

# Strengthening Cooperation among Intelligence Agencies in the Enforcement of Law on Terrorism: The Case of Indonesia

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**Rizki Wahyudi\***

University of Indonesia

**Muhammad Syauqillah**

University of Indonesia

## Abstract

The development of global, regional and national situations related to terrorism is dynamic and complex affecting national stability and security. It requires optimal and effective action from the government. The complexity of counter-terrorism requires the synergy of all parties. Strengthening cooperation between intelligence agencies can solve the current threat of terrorism. This article aims to propose intelligence cooperation and present the concept of intelligence synergy within the framework of law enforcement in combating terrorism in Indonesia. The article is descriptive qualitative research. It employs in-depth interviews and literature study as a data-gathering technique. Using collaborative governance theory, the article argues that to realize synergy between intelligence agencies, all Indonesian intelligence agencies need to conduct joint action procedures and hold joint terrorism countermeasures exercises, and related activities aimed at creating a common perception and eliminating rivalry among the agencies.

## Key Words

Collaborative Governance, Intelligence, Synergy, Terrorism.

## Introduction

Terrorism is a strategic issue that has become a security threat in many countries. Frightening terror is generated widely in various parts of the world to become a global threat to security stability (Reksoprodjo, Widodo, and Timur 2018). In Indonesia, the spread of radicalism is still a significant threat to the resilience of the state ideology (Adikara, Zuhdi, and Purwanto 2021). In recent times, terrorist networks and cells have experienced

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\* Corresponding author:

Rizki Wahyudi, Terrorism Studies School of Global Strategic Studies (SKSG), University of Indonesia.  
Address: Jalan Tribuana 3 No.25, Jakarta Timur  
Email: [rwahyudi86@gmail.com](mailto:rwahyudi86@gmail.com)

various polarizations. In the early 2000s, the structure of the terrorism network was in the form of large and invisible groups. But today, these large groups have turned into small groups that are not well-organized, and network cells are not interrelated (Ramelan 2017).

Terrorist acts from small groups continue to show their existence in the past decade with various models and interactions. Terror actions have developed into a lone wolf model of terror involving women and children (Riyanta, Rahayu, and Benny 2021). Terror acts with the leaderless jihad mode are currently difficult to detect and cause fatalities (Karnavian 2017). The terrorist group network is relatively coordinated and operates using covert methods. Therefore, intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are needed (Suhayati 2016). Intelligence officers who are already scattered throughout Indonesia can be assigned the task of detecting the potential for radical groups that carry out secretive dissemination of their ideological understanding (Riyanta 2015). Competent officers must carry out the action and countermeasures against terrorism appropriately and effectively.

The role of intelligence forces from the police, National Intelligence Service (BIN), Indonesia Armed Forces (TNI) and others becomes crucial in mapping the structure of terrorist groups and overseeing the movement of terrorist groups. As the terrorist network group's action threatens state sovereignty, these intelligence forces need to involve the participation of TNI's intelligence (Triskaputri 2019). Intelligence aims to detect, identify, assess, analyze, interpret, and present information on providing early warning to anticipate various possible threats. Its function is to protect the safety and existence of the state for achieving national interests and security from potential and actual threats (Article 5 of Law Number 17 of 2011). In general, the function of a state intelligence organization is to secure the national interest (Soegirman 2012). Intelligence has a vital role in countering terrorism (Riyanta 2015).

Intelligence collects extensive, complete, and well-understood data and information relating to all national defence and security resources in conducting counter-terrorism. The role of intelligence as the eyes and ears of the Indonesian government is to provide accurate data quickly for early detection (early detection and early warning) about matters relating to threats to the state from within and from outside (Pedrason 2018). The former Head of the Strategic Intelligence Service (Kabais TNI), Admiral Soleman B. Ponto, stated that the intelligence perspective in countering terrorism is needed on the strategic spectrum (Suharmono 2020). Intelligence capabilities of strategic value to seek information, process information, and present information for decision-making are indispensable in supporting counter-terrorism measures.

In creating security stability for the sovereignty of the state, it is necessary for the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (Kemenko Polhukam), BNPT, BIN, TNI, and Indonesian National Police (Polri) to make efforts to prevent terrorism. In this regard, this research aims to provide an overview of the conditions of cooperation between institutions and present the concept of intelligence synergy within the framework of law enforcement by using the analysis of Collaborative Governance Theory. This research will provide input and policy recommendations for the five state institutions to increase integration in the handling of terrorism. In addition, this research is expected to be a reference for other research related to the synergy of intelligence in countering terrorism.

There have been discourses on intelligence failures in preventing terrorism in Indonesia. As explained by Manullang (2006), one of the reasons why various parties often criticize intelligence agencies is because they are considered ineffective in providing a sense of security and comfort because intelligence in each agency runs independently. In terms of technology deployment of state intelligence apparatus outside the police, such as BIN and the TNI, it has not been regulated synergistically to support National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT)'s duties in the field of prevention. Mahyudin (2016) found that the level of trust among Indonesian intelligence agencies was in a state of trust deficit with the rivalry between institutions and past residues.

In their research, Zulfikar and Amanah (2020) explained that BNPT, as the leading sector of counter-terrorism in Indonesia, has carried out a strategy to prevent terrorism by prioritizing the principle of coordination among state intelligence organizations. In this case, the intelligence apparatus plays an essential role in detecting acts of terrorism. According to Suhayati (2016), handling the problem of terrorism requires high quality and intelligence capacity to uncover the perpetrators and motives behind acts of terrorism and the root causes of the underlying issues. However, intelligence officers do not have the authority in law enforcement. It is hoped that the task of the police in countering terrorism will be more optimal with the synergy among institutions that have capabilities in the field of intelligence.

In this study, we use a descriptive qualitative approach, by which one looks at a social reality in a holistic way to find complex, dynamic, meaningful, and interactive relationships so that he or she analyzes and constructs the social situation understudy to be more precise and more meaningful (Sugiyono 2017). The choice of this approach is expected

to provide a clear, accurate, factual, systematic and valid description for understanding the strategy and construction of intelligence synergies within the framework of law enforcement against terrorism. We conducted research using interviews, literature and document studies and descriptively explained these social situations. In conducting this research, we collected data, assessed data quality, analyzed data, interpreted data, and made conclusions.

To explain the issue under study, we use the Collaborative Governance concept. According to Agranoff and McGuire (2003), collaborative governance explains the context of cooperation among government agencies, emphasizing collaboration and relationships among multi-sectoral participants. Ansell and Gash (2007) refer to Collaborative Governance as a series of arrangements in which one or more public institutions directly involve stakeholders or assets. Collaboration is needed to enable governance activities to be structured to effectively respond to the increasing need for managing cross-governmental, organizational, and sectoral boundaries.

From Ansell and Gash's explanation, it can be seen that the collaborative aspect of government administration is the element of formulating and implementing public policies or programs by public institutions, namely the government. In addition, in practice, collaboration in government administration must uphold the value of deliberation and consensus among actors or stakeholders involved in the partnership. There are various reasons behind the emergence of the need for collaboration from each institution or institution. Collaborative Governance does not appear because it is caused by the initiative of various parties' self-awareness that encourages cooperation and coordination in solving problems (Junaidi 2015).

Collaborative Governance or Collaboration in Governance emerged as a response to the failure to implement current governance and the high costs involved in politicizing regulations (Ansell and Gash 2007). The concept of Collaborative Governance emphasizes the importance of building a collaboration based on the emergence of consensus among its members, not based on individual competition among group members. Each member in the framework of cooperation must try to respect each other and contribute. The complexity of the problem results in the emergence of interdependence which increases the demand for collaboration.

### **Intelligence Inter-institutional Cooperation in Countering Terrorism**

The condition of the authority's interagency cooperation in counter-terrorism in Indonesia is still far from achieving the expected goals. Several problems are still being found, such as no synchronization of data owned by each relevant institution to prevent and take optimal action against terrorist threats. There is no legal umbrella to cover collaborative terror countermeasures activities, especially in dealing with terrorism so officers in the field have a powerful and standardized Standard Operation Procedure (SOP). Sectoral selfishness is apparent among intelligence institutions and related government institutions. It becomes an obstacle to the optimization of activities to counter terrorism in Indonesia. As a result, sharing information between one institution and another is still a common problem.

With a high level of the terrorism threat, the Indonesian government is facing a situation where the performance of its institutions that are directly related to the handling of acts of terrorism has not been able to run optimally. It is assumed that it only relies upon a specific institution, namely the national police force (POLRI) as the main element in prevention and prosecution. On the other hand, the dynamics of terrorist acts have developed in such a way that they have exceeded the capacity and capability of POLRI as law enforcement officers. Therefore, the issuance of Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law should be followed by efforts to encourage the involvement of other government institutions outside POLRI such as Kemenko Polhukam, BIN, and TNI through an effective cooperation mechanism under the coordination of BNPT.

The development of counter-terrorism efforts related to the implementation of tasks, functions and roles Kemenko Polhukam, BNPT, BIN, TNI, and Polri in Indonesia from 2002 to the emergence of the revision of the Terrorism Law in 2018 is characterized by the dominance of one institution: POLRI is the spearhead of implementation in the terminology that terrorism is an extraordinary crime. In handling this, there is a tendency to use a legal approach by law enforcement officials. Likewise, BIN and TNI involvement is still attached according to their respective duties and functions as described in the law on intelligence and the law on the TNI. The development of the performance of related government institutions in countering acts of terrorism de can be explained as follows:

- 1) The Bali Bombing I in 2002, which claimed the lives of hundreds of people, became the initial basis for the Indonesian government to carry out efforts to combat terrorism using a legal approach by referring to Government Regulation instead of Law (PERPPU) Number 1 of 2002.

This regulation was later ratified into Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism. This step was followed by issuing Presidential Instruction Number 4 of 2002, which mandated the coordinating minister for political and security affairs (Menkopolkam) to formulate national strategies and policies in dealing with terrorism. Menkopolkam subsequently issued Decree No. 26/Menko/Polkam/11/2002, concerning the Coordination Desk for Combating Terrorism (DKPT);

2) Departing from the phenomenon of terrorist organizations that are systematically recruiting and conducting regeneration, the government saw the need for an integrated and strategic effort to respond to this. The DPR, through the 1st Commission, in response to this matter, held a joint working meeting with the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Menkopolkam) on August 31, 2009. The 1st Commission DPR stated that it supports the government's efforts in tackling and eradicating terrorism and recommended several points, which were later realized in establishing the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT). Law Number 5 of 2018 Article 43e and 43f mentions that the duties and functions of BNPT as the leading sector in coordinating activities with all related institutions are still not optimal; and

3) After the emergence of the ISIS organization and its increasing presence in the Southeast Asian region, the threat of terrorism in Indonesia became increasingly complex. According to the former Indonesian Minister of Defense, Ryamizard Ryacudu, there was substantial evidence that ISIS had attempted to bring conflicts in Marawi to Indonesian territory (Bomantama 2018). Nevertheless, the threat of terrorism is still the main agenda of the government in the security sector, where the fact that the number of terrorists in Indonesia is not in the red zone and terrorism attacks tend to decrease after the establishment of Den 88 Anti-Terror (AT) POLRI (Araf 2015). Thus, the handling of terrorism that involves elements of foreign powers is considered to affect the forces of other apparatuses outside the police.

Based on the three facts mentioned above, the reality is that no institution firmly takes responsibility in dealing with terrorism. For example, in the incident of terrorist inmate riot at the Kelapa Dua Police Mobile Brigade detention house, the police stated that the problem was the problem of the Directorate General of Corrections (Jordan 2018). Meanwhile, the Directorate General of Corrections claims that the Brimob POLRI Kelapa Dua detention house is not part of the structure of the Directorate General of Corrections at the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. The detention house was initially for police members who

did violations, but then it was used as a detention house for convicts of terrorism cases. In this case, the Directorate General of Corrections is only responsible for providing technical guidance to the Brimob detention house. In addition, the responsibility for its implementation in the field rests entirely with the Indonesian National Police (Satrio 2018). To avoid the same mistake, since the riot at the Brimob Detention Center Kelapa Dua, the Directorate General of Corrections isolated all terror convicts from the Brimob Kelapa Dua detention centre. Implementing the One Man One Cell system is expected to minimize the potential for conflicts caused by these terrorist prisoners (Egeham 2018).

Based on the incident, the Indonesian government seriously regarded terrorism as a threat to the state. There was a need for the involvement of other institutions outside the police because the police had limited functions of intelligence and enforcement so special forces were needed to deal with threats that endangered national security. As a country that stipulates the method of the criminal justice system in counter-terror policies, in 2018, the government finally issued an anti-terrorism law by including elements of the TNI to work together with POLRI as the frontline in overcoming acts of terror. Counter-terror efforts that can run effectively are those that have legal boundaries and can set priorities.

Referring to the current threat of terrorism, which is rampant with bombings and lone-wolf attacks, law enforcement efforts carried out by the Indonesian National Police must be accompanied by activities in the intelligence sector to optimize prevention efforts. All efforts made by the government are meaningless when the death toll has fallen due to the failure of the apparatus to prevent acts of terrorism. On the one hand, to carry out intelligence operations in the context of preventing acts of terrorism, the police as a law enforcement agency will clash with the provisions in the Criminal Code, which limit their authority in the field of intelligence. However, if the police force expands its jurisdiction, it will result in potential violations of Law and Human Rights (HAM), which are dangerous both for the POLRI institution and for the community.

Law Number 5 of 2018 does not explicitly explain the mechanism among intelligence officers. Institutions such as BIN and the TNI have intelligence functions that can help prevent acts of terrorism through intelligence and counterintelligence activities directed against terrorist groups operating in Indonesia, including their supporting networks both at home and abroad (Halim 2019). As a result, the implementation of tasks, functions, and roles of Kemenko Polhukam, BNPT, BIN, TNI, and POLRI is still characterized by inter-institutional compartmentation.

Thus, up to now, the legal regulations that function to collaborate in the implementation of tasks and functions in supporting the achievement of optimal countermeasures against terrorism are not yet available.

In essence, the threat of terror is included in the category of extraordinary crime. Therefore, the approach requires an exceptional measure that is limited to using the capabilities of only one institution. Moreover, it can be understood that law enforcement officers are not designed to deal with inherent threats. Paramilitary such as Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF). Therefore, a special discretionary effort is needed in terrorism prevention, which is not enough to rely solely on law enforcement operations using an evidence approach. Sometimes an intelligence operations approach is required, through clandestine activities whose concepts conflict with the criminal law in Indonesia, where the steps for handling them are carried out through actions that are by the law and beyond the law. The handling by the law can be carried out on law enforcement operations and the deradicalization process for the perpetrators of these terrorist activities. Meanwhile, when there is a strong indication of an act of terrorism, the relevant authorities can make efforts and preventive measures, even though it is beyond the law, by referring to the procedures and discretion that apply to intelligence operations. Thus, there is no abuse of power by the relevant officers in the field.

Without supporting a binding cooperation mechanism, countering terrorism involving several government agencies such as BIN, TNI and POLRI, the collaboration process at the operational level and the achievement of its duties will be slow. It is because a complicated and rigid bureaucracy hampers the collaborative mechanism of cooperation. Good handling of terrorism requires maintaining adaptive momentum (Yani and Montratama 2016). An example of this is the chaos in the implementation of counter-terrorism operations that occurred in Poso. The delay in handling the incident in responding to the development of the incident confused and caused the death of three members of the Indonesian National Police because they could not anticipate the sudden attack.

### **The Conception of Inter-Intelligence Synergy within the Law Enforcement Framework**

Intelligence has an essential role in the security sector: providing forecasts, early warnings, and early detection of threats/disturbances that threaten national security. Fast, comprehensive and accurate analysis related to the threat of terrorism is reference material for policymakers in taking appropriate and directed management of terrorism handling mechanisms.

Widjajanto, Keliat, and Lay (2006) classify intelligence functions into three levels of scope: strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Where is in this case the synergy among institutions? Deep intelligence prevention terrorism in Indonesia functions at the operational level. Intelligence activities are part of the state's early warning and defence systems, enabling policymakers to have early warning or foreknowledge.

Hulnick (2005) revealed that the role of intelligence in the national security system must adapt to certain conditions related to work methods, work culture, and differentiation and specialization of functions. The complexity of the obstacles and challenges in countering terrorism in Indonesia in the future becomes problematic that must be faced together. The synergy between the legal and intelligence approaches and the close cooperation between the related institutions absolutely cannot be avoided as a condition for effective countermeasures against acts of terrorism. A collaborative model of collaboration among associated institutions can be a catalyst in achieving the effectiveness of handling acts of terrorism and reducing the number of terror incidents in Indonesia. However, this must be accommodated as a derivative of Law Number 15 of 2018, which contains a technical explanation of the cooperation mechanism among Kemenko Polhukam, BNPT, BIN, TNI, and POLRI can operate under a binding legal framework.

In addition, the role of the five institutions in providing their contribution is facing differences in the capacity, capability, and culture of their respective organizations in dealing with acts of terror. Ansell and Gash (2007), in the theoretical foundation's collaborative governance, addressed four fundamental values that must be embedded in collaboration to achieve success, namely the existence of consensus orientation, collective leadership, the establishment of multidirectional communication, and the desire to share resources. In other words, external intervention is needed from the government, which must maintain the proportionality of the division of tasks, authorities and budgets to each of its institutions whose roles, functions and duties are related to efforts to combat terrorism in Indonesia.

The implementation of tasks, functions, and roles related to handling acts of terrorism from the five institutions mentioned above is still marked by overlapping duties and authorities of institutions which are not regulated in the law. In addition, the government needs to emphasize the roles and projections of proportional and objective involvement of each institution in a common framework. By issuing additional technical regulations, the implementation of tasks, functions and roles of Kemenko Polhukam, BNPT,

BIN, TNI, and POLRI in dealing with acts of terrorism in Indonesia can work collaboratively. Cooperation in handling a terrorism threat must be optimal, which means that in a terror contingency condition, each element has to understand and carry out its respective roles and duties without exceeding its authority. As emphasized in the Collaborative Governance theory, the demand for collaborative problem-solving is based on the awareness of collaboration and coordination because of the limitations possessed by one or several agencies in maintaining the public interest, which is a sense of security.

### **Collaborative Efforts among State Apparatus in Countering Terrorism**

The complexity of counter-terrorism cannot deny the cooperation of all parties, especially the state administration apparatus. The task of the police in countering terrorism will be more optimal with the synergy among institutions that have capabilities in the field of intelligence and have legal jurisdiction so that this can be formulated in a pattern of cooperation in synergistically realizing national security stability. National stability is the main factor in creating sovereignty for the Republic of Indonesia so that it is necessary for Kemenko Polhukam, BNPT, BIN, TNI, and POLRI to prevent terrorism.

From the theory of Collaborative Governance, one lesson that we can learn is how the British government followed up on the suicide bombing case in Manchester in 2017 by collaborating with the capabilities of all related elements. In this incident, the British military intelligence agency, MI-5, assisted the security forces in tracking down the bombers, who were known to be quite dangerous because they had undergone special training in assembling explosives and were believed to be connected to international terrorist networks. As a follow-up, the British Prime Minister authorized the use of the British Army's 22 SAS special forces to carry out Operation Suppression with the support of the Anti-Terror Police Unit, which ended successfully (Wells and Sullivan 2017). So, reflecting on this, the elaboration of Law Number 5 of 2018 is expected to realize similar conditions. When terrorism has become a critical threat to state security, a collaborative effort must be taken in the form of a permanent framework of cooperation. The collaboration of Kemenko Polhukam, BNPT, BIN, TNI, and POLRI is hoped to improve intelligence synergy among these institutions.

Implementing the duties, functions, and roles of Kemenko Polhukam, BNPT, BIN, TNI, and POLRI in a collaborative work environment is based on regulations from Law Number 5 2018, which regulates the use of state

intelligence apparatus. By being under the coordination of BNPT and with support from the Kemenko Polhukam in providing access, BIN, TNI, and POLRI can help smooth tasks in prevention and prosecution. Joint intelligence officers must implement intelligence operations from BIN, the TNI, and POLRI. They must face various targets according to their respective capacities and capabilities to obtain intelligence information quickly and accurately. The rivalry and conflict among officers of each institution due to the lack of clarity about the job's description still occur. Moreover, intelligence operations sometimes fail to comply with the law and can go beyond the law. From this, derivative rules are needed to clarify the authority and limits of administration of each intelligence operator (BIN, TNI, and POLRI) in taking necessary actions in the interest of state security so that unwanted chaos does not occur.

So, it is necessary to have a government regulation that explains the role of each of these state institutions in certain conditions and situations of terrorism threats following their respective authorities and capabilities to ensure speedy action. For example, intelligence analysis suggests that remarkable military capabilities are needed in Poso and Sulu, Philippines. In this case, through existing regulations, the government can provide direct authorization for the involvement of the TNI's terror countermeasures without having to go through a long bureaucratic procedure. Rules can be in the form of government regulations or a presidential regulation that explains the stratification of terrorism threats that may arise in the territory of Indonesia, along with the proportional division of tasks and responsibilities of each related institution, both in the context of prevention and prosecution.

In carrying out operations to counter terrorist acts involving officials from various state institutions, the authority is still in the hands of POLRI. For example, in the handling of terrorism cases in Poso, the Police tended to override the duties of the BNPT, which is responsible for coordinating the implementation of interagency tasks, TNI and BIN in counter-terrorism. Therefore, increased authority and budget support of Kemenko Polhukam, BNPT, BIN, TNI, and POLRI related to efforts to combat acts of terrorism can be pursued by creating a permanent operating procedure for the implementation of the duties of intelligence and enforcement officers from BIN, TNI, and POLRI.

In dealing with terrorism, it is necessary to align it with the capabilities in possession to overcome the threat of terrorism in a specific situation and operating environment. Apart from that, intelligence assessment or analysis should be carried out to improve the quality of intelligence

information on developing the strategic environment, processing and preparing intelligence products to minimize the error rate. For this reason, support for intelligence operational facilities and infrastructure at the central and regional levels continues to be pursued to improve the quality of intelligence performance (Yunanto et al. 2015). Because of the future threats that require the role and involvement of all relevant institutions, it is only natural that there should be an equal distribution of budget support to carry out activities in the prevention and prosecution of acts of terrorism.

The capacity and capability of Kemenko Polhukam, BNPT, BIN, TNI, and POLRI in tackling acts of terrorism in Indonesia can be adequate if there is a collaborative concept of cooperation without sectoral egos from each part. This collaboration is expected to coordinate the implementation of tasks among state institutions comprehensively and effectively to achieve common goals. So, it is necessary to have a correct understanding of the functions, duties and authorities of Kemenko Polhukam, BNPT, BIN, TNI, and POLRI. They are involved in efforts to combat acts of terrorism in Indonesia. Weak coordination in the incident of misfiring by TNI personnel indicates a misunderstanding of POLRI members regarding the functions, duties, and authorities of law enforcement officers who should understand the procedure for action to be taken (Yuliawati 2016).

Instilling values and beliefs follow the main tasks of each institution. According to Kreitner and Kinicki (2005), value is defined as a belief firmly held and displayed by members of an organization in their daily behaviour. In contrast, belief is a person's thoughts and beliefs regarding how they should carry out their duties and interact with others as members of an organization. The values and beliefs that are embedded in the soul of each member of the relevant institution must be able to support the achievement of goals that are greater than just the interests of the organization. The advantages of the aspect of capacity and capability must be a positive value that can be used to ensure the smooth implementation of tasks within the organizations.

It must also be admitted that whenever terrorism evolves, it adopts new ways to spread fear to people. In this case, the state has an essential role in ensuring security for the country's citizens. Therefore, the state has to evolutionarily adopt various ways to deal with acts of terrorism. The synergy of interagency intelligence is critical to the success of implementing the Anti-Terrorism Law. In addition, with clear technical rules, the leading officials in the five institutions already understand the portion of their respective duties. Good communication arises so that awareness and situational sharing can be carried out to support the smooth

implementation of tasks. The Collaborative Governance theory states that a consensus orientation is needed to achieve common goals. Based on this explanation, it can be understood that the estuary of the synergy of intelligence operations within the framework of Law Enforcement is the existence of a solid legal basis.

## Conclusion

At the moment, the cooperation of interagency in counter-terrorism in Indonesia cannot be achieved. The government faces the threat of terrorism, but it has not been able to run effectively because it tends to rely only on one institution, namely the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), in prevention and overcoming terrorism. The issuance of Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law should be followed by efforts to encourage the involvement of other government institutions outside POLRI such as the Kemenko Polhukam, BIN, and the TNI through a cooperation mechanism under the coordination of BNPT.

To optimize the handling of terrorism in Indonesia, it is necessary to realize a unified perception of proportional task execution from all intelligence and enforcement officers from BIN, TNI, and POLRI following the national-scale terrorism countermeasures policies and strategies conducted by BNPT. The mechanism can be carried out by preparing permanent joint procedures, implementing reciprocal terrorism countermeasures, and other activities that can support the creation of common perceptions of members of each institution and eliminate egocentric attitudes and interagency rivalries. This is an important measure to create joint operations aimed at countering terrorism in effective ways and to maximum results.

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