political mapping have never shaken the meaning of Arab and Islamic unity (Mura, 2012). Islam also grew for the first time in Arab lands, then spread to various nations through Arabs.

In interpreting Wathaniyah (patriotism), there are three meanings put forward by al-Banna, namely: *First*, Patriotism. Al-Banna said:

> "If what is meant by patriotism by its callers is love for this country, attachment to it, longing for it, and emotional ties with it, then this is naturally ingrained in human nature on the one hand, and is recommended by Islam on the other."

Second, the Independence of the Country. Al-Banna said:

> "If what they mean by patriotism is the necessity of fighting to liberate the homeland from the clutches of imperialist robbers, perfect its independence, and instill self-respect and freedom in the souls of the nation's children, then we agree with them on that."

Third, National Patriotism. Al-Banna said:

> "If what they mean by patriotism is strengthening the bonds between the members of the people of a State and guiding them towards empowering those bonds for the common good, then we agree with them." (Mura, 2012).

400   ***Ilmu Dakwah: Academic Journal for Homiletic Studies*** 16(2) (2022) 397-414

Al-Banna also criticized the view of patriotism that only thinks about liberating its territory. As in the case of Western society which is more inclined to the development of physical elements in the order of life, this is not desired by Islam. From this, an illustration is obtained that the purpose of a Muslim's life is not only limited to certain regions but on a broader scale is for all mankind (Jung & Zalaf, 2019).

Regarding the concept of nationalism, Al-Banna supports nationalism which means that the next generation must follow in the footsteps of their predecessors in achieving their glory. Islamic nationalism originates from the hadith of the Prophet: *"A Muslim is the brother of another Muslim."* Meanwhile, another said: *"Muslims are of the same blood, those above work to support others, and they unite to fight their enemies."* This means that Islamic nationalism is not limited to the state (Mura, 2012).

Islam came to eradicate the Jahiliyah culture. Ignorant nationalism must be abandoned by Muslims. He said that if the meaning of nationalism is reviving the rotten traditions of ignorance, re-establishing a civilization that has been buried and replaced by a new civilization that already exists and is beneficial, or freeing itself from the bonds of Islam by claiming for the sake of nationalism and national pride, then the notion nationalism like this is bad, the consequences are despicable, and the results will be bad (Mura, 2012).

Internationalism according to Hasan al-Banna is inherent in Islam, because Islam is a religion that is intended for all mankind.

> "Our preaching is called internationalism because it is aimed at all mankind. Humans are brothers and sisters; their origin is one, their father is one, and their lineage is one. There is no virtue other than piety and charity that is presented, including goodness and virtue that can be felt by all."

The concept of internationalism is the last circle of al-Banna's political project in the *ishlahul ummah* (improvement of the ummah) program. The world, can't help but move towards it. Unity between nations, associations between tribes and races, the unity of weak parties to gain strength, and the joining of those who are separated to gain the warmth of unity, all of this is an introduction towards realizing the principle of the leadership of internationalism to replace the racist and tribal thoughts that mankind believed before. In the past, you had to believe in this to gather the basic elements, and then you had to let it go later to combine the various major groups, after which total unity was realized in the end. This step,

according to him is slow, but it must happen. To realize this concept, Islam has also proposed a clear solution for society to get out of this circle of problems. The first step taken is to invite the unity of faith, then realize the unity (Soage, 2008).

The formation of the IM took place in the month of Zulqaidah 1347 H or coincided with March 1928, as many as 6 people visited Hassan Al-Banna's house, these six people were some of the people who had been influenced by touch and study, as well as Hassan Al-Banna's lectures. In his explanation, Hassan Al-Banna revealed, *"In their voices, there is power, in their eyes, there is light, in their faces, there is the light of faith, belief, and Azam."* The six of them expressed their dismay at life and saw the chaotic conditions in Egypt and Arabia in general. Then, they asked Hassan Al-Banna to be in charge of what they were doing. They also pledge to become warriors on the path of da'wah. They also swore allegiance to their brothers, charity for Islam, and jihad in it (Levy, 2014).

After finishing, one of them asked about the organization that was used as a medium for preaching. Hassan Al-Banna was initially not pleased with any form of formality, the important thing is that they can serve the foundations of thought, morality, and practice. "We are brothers and sisters in serving Islam. So, we are the IM." After that, they discussed further activities, including renting a place to gather. The name of the place is *"Madrasah Tahdzib Ikhwanul Muslimun"* with an Islamic studies program. This is where they study the Koran, improve their reading of the Koran, practice the laws of tajwid, and memorize the Quran. Madrasah Tahdzib was a place where IM cadres were formed. In addition to learning the Qur'an, they also study hadith, monotheism, and worship following authentic books and sunnah. Continuing with the lessons of Islamic history, prophets and apostles, the history of the *khulafa al-rashidun* and finally being given to them with a limited scope (Muhamad et al., 2021).

In the first year, Madrasah Tahdzib succeeded in producing 70 cadres. The concept of *tarbiyah amaliyah* (physical development) that acts in their souls during association and behavior, love between them, helping sincerely in their life affairs, and self-preparation for all of that is the dominant element which is the key to the formation of the IM. In the following times, Al-Banna spent much of his time involved in the IM congregation. Apart from giving lectures to various regions, they also opened IM branches in various places (Muhammad Nawaz Awan, 2021).

The aim of establishing the IM is the formation of individual Muslim

figures, Islamic households, an Islamic government, an Islamic state and led by Islam, unifying the divisions of the Muslims, and liberating countries that are still colonized and usurped, then carrying the flag of jihad, and preaching to Allah so that the world gets the peace of Islamic teachings (Muhammad Nawaz Awan, 2021).

After al-Banna's leadership, IM became a large organization with a growing following. This of course requires a disciplined and effective organizational da'wah movement strategy in mobilizing its resources. Besides that, of course, several other factors have caused IM to maintain its existence until now. These three factors include; internal solidity, external (community) support, and moderation.

Internal Solidity

Members of IM are very loyal and also solid. This is because IM has its educational method, namely the *usrah* system (cell/family) (Mitchell, 1993). Each *surah* consists of five to nine people with a leader. Each is a component of larger organizational units. In *usrah*, educational materials (*tarbiyah*) and cadre training (*da'wah*) are taught (Fealy & Bubablo, 2007).

The family is used as the smallest educational unit in IM. This reflects the organizational design of the IM created by al-Banna on the principle of the "*Seven Steps Concept of Ikhwanul Muslimin*" (see Figure 1). This system outlines a seven-step long-term strategy for Muslim society, starting with the Muslim Individual, Muslim Family, Muslim Community, Muslim State, Muslim Government, Caliphate, and finally the Muslim Global Guide (Willi, 2021). IM's da'wah movement must reflect the logic of the seven-step stages. So that this concept became the foundation of IM political stand.


Source: (Victor J. Willi, 2021)

Figure 1. Seven Steps Concept of Ikhwanul Muslimin

Usrah is the core of all activities of the IM movement, so it is hoped that Islamic reform will begin in the family unit. Members in usrah usually have comparable levels of education (Mitchell, 1993). Children and adolescents are further divided into subgroups, such as groups of children between 6 to 10 years old, groups of children who are still in elementary school (10-13 years), and groups of junior and senior high school students (13-17 years). There is also a special family consisting of scholars, intellectuals, community leaders who generally have higher social, economic and educational status (Willi, 2021).

Hasan al-Banna defines the pillars of usrah into three parts, namely knowing each other (*ta'aruf*), understanding each other (*tafahum*), and bearing each other (*takaful*). The purpose of getting to know each other is to strengthen the unity among IM members. Mutual understanding to be able to accept advice from its members. While mutual support is intended so that each member can provide assistance to each other (Mahmud, 1997). The usrah concept provides a strong foundation for loyalty among IM members.

An important function of the usrah is to guarantee the moral education (*tarbiyah*) of IM cadres. The process of moral education is carried out by holding weekly meetings. During weekly meetings, IM cadres study and discuss religious texts, such as Tafsir Al-Qur'an and Hadith, Fiqh, and History of the Prophet. Victor J. Willi made an analogy that the IM's organizational model is similar to that of the Sufi order system. They are described as a collection of concentric circles arranged hierarchically. Individuals at the edge of the circle are considered to have a lower level of knowledge and membership status than those at the center of the circle (see Figure 2).

Source: (Victor J. Willi, 2021)

Figure 2. Organization System Model of Ikhwanul Muslimin

The IM also has educational goals at a very strong organizational level. Broadly speaking, there are five main goals of the IM organization, such as obedience, sturdiness, sincerity, brotherhood, and trust. These five goals were of course created by its founder, Hasan al-Banna, in the Treatise at-Ta'lim which originates from Da'watuna and *Ila Ayyi Syai'in Nad'un Naas* (Al-Anani, 2013).

Each point of the IM's educational goals is interrelated with one another and its implementation is a practical application of Islamic conceptions. The understanding of the obedience aspect is carrying out orders in difficult or easy conditions. Meanwhile, steadfastness demands that members of the IM always work and strive for jihad, even though its implementation takes a long time. Sincerity is self-liberation from misguided desires. In the aspect of brotherhood, it is emphasized to prioritize others, besides that, brotherhood is considered the closest to faith. And the last aspect is trust, especially trust through leadership, which is the forerunner to the formation of successful da'wah (Mahmud, 1997).

IM has several big goals in its da'wah movement. These goals are divided into two, namely tentative goals and permanent goals. In the tentative goals there are three objectives: 1) liberating Islamic countries from foreign occupation, 2) fighting materialistic and atheist movements that dominate Muslim countries, 3) reformulating the political, social, economic, educational and judicial systems based on the principles of Islamic principles. The permanent goals of the IM are implementing

Islamic teachings in everyday life, uniting all Muslim countries under the banner of Islam, and spreading Islamic da'wah throughout the world.

Some of IM's goals have an important role to play in aligning members with IM's ideology and leadership. These broad goals help to increase internal coherence and sustain solidarity among IM members. By aligning members with IM goals, the possibility of disputes and divisions can be minimized. Therefore, top priority is given to achieving the goals of the movement rather than focusing on internal problems (Al-Anani, 2013).

Al-Banna and subsequent IM leaders have used this grand objective of the IM to recruit and attract people to join the IM. By setting IM's goals aligned with the Islamic religious goals, IM was able to recruit many new members to join IM. The purpose of this goal is to increase the IM's credibility in the eyes of Muslims who believe that Islam must maintain its dominance and supremacy (Al-Anani, 2013). In this way, al-Banna as a person who makes big goals for IM managed to connect the identity of the IM movement with its members.

The ideology and system of the IM movement that was created and built by al-Banna produce an identity pattern for IM based on a sense of commitment and solidarity among IM members. They act not as individuals but as brothers (*ikhwan*). According to Melucci, a leader in a social movement must work hard to maintain and strengthen his group's identity (Melluci, 1996). So al-Banna tries to always connect the past with the present and religious texts with the context of life experienced by Muslims.

External (Community) Support

The second factor that adds value to the IM is external support, especially from the community. This support is inseparable from IM's social activities. IM members are involved in economic activities, namely providing employment opportunities for the urban poor. In addition, IM also forms various social service networks such as organizing mosques, and schools and providing health services for the poor. This social activity aims to show IM's presence in areas where the central government is very weak to do so (Obaid, 2018). The government's inability to provide services to the poor creates a good opportunity for IM to fill the vacant role of the state.

The 1992 Cairo earthquake is a clear example where IM's response moved more quickly and effectively in assisting with the government's

attitude which was considered slow. The earthquake destroyed a lot of people's houses, especially in poor areas. IM members quickly set up medical shelters and tents, providing food, clothing, and blankets to the townspeople. In addition, they also donated money to every family whose house was destroyed by the earthquake. This presented a positive image for IM both inside and outside Egypt because it was always discussed and paid attention to by the media at that time (Obaid, 2018).

Social activities have been the main agenda of IM since it was first born. It can be seen that when IM was first established in 1928, IM immediately established a Social Assistance Office in Cairo. It should be noted that IM's social institutions were formed earlier than the social institutions formed by the Egyptian government in 1945. Social activities are very closely related to the surrounding community which is an important target for the Muslim Brotherhood. This is also following IM's Articles of Association (Munson, 2001).

The Ikhwanul Muslimin social service institution is divided into four sections. First, namely, service that lightens the burden of others. This means that IM members provide material assistance to people in need. The second part assists the unemployed by providing jobs and providing business capital loans. The third is in the form of handling services in prevention, namely counseling activities about disease prevention. While the fourth section deals with coaching services. The purpose of this activity is to improve the standard of living of individuals and encourage them to take advantage of their free time (Michael, 2019).

Moderation of Ikhwanul Muslimin

The third factor in maintaining the existence of the IM is its moderation. This moderate attitude is reflected in IM's acceptance of politics and the democratic process. IM is not allergic to politics, because Islamic Sharia requires a state to strengthen it and requires power to reform society. This is also following Hasan al-Banna's view that politics is an area that must be entered as long as it is used to serve IM's broad goals in Islamizing society (Mellor, 2018).

As for politics, Hasan Al-Banna defined politics, saying:

"When I say about politics, what I mean is absolute politics, namely politics that puts the interests of the people as a whole, inside or outside the country without being bound in the least by the political system." Al-Banna divides politics into two, namely internal and

external politics.

Internal politics is regulating the wheels of government, explaining their duties, detailing rights and obligations, and controlling and assisting high-ranking officials so that they are obeyed if they do good and are straightened out if they deviate. According to al-Banna, Islam has paid close attention to the problems of internal politics. Islam has laid down its rules and principles, detailed the rights of government and the rights of those who are ordered (the people), explained the attitude of the wrongdoers and wronged people, and outlined the limits (punishments) that must not be exceeded. Then the purpose of al-Banna's external politics is to maintain the freedom and independence of the people, to instill self-confidence, authority and to walk the path to a noble path that can align its position among various nations, keeping it away from the despotic attitudes of other nations (Levy, 2014).

Islam is a comprehensive religion, governing all issues in the joints of human life. This means that Islamic teachings include *aqidah*, worship, and *muamalah*. Both in the scope of individuals, families, and society at a broader level. So when Islam is understood in this way, according to Al-Banna, state issues are an important part that has also been regulated by Islam (Bel, 2009). In several of his treatises, Al-Banna said:

> "If Islam has nothing to do with political, social, economic and cultural issues, then what is the function of Islam itself? Is Islam just a movement of bowing and prostrating that does not leave a mark on oneself?"

Furthermore, regarding the concept of governance in a country, Al-Banna does not discuss it specifically. For him as long as the government can take place in an Islamic manner, then whatever form of government is not a problem. As for what is meant by the Islamic government in Al-Banna terminology is a government consisting of Muslims who carry out all their obligations, do not commit immoral acts openly, and consistently apply Islamic laws and their teachings (Levy, 2014).

Several characteristics reflect the Islamic government (Muhamad et al., 2021), namely: (a) a sense of responsibility in carrying out the mandate of the government, (b) loving and caring for its people (c) being fair to everyone, (d) restraining themselves in using State assets, and (e) economical in using State assets.

According to Al-Banna, several obligations must be carried out by government officials towards their people before they get their rights

(Muhamad et al., 2021), namely: (a) creating a sense of security, (b) implementing laws, (c) equalize education, (d) prepare strength, (e) maintain health, (f) safeguard public interests and facilities, (g) safeguard natural resources and manage State wealth, (h) safeguard State resources, (i) strengthen morality, and (j) spreading da'wah.

When Islamic government officials have carried out their obligations as stated above, they get the following rights: (a) loyalty from the community, (b) the community helping the government with all their souls and wealth, (c) entitled to receive advice and guidance, and (d) has the right to change the government.

IM's compromising attitude towards politics and democracy is very different from other Islamic groups such as the Jihadists and Salafis. They think IM is a coward because he accepts democracy. For those governments that are not following Islamic law are infidels. Apart from that, they also think that democracy is an unforgivable sin because giving sovereignty to humans over God means that there is a deification of the people (Kuiper, 2021).

Many observers believe that IM's compromising attitude towards democracy is just a tactic. They fear that the IM is like other organizations that initially supported democracy and then withdrew after coming to power, such as the Bolsheviks and the Nazis (Tibi, 2012). However, the IM is very different from these organizations, because they did not use the path of revolution in reaching power but by gradual and peaceful Islamization. The IM places great emphasis on individual piety, then gradually on the family, and finally on society.

IM members began to gain experience and expertise in widespread political mobilization during the reign of President Anwar Sadat. This was because Anwar Sadat used Islamic groups to fight his political opponents from left-wing groups and supporters of Nasserism (Tadros, 2012). In 1971 President Sadat began releasing IM members as political prisoners from the prison. In 1979 there was a meeting between Anwar Sadat and the IM leaders.

In the 1990s, IM members began to emerge against plans to form a political party. IM's push to establish a party to overcome obstacles to the political rights of its members. But there are still many IM members who oppose the idea. Those who oppose the idea of establishing a political party see IM as an organization whose scope goes beyond a political party. In addition, it is also feared that the presence of political parties will weaken

IM's da'wah movement. Those who oppose IM becoming a political party come from groups of older people who are involved in IM preaching and cadre activities (Dingel, 2017).

IM's notion of being actively involved in politics strengthened in the mid-2000s. In 2004 IM under the leadership of Mahdi Akef issued a memorandum presenting IM's position on necessary reforms on political, economic, social, and religious issues (Tadros, 2012). The group that supports IM's involvement in politics comes from the politically active generation of the 70s. They are deeply involved in bringing IM as an actor into the realm of formal politics. They believe that IM will develop into a political party (Zahid, 2010).

The success of the IM in the political field was winning 20% of the vote in the 2005 legislative elections. IM members ran for election through independent channels. They won 88 seats out of a total of 444. During the campaign, they used the IM slogan and platform. The 2005 Egyptian election was considered a relatively free and fair election during the reign of Hosni Mubarak. This was inseparable from international pressure and the Egyptian people who wanted political reform. Even though IM did not get a majority of votes, due to the domination of the ruling party, IM's achievements show the electoral potential of the movement, which has consistently implemented its long-term gradual strategy.

The Arab Spring events in the Middle East Region had a significant impact on Arab countries, including Egypt. The fall of Hosni Mubarak's authoritarian government created unprecedented political opportunities for the IM. IM officially established a political party, namely *Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa-l-ʿAdālah* (Freedom and Justice Party/FJP) in 2011 (Al-Anani, 2015). FJP will be a civil party with an Islamic framework. As stated by the secretary general of FJP, Mohammed Saad al-Katani, that FJP is not a religious party but a civil party that wants modern democracy (Wickham, 2013).

At the beginning of the formation of the FJP, all the highest party leaders were elected by the IM shura council. Even so, FJP will be completely independent of the IM organization but will continue to consult on important matters. This makes FJP the political wing of IM. Apart from that, in the management of FJP, there is a Coptic Christian, namely Rafiq Habib who was chosen as deputy chairman of the party. This indicates the political inclusivism of IM members (Milton-Edwards, 2016).

IM's important success in Egypt's political history occurred in the

2012 election. This election is considered the freest and fair election since Egypt became a republic in 1952. FJP emerged as the main winner by winning 44.9% of the seats in parliament (Muhammad Nawaz Awan, 2021).

IM's political victory in the legislative election was followed by victory in the 2012 presidential election. IM chose Muhammad Mursi to run in the presidential election. Morsi's strongest rival is Ahmad Shafiq who is considered a supporter of Hosni Mubarak. By relying on the strength of organizational resources during the campaign, Morsi finally won 51.7% of the vote. Morsi was sworn in as president of Egypt on 30 June 2012 and made him the first freely elected president of Egypt (Dingel, 2017).

One of the other important points of the IM is trying to keep Muslims away from violence. Instead, they link their members to politics and charity work. They claim to be successful in filtering out radicalism within their members. A senior member of the IM in Cairo said that if it were not for the Muslim Brotherhood, many young people would become radicalized. IM's success in warding off radical influences was, of course, due to the strict organizational discipline and serious educational programs. This is implemented through the organization's motto, namely *sami'na wa atho'na* (we listen, and we obey) (Leiken & Brooke, 2013).

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CONCLUSION

As the founder of IM, Hasan al-Banna was able to make IM able to survive until now. This is inseparable from al-Banna's thoughts on IM goals. By articulating IM's broad and strategic goals, al-Banna was able to connect the next generation to the legacy he created. Until now the majority of IM leaders and cadres continue to remember al-Banna's thoughts legitimizing and strengthening their position in the IM movement.

The superiority of the Ikhwanul Muslimin organization lies not only in the charisma of its leaders but also in the mobilization of resources which

has an important role in maintaining the existence of its da'wah movement. Three key points have enabled IM to continue to move amidst the various domestic political situations in Egypt. First, internal organizational solidity allows IM to move with the same goal. An important element in internal solidity is IM's *tarbiyah* and *da'wah* systems which focus more on the family element. The second factor is community support which is still strong as a result of IM's activities in the social and educational fields. IM's social programs are more aimed at improving the welfare of the poor. The last point is IM's moderate attitude towards Democracy and Global Jihad. IM's foray into practical politics has made its members more open to the ideas of democracy, human rights, and political pluralism. In addition, IM's moderate views on the concept of global jihad can prevent IM from falling into radicalism and extremism, so IM has an anti-violence view.

Post-Arab Spring Egyptian politics brought considerable changes to the IM movement. For the first time, the IM became the ruler in Egypt after decades of being an opposition force and sometimes going underground. Even so, IM still faces challenges from Egypt's military strength which is still strong. This has an impact on the constellation of Military-IM relations. Therefore, in the future, more in-depth studies are needed regarding the future of IM in Egypt's domestic politics after the Arab Spring.

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