

Counter Narrative Policy to Handling Radicalism in Indonesia

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Abstract

Contra-radicalization was designed to counter radical ideology, primarily transnational ideology in Indonesia. In its realization, it has two approaches, soft and hard, with two methods, online and offline. However, based on the fact that those radical ideologies are still present virtually and in reality. Thus, this research aims to describe how the program is run by BNPT (National Counter Terrorism Agency) using its strategy, method, and approaches. This research used Grindle's implementation theory of policy content, with the method used being descriptive and qualitative. The results showed that there are indicators challenging the implementation of the program such as the clarity of interest affected, lack of resources used, and the characteristic of the regime.

Keywords: Contra Radicalization, Contra Narrative, Policy Implementation, Terrorism, Radicalism, Approach Methods

Abstrak

Kontra radikalisasi dirancang untuk melawan ideologi radikal terutama ideologi transnasional di Indonesia. Dalam realisasinya memiliki dua pendekatan yaitu pendekatan lunak dan pendekatan keras dengan dua metode yaitu online dan offline. Namun, berdasarkan fakta ideologi radikal tersebut masih hadir secara virtual dan realitas. Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan bagaimana program yang dijalankan oleh BNPT (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme) dengan menggunakan strategi, metode, dan pendekatannya. Penelitian ini menggunakan teori implementasi Grindle mengenai konten kebijakan, dengan metode yang digunakan adalah deskriptif kualitatif. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa terdapat indikator yang menantang pelaksanaan program seperti kejelasan kepentingan yang dilakukan, kurangnya sumber daya yang digunakan, dan karakteristik rezim.

Kata Kunci: Kontra Radikalisasi, Kontra Narasi, Implementasi Kebijakan, Terorisme, Radikalisme, Metode Pendekatan

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is an act that is not following the law. The emergence of special rules regarding eradicating criminal acts of terrorism regulated in Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations instead of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, becoming a law signifies the seriousness of the Government in eradicating terrorism. The act of terrorism is also not following the ideals of the Indonesian people as stated in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution, one of which is "...protecting the entire Indonesian nation and all of Indonesia's bloodshed...". Thus, it is necessary to handle acts of terrorism seriously so that the ideals of the Indonesian people are achieved and get peace and a sense of security in carrying out life (Jazuli, 2016) (Nasrullah, 2005) (Sukmariningsih, 2018) (Mubarak, 2012). Terrorism is a serious threat to the sustainability of the security and sovereignty of a country, including Indonesia. This important aspect in acts of terrorism is created from the ideology of radicalism, which is the basis for someone who then joins and follows the terrorism

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movement or it can be said that this radical understanding is the first step of the emergence of acts of terrorism (Sholikin, 2018) (Takasli, 2015) (Khamdan, 2015). Terrorism is considered an extraordinary crime requiring special handling efforts (Anakotta, 2020). Meanwhile, Muladi (2004) in Marthisan argued that terrorism is a form of extraordinary crime or what is known as a great crime that requires handling extraordinarily or extraordinary measures (Anakotta, 2020).

Acts of terrorism are said to be one of the extraordinary crimes caused for several reasons, such as (1) terrorism is an act with the greatest danger that threatens human rights, namely violations of human rights to maintain life and human rights to be free from feelings of guilt. Afraid; (2) terrorism does not have a definite target or is random and indiscriminate, which often involves or sacrifices innocent people; (3) the use of weapons with modern technology that allows for mass destruction; (4) the possibility of a network of terrorist organizations nationally and internationally which makes it easier for them to cooperate and obtain protection; (5) can be a threat and endanger national and international peace and security (Anakotta, 2020).

Furthermore, this act of terrorism can occur because of the emergence of radical ideas that cause misinformation and create narratives that have a negative impact on society. The depletion of the sense of nationalism in the Indonesian people can be a trigger and foster radicalism in Indonesia. This can be seen from the understanding of Pancasila values which are now only limited to calluses without any implementation in everyday life so that implementation does not reach the goal, namely to fend off radicalism. As a result of the existence of Pancasila values that are not grounded and ingrained in the Indonesian nation, followed by an increasingly advanced radicalism movement, as well as the increasing poverty and unemployment in Indonesia, this has become an entry point for the development of radicalism in Indonesia (Hartanto, 2017)(Rokhmad, 2012)(Suwito, 2014). In addition, the radical understanding that develops among the youth causes the weakening of the nation's integrity and the spread of conflicts between nations. So these conditions need to be a concern and carry out the formation of the character and integrity of the nation, especially youth, to minimize conflicts between ethnic groups, religions, races, and groups (Suwito, 2014) (Aziz, 2016) (Fathurahman, n.d.) (Rusman, 2018).

With this, of course, the radical understanding that causes acts of terrorism is a serious threat that can create a crisis against Indonesian sovereignty, especially against the four national consensus, namely the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Satriawan, Islami, & Lailam, 2019) (Winarni, 2016) (Ayurinanda, 2018). At the same time, this radical organization is an organization that is easy to develop and easy to connect with one. This is in line with the results of research conducted by Nurdin (2016) entitled *Radicalism on the World Wide Web and Propaganda*. In his research, he stated that radical organizations in Indonesia or on an international scale had used the internet intensively in managing their movements. The internet is used to influence, convey radical propaganda, recruit new members, communicate, and do fundraising. In addition, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2011 identified 7 (seven) forms of use of cyberspace for this radical group, including propaganda, recruitment, funding, training, planning, spreading terror, and cyber attack (Muthohirin, 2015) (Ghifari, 2017).

In terms of the use of technology in cases of criminal acts of terrorism, an organization known as ISIS has also announced its establishment through social media. This radical group, which Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi commands, uses technology such as the internet to carry out propaganda and spread threats against several countries through videos uploaded to Youtube. One of the facts that spread and the most horrifying was when ISIS executed a reporter from the US by beheading, which then the video of the beheading spread to social media. In addition, in the ISIS case, before the shooting that killed 14 people in

San Bernardino, California, there was a husband and wife couple who uploaded their writings to their Facebook account expressing their loyalty to the ISIS group. So this explains to the global community that social media is not only used by terrorist groups to spread acts of terror but also proves that the sophistication and identity of the group is a group that is not technologically blind (Muthohirin, 2015) (Muthohirin, 2015)(Anam, 2018)(Pearson, 2016).

Furthermore, in Indonesia itself, radicalism has led to several acts of terror, such as separatism, anti-union, and other acts of terror (Asrori, 2015) (Rubaidi, 2011) (W.kusuma, 2002) (Musthafa, 2002). To create state defense and security and prevent acts of terror, the Government, through the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) in Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning the Crime of Terrorism which contains policies on counter-radicalization aimed at preventing radical understanding such as using violence in the name of religion, infidel people (takfiri), and limited meaning of jihad (Ghifari, 2017) (Ulya, 2016). In addition, this policy also aims to counteract radical notions that have been in the spotlight in various countries, such as actions that support views that are different from those supported by most but often embody extreme, terror, and destructive behavior (Chalim, 2018) (Khamid, 2016) (Mage, 2017).

Several other efforts that the Indonesian Government has made in dealing with acts of terrorism are carried out in several ways, such as (1) the issuance of Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism which was later changed to Law Number 5 of 2018; (2) the establishment of a Special Officers Unit known as Densus 88 AT or Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror which was formed through the Decree of the National Police Chief No. 30/VI/2003 which has special authority to enforce the law against cases of criminal acts of terrorism; (3) the issuance of Presidential Decree Number 46 of 2010 concerning the Establishment of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) which has the task of tackling cases of criminal acts of terrorism; and (4) special operations involving a joint task consisting of elements of the TNI and Polri to eradicate cases of criminal acts of terrorism (Anakotta, 2020).

Furthermore, the data shows that the number of convicts of criminal acts of terrorism until 2022 is recorded as 1,031 people, with the distribution of this number being in detention houses (Rutan) or correctional institutions (prisons). Komjen. Pol. Boy Rafli Amar, Head of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), stated that the number was 575 people in remand, and 456 were in prison. Furthermore, the five areas used were West Java, as many as 471 people; Central Java, as many as 205 people; Jakarta, as many as 163 people; Lampung, as many as 37 people; and East Java, as many as 36 people (Fadjarudin, 2022).

The discovery of recidivist terrorism cases also influences the development of terrorism cases in Indonesia. The recidivist who used to be behind bars for his acts of terrorism is now repeating acts of terrorism and being arrested again by the authorities. Based on research data conducted by the Peace Prasati Foundation, during 2018-2019, there were 80 terrorism recidivists. The high number of recidivists proves that the problem of terrorism is still happening, and it will be the Government's job to tackle it.

Furthermore, it is not only policy products issued by the Government, but it also makes counter-narrative countermeasures in the form of the realization of counter-propaganda carried out by BNPT through 2 (two) methods consisting of online methods and offline methods (Sadarusalam, 2019). The two methods are carried out with several strategies, namely as follows:

1. External, namely the strategy carried out by BNPT through coordination with institutions, stakeholders, and ministries outside BNPT to prevent radical ideologies.

2. Internal, namely the strategy made by establishing a peaceful media center where the media is used as a tool for radical counter-narratives in various forms such as videos, memes, posters, articles, And so on.

Furthermore, counter-narrative policies in preventing and overcoming radicalization in Indonesia are carried out by using soft approaches, such as by countering propaganda with counter-narratives created or narratives that reverse false information through straightening factual information or by using hard approaches, such as blocking websites that are indicated to be radical (Sb, 2016).

Even so, the fact is that radicalism in Indonesia is still quite high. First, based on data obtained from primary sources, it is stated that around 26 Facebook accounts are spreading radical and terrorism content, 32 websites for bombing procedures, 16 lists of terrorist Twitter accounts, 108 radical Islamic sites that post Sara, anti-Chinese, and anti-Chinese posts. anti-NKRI and anti-government, which can be downloaded, 34 salafy websites for Ustad Fans need to be watched out for. Two hundred twenty-five radical articles are spread and can be downloaded by the public. The book of Muqarrah Fi Tauhid which is used as the basis for the movement of every radical and has several times become evidence as a terrorist study tool, can still be searched on google and is easily accessible by the public. Second, there is still widespread understanding of radicals in universities and among Civil Servants, based on research conducted by the Setara Institute in several higher education institutions in Indonesia, which shows that there are about ten campuses exposed to religious radicalism, namely: the University of Indonesia, UIN Syarief Hidayatullah, ITB, UIN Bandung, IPB, UGM, UNY, Unbraw, Airlangga University, Mataram University.

Based on this background, it is necessary to measure the implementation of the counter-radicalization policy. So to measure the success of the implementation of the policy can be measured according to Grindle (Subarsono, 2015); the measurement of this implementation can be done using two dimensions consisting of the policy content and the context of the policy. However, in this case, the researcher analyzes one dimension, namely the content of the policy dimension. The indicators of content of policy consist of: Interest affected, Type of benefit, The extent of change, Site of decision making, Program implementer and Resources committed (Grindle, 1980).

Furthermore, the previous research used by the researcher was a study conducted by Mochamad Kholid Afandi entitled "Contra Narrative of Islamic Radicalism in Social Media (Case Study of GP Ansor Surabaya)." This study aims to learn about youth's understanding of Islamic radicalism on social media, forms of counter-narrative discourse, and the implications of understanding Islamic radicalism discourse on social media. The type of research used is qualitative research with descriptive methods. The research object used is the counter-narrative of Islamic radicalism in social media conducted by GP Ansor Surabaya, while the formal object confirms the thought of Michael Foucault's discourse and power relations as the analytical knife. The results showed that GP Ansor Surabaya understood that the discourse of Islamic radicalism on social media was a threat to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila, so GP Ansor countered the narrative of Islamic radicalism on social media by forming the Ansor Cyber Army and anti-hoax troops who organized prevention programs through digital literacy training. Furthermore, the implication of the counter-narrative movement of Islamic radicalism is in the form of increasing public understanding of tolerance and friendly Islamic da'wah on social media (Jazuli, 2016).

Another research used is by Ahmad Jazuli with the title "Strategies for Prevention of Radicalism in the Context of Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism." The research aims to identify and analyze the radicalism prevention strategy to eradicate the crime of terrorism. The method used is a normative juridical approach and descriptive analysis through the study of doctrinal law on the relevant laws and

regulations in Indonesia. While the results obtained, namely to prevent radicalism, can be done using two strategies: an approach and a gentle approach. At the same time, the strategy combines enforcement and prevention and is carried out simultaneously by taking a "proactive law enforcement" approach without neglecting the rule of law and the legal principle (Sudrajat, Hanadi, Hendriana, & Utami, 2021).

Researchers also use research conducted by Tedi Sudrajat, Saryono Hanadi, Rani Hendriana, and Nurani Ajeng T. Utami entitled Anti-Radicalism Policy through Counter Radicalization of State Civil Apparatus Employees in Indonesia. The purpose of this study is to analyze the policies issued by the Government to prevent radicalism among ASN employees. The research method uses a sociological juridical approach with a descriptive research specification. The analytical method used uses content analysis and constant comparative analysis methods. The results showed that the Government made two efforts, namely general and special efforts (Sudrajat, Hanadi, Hendriana, & Utami, 2021).

The novelty that distinguishes this research from previous research lies in the focus of the research, where the researcher focuses his research on counter-narrative policies in handling radicalism. In addition, another difference lies in the dimensions used; namely, the researcher uses the theory proposed by Grindle regarding the Context of Policy as a measuring tool in conducting the analysis. So that by using this theory, researchers can focus their research on policy implementation and measurements related to the success of policy implementation regarding counter-narrative policies in overcoming radicalism in Indonesia.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research is a descriptive study using a qualitative approach where this study describes the reality of implementing counter-radicalization policies using two methods, offline and online, as stated by Creswell (2010) which states that the qualitative approach is a process of exploring and understanding the meaning of actions or behaviors carried out by individuals or groups, as well as describing social problems and other humanitarian problems (Creswell, 2010). The data collected is data obtained from primary and secondary sources. Primary data sources were obtained through interviews with the informants whom the purposive sampling technique had determined.

The research informants in this study consisted of the Head of the BNPT Prevention Division, the Head of the West Java FKPT Religion Division, the Head of the West Java Duta Damai Coordinator, and the Peace Media Center. Informants are determined in advance by considering the research subjects involved in policy implementation so that they can explain the existing reality. At the same time, secondary data sources were obtained through BNPT tabloid documents, audio-visuals, and related websites such as peacelahindonesiaku.com. The data collected is then analyzed using the model analysis proposed by Huberman which consists of data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). In contrast, data validation is done by using the data triangulation technique.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The discussion regarding implementing counter-narrative or counter-radicalization policies is based on real problems that follow the strategies, methods, and approaches BNPT has taken in tackling radical ideas that still spread in Indonesia. In this case, the researcher measures the extent to which counter-radicalization policies have been implemented in Indonesia by using a measuring instrument, namely the theory put forward by Grindle regarding the content of policy with six indicators in it. The explanation of these dimensions is as follows:

Interest Affected

Interest affected is a form of Interest that can influence policy implementation and is a measurement used to determine the extent to which the interests of policy targets have been contained in the counter-radicalization policy. In this indicator, measurements are made on two things: who is the target of the policy and what is the Interest of the target in counter-radicalization efforts. Based on the research results, the general target of this counter-radicalization program is all Indonesian people who have not been exposed to radicalism, including students, artists, employees, and so on. This means that people exposed to radical ideas are not the target of this policy. This is as explained by the Head of the BNPT Prevention Directorate:

"If in today's context, prevention is defined as national vigilance, counter-radicalization and deradicalization are carried out according to this law. So in the law, there is prevention and law enforcement. So prevention is done by counter-radicalization, counter-narrative, and counter ideology. Counter radicalism here is for people who have not been exposed to radical ideas, such as students, artists, and the general public. The point is if deradicalization is only dealing with 2000-2000, 2000 are arrested with their families, if I subtract 2000 from 260 million people Indonesian people, Indonesian people, that's the only difference, it's called counter radicalization."

Furthermore, the target is then divided into two methods, namely, the target of the offline method and the target of the online method. Both methods have been implemented by involving all levels of society, such as religious circles, educators, and youth. These targets are realized depending on certain programs. For example, Duta Damai who has a target focus of students, junior and senior secondary education students, as well as spiritual organizations in the educational environment. This is following another statement regarding the target of this counter-radicalization program which was explained by the Media Damai Center Staff as follows:

"The target of the counter-radicalization policy, both offline and online, is the general public who have not been exposed to radicalism and people who are vulnerable to exposure."

Meanwhile, in the context of whether the interests of the entire community are contained in the policy of this counter-radicalization program, the study results show that some Indonesian people are unaware of these interests. In this case, some people do not believe in the existence of a radical understanding that is spreading. This is caused by a lack of understanding and ignorance of the dangers of terrorism because some people who, in this case, can become potential victims of terrorism cannot recognize what threats will be faced. So that this situation becomes one of the obstacles that occur during the implementation of the counter-radicalization program. This is explained in detail in the following interview results:

"This external obstacle occurs because many people do not believe that terrorism exists, there are people who think that this is a fabrication, so it's like people being told that you are sick, a doctor tells you but you still say that I am not sick, so difficult right?. Unless you have autoimmunity, so even if you do not want to be given medicine because you do not feel sick, then you feel "ah, this is just a conspiracy, it is just badmouthing Islam, Islamophobia" is inhibiting us, that is why we always tell, and now Thank God, there is one more person who does not understand, actually this is how these ideas are growing rapidly, is one of them because we are not aware, why are we not aware because we do not know? why don't you know, because the issue is considered sensitive".

However, this differs from the explanation presented by the Media Damai Center Staff, who stated that the community responded well. This can be seen in the following interview results:

“In general, the community welcomes this program because the community still does not have adequate understanding and knowledge about the dangers and prevention of terrorism. This lack of knowledge is one of the causes of vulnerability”.

Meanwhile, to find out whether the Interest of the target group contained in the policy can be seen through 2 important components, as stated by Chris Wheeler (2013), namely objective and outcome, as well as processes and procedures. By the nature of this counter-radicalization program, it can be considered objective because it leads to mutual security, while in terms of procedures and processes, it can be seen from several components, namely the existence of laws that regulate, function fairly, and not partially as well as professionalism, transparency accountability, no mal-administration and no there is a conflict of Interest, then based on the statement above, these things have been done by BNPT, especially in the field of prevention in carrying out this counter-radicalization program (Wheeler, 2013).

From some of these explanations, the researcher can conclude that the target group's interests are not contained in the policy. This is because the policy targets cannot directly feel the dangers of terrorism. Some of the targets are less aware of the radical understanding that is developing because they have a perception of radicalism itself, so it can be concluded that it is the public perception that leads people as if they have no interest in counter-narratives. This can also be considered reasonable because the essence of this policy is advocacy which this advocacy policy aims to convince the public of what is happening, especially to prevent radicalism. So, in general, on this indicator, researchers can conclude that the Interest affected or the interests of the target group have led to the success of policy implementation. This is because the counter-radicalization policy implicitly contained the target group's interests. However, the quality of policy advocacy is still said to be not optimal, so it cannot convince the public, and some people do not believe in the danger of terrorism.

Type Of Benefit

In the indicator of the type of benefit or the type of benefit received by the target group, the researcher measures this in terms of the type or form of the benefit. The types of benefits received by the policy target groups from this counter-radicalization program are in the form of narratives, counter-propaganda, counter-narratives, counter ideologies, and counterintelligence. While the narration contains a substance that can provide understanding to the community, it can be said that the narration can be an antidote or immunization for the reader. This follows what is explained by the Head of the BNPT Prevention Division as follows:

“...counter radicalization consists of counter-narrative, counterintelligence, counter-propaganda, counter ideology, and other counters. So counter-radicalization is the same as immunization, that's easy. So when people are given it, people are calm, if they are not given it, they end up being troubled.”

The explanation of the types of benefits received from this counter-radicalization policy cannot be measured externally or explicitly. However, it has benefits that can be obtained from this policy in the form of a straight understanding based on state life within the current system. Propaganda spread on social media or in books carried out by extremists can harm society, but information that is considered to be able to benefit extremists is one thing that BNPT can prevent. Alternatively, it can be concluded that the policy's benefits can be carried out by providing correct information and not following what is directed by the propagandist. This is as explained by the resource person regarding the following benefits:

“This counter-radicalization is very important so that people who have not been exposed and who are vulnerable can be fortified from the influence of radicalism. The way to fortify them is to

increase their deterrence and endurance. Lack of knowledge is one of the causes of vulnerability. By knowing the dangers, potentials, and prevention efforts, the public will be more aware of the phenomenon of terrorism that can infect anyone.”

Other benefits were also explained by the Head of the Religion Division of the West Java Province FKPT, who stated that other benefits obtained from the dissemination of information through social media were as follows:

“I will give an example of the propaganda intensified by the propagandists, what is your job, sir? Is that salary enough for your life? do you want to work with me? I give 2 billion, but the task is to deliver this item here. this is dangerous and must be prevented. In prevention, we don't just talk about brothers and sisters, don't do this, don't do that, counter-radicalization in cyberspace or through institutions, so the approach is soft power, there is a change in mindset that must be given to students, students, and so on, it's in the form of education, through pesantren, through mosques, and others. These are the things that can prevent the incident that I described earlier”.

So based on the explanation, the researcher can see that the benefits received by the community are in the form of state security, the truth of information, and the truth of understanding so that it does not plunge the community into unexpected directions. Meanwhile, the information provided by BNPT is an antithesis of propaganda carried out by exposing several conflicts that have occurred at a global level so that it can ignite the fire of the spirit of Muslims in Indonesia.

Directly, the researcher views that these benefits cannot be felt directly by the Indonesian people because the nature and shape of it are narratives and narrative contexts. However, on the other hand, it has benefits that will lead to the realm of clear thinking and understanding for some people, or it can be said that the benefits received are indirect. This is in line with what was stated by Ebenezer in Oni (2019) which states that this policy can be called an advocacy policy where the policy focuses on government activities designed to describe the support and promote certain policies through several objectives, including discussion and persuasion. Furthermore, political activities can create understanding, awareness, and public sensitivity to policy orientation and content (Oni, 2016). So on this indicator, the researcher can conclude that this counter-radicalization policy benefits the target group, namely the security of all Indonesian people from radicalism that can threaten state consensus.

Extent Of Change

In this indicator, researchers measure the extent to which the changes they want to achieve from the targets made by policy or program makers so that researchers also see what expectations or goals they want to achieve in realizing this counter-propaganda policy. Based on an interview with the Chief Coordinator of the West Java Duta Damai, he explained that the purpose of counter-radicalization and counter-propaganda carried out online and offline against the target group is very simple. Duta Damai does not want to give the perception that radicalism or terrorism comes from one race, one religion, or one ethnicity. So that all of them can potentially generate radical understanding. As for the level of understanding of radicalism in West Java Province, he said there were no statistical targets for achieving the changes. This can be seen in the results of the interview with the Chairperson of the West Java Province Duta Damai as follows:

“Our hope is simple, the hope is to lead/build opinion to the public so as not to discredit one religion, race, etc. because the problem of radicalism and terrorism is a common problem and has become a global issue, not only subjected to one religion, so we don't want black and white related to this issue, so we also raise other contexts such as hoaxes, hate speech, etc.”

Furthermore, unlike the Ambassador of Peace, who does not want to lead the public to one religion or race, the Director of Prevention stated that counter-radicalization is aimed at stopping or preventing the ideas that develop and can damage the state system today. The change to be achieved from the existence of this counter-radicalization policy is the public's understanding of the information circulating regarding the Middle East conflict or even countries where Muslims are seen as being oppressed. He also stated that what he wanted to achieve through this policy was a change in the public's understanding of developing information that could provide wrong information and could spark anger from several community groups. In this case, BNPT has made arrangements that should happen to the community. So this can be seen in the following interview results:

"Uighurs for example, Uighurs are in the province of China in Xinjiang, about 49 percent of Islam and the rest are Chinese, of those 49 percent 50 percent are native Uighurs, the rest are Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and other Tan Tans but the most are Uighurs because he is the majority in some Islam, they want to establish their own country, there is another narrative, I want it to be led by the same person as me, the narratives they put forward, that is what we must give understanding to the community. for example, it's not like that, that later we have to make the last prophecy, the narrative is like this, Muslims are being wronged, which Muslims? there is a criminalization of religion, how many people like this have been arrested by the police? even if there is, for example, because it is legally wrong, so this narrative has been built on its substance."

Regarding the crackdown on the spread of radical ideas through social media, BNPT's actions against websites that, according to the findings of Densus 88, are classified as radical websites are to take action. Where the action already exists and is part of the counter-radicalization policy, this counter-radicalization only provides or counters narratives that are considered heretical. The counter-radicalization part of responding to websites like this is to provide advice to the Kominfo to follow up on the website, while the authority for following up on the website is in the Kominfo section. This can be seen in the following interview excerpts:

"If it's not counter-radicalization, if counter-radicalization provides a counter-narrative, the counter-narrative can be head to head or can provide alternative narratives, it's counter-radical, so counter-radicals does not include those who block, but for that block we only suggest, suggesting this to be blocked, because it cannot be punished, it cannot enter the realm of law yet. In the structure, we only recommend Kominfo, so we only ask Kominfo. Because Densus cannot catch this person, it will be recommended to block it, it's still counter-radical. The one with the ability to block is Kominfo because he has everything, not us. has the capacity to do the blocking, but the authority cannot because the one who owns the domain is Kominfo."

So from the explanation above, the researcher can see that the change to be achieved through this policy is simple, namely making changes to a public understanding regarding information that develops and can lead to misinformation, thereby sparking anger from several community groups. So, in this case, BNPT has set the settings that should not happen to the community. However, this is different from what was stated by Carter A. Wilson (2019), which states that the objectives of a policy can be achieved depending on the desired level of change, such as in terms of changes in population and changes in costs. This population change depends on the percentage of the total population, so the change will occur if the target population has a smaller percentage. However, if the population percentage is large, the changes tend to be less (Wilson, 2019). If viewed from the population reach, the changes that will be achieved by counter-radicalization tend to be difficult because it must reach the entire population of Indonesian society who has not been exposed.

So the researcher can conclude that this counter-radicalization change is indeed difficult to occur. However, BNPT does not yet have written indicators or targets regarding the desired changes in the community. In addition, the discrepancy between the target concept and the implementor of the subjected area affects the performance or realization of the counter-radicalization policy itself.

Site of Decision Making

In the indicator of the decision-making site or location, researchers see whether those with the relevant authority can decide technical decisions. The Prevention Division decides the decision regarding counter-propaganda itself, which then goes down to the Sub-Directorate for Counter-Propaganda, the Media Center, and the Duta Damai. The FKPT is related to community empowerment, prevention, or counter-propaganda, which is carried out 80% offline. In contrast, for counter-narrative and counter-propaganda carried out by Duta Damai, under the Center for Media Damai, 80% of the responsibility is online. This can be seen from the following interview excerpts:

"I have 3 sub-directories, namely the supervision sub-directorate, the counter-propaganda sub-directorate and the community empowerment sub-directorate, for the counter-propaganda sub-directorate we have more online, if the offline community empowerment is more, only not 100%, the online counter-propaganda is mostly , we have Duta Damais, the Duta Damai are our people / student friends who have blogger, internet skills, which we recruit, and continue to launch counter-narratives."

Another statement regarding who is responsible for this counter-radicalization program can be seen from the results of interviews with other informants as follows:

"BNPT through the deputy for prevention. BNPT as the coordinating agency coordinates related institutions according to their respective fields and also involves the community."

Meanwhile, the place for making decisions regarding the narrative built to carry out counter-propaganda at Duta Damai depends on the Media Center for Peace area. The Media Peace Center has central issues with themes as determined in the National Coordination Meeting and the form of a blueprint. This can be seen in the following interview excerpts:

"The narratives that are often raised are social tolerance, national aspects, every week there is an issue raised by the central Duta Damai coordinator (PMD) there is a blue print for the narrative every week from PMD. regional Duta Damai only bring down central issues, or the narratives raised are adapted to local wisdom, according to their respective regions or provinces according to philosophical values, we as Duta Damai are trying to read millennial trends, for religious narratives we don't want to be trapped in black and white, we give an understanding that it is not related to religion."

Meanwhile, the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants in Abubakar (2012) explained that the decision-making level is based on the institutional hierarchy. These levels include strategic decisions, tactical decisions, and operational decisions. Strategic decisions are related to top management, tactical decisions are related to middle management, and operational decisions are related to everyday decisions in running a program (Nura & Osman, 2012). Judging from the statement that BNPT has implemented the counter-radicalization program, it has these three levels, strategically, the field of prevention conceptualizes online counter-radicalization, tactically decided by PMD, and operationally Duta Damai carries out counter-radicalization. So based on this reality, the researcher can conclude that the location of the decisions taken in this counter-radicalization is appropriate and follows the existing structure. This means that fields have carried out decision-making activities related to what decisions must be taken.

Program Implementator

The implementor of this counter-radicalization policy generally lies in the Prevention Sector at BNPT. However, technically, this implementor depends on the existing program structure. This is because, in the implementation of counter-radicalization itself, several implementers are in structures such as PMD, Counter-Propaganda Sector, Media Literacy, FKPT, and Ambassadors of Peace. The implementers of counter-radicalization are the entire Sub-Directorate of Prevention Unit, where the sub-unit includes the Sub-Directorate of Counter-Propaganda, Sub-Directorate of Community Empowerment, and Sub-Directorate of Protection. The Counter-Propaganda Sub-Directorate contains media literacy, PMD, and Ambassadors of Peace. The units are responsible for online, around 80% counter-propaganda, and offline, 20% offline. Meanwhile, the Community Empowerment Unit, which includes FKPT and the fields of women, education, youth, clergy, researchers, and all elements of society, is responsible for implementing offline prevention, which is around 80%. This can be seen in the following interview excerpts:

"I have 3 sub-directories, namely the supervision sub-directorate, the counter-propaganda sub-directorate, and the community empowerment sub-directorate, for the counter-propaganda sub-directorate we have more online if the offline community empowerment is more, only not 100%, in the online counter-propaganda, we have ambassadors for peace, those Duta Damai are our people / fellow students who have blogger, internet skills, whom we recruited, and there they continue to launch counter-narratives, and have reached Asia now, and there will be Duta Damaiglobal, will invite all youth in the world to incite peace through online, actually this movement is massive, right, we in this world cannot be piecemeal, we must be peaceful, everything must be peaceful if there is peace, there is conflict, the conflict will follow. get over here"

While the strategy was carried out to integrate all of the implementors so that the performance achieved is in the same direction and follows the objectives of the drafter, the resource person as one of the drafters in the Prevention Sector responded to this as follows:

"We monitor, there is monitoring, there is evaluation, every year we hold coordination meetings, work meetings, National Working Meetings, National Coordination Meetings, we usually hold National Working Meetings at the beginning of the year, like yesterday we gathered Duta Damais, everything that has been done, what has not, then how to give, if in community empowerment we have FKPT in 32 provinces, so that is our extension, in West Java, there is that, usually lecturer collaboration between Kesbangpol "

For the implementers of the counter-propaganda in the Duta Damai himself, who is more concerned with virtual reality, there is a division of labor that each can do. Just as the Implementer of narrative development is in the Blogging Sector, the Implementer who produces various interesting virtual forms such as memes, videos, and images is in the Visual Communication Design section, and the implementor in charge of websites and other social media is in the IT Sector. This is following what was stated by the informant, namely:

"The virtual world focuses on online, formed 3 divisions of blogging experts (writing), this division is responsible for the narratives that are built usually people who are competent in managing blogs, visual communication design (DKV) which produces memes, videos, images related to issues that are being raised whose substance is counter-propaganda and IT (the official website of DD Jabar) which is responsible for several social media as well as the website of the Duta Damai himself"

So based on the explanation, the researcher can see that the Implementer of this counter-radicalization policy is generally the Prevention Sector. However, in detail, this implementor can be distinguished according to the structure that is more responsible offline, namely in the field of Community

Empowerment, while for online implementors, it is more to the Media Damai Center under which there is an Ambassador of Peace. From the reality that has been described previously, the researcher concludes that the implementation of the counter-radicalization policy is following the objectives of the policy, where all implementers are mentioned in detail and systematically so that in the implementation of the counter-radicalization program, there has been an implementer who is responsible for the output.

Resources Committee

The Resources committed indicator can be assessed from two things, namely in terms of sources of funds and human resources. Sources of funds can be related to the funds used, while human resources can be seen from the quality, ability, and potential of those involved in counter-radicalization programs in general. The human resources that carry out this counter-radicalization program consist of 100 people who work in the Prevention Sector. These resources are also supported by coordinating with other ministries. This can be seen in the following interview excerpts:

"We cannot do counter-radicalization alone. In my place, 100 people manage 265 million, so we have synergy with 36 K/L; we have to do that; we cannot be alone. Synergy in our Government has 38 ministries/agencies involved."

While the obstacles often faced in human resources, the Head of Prevention stated that the quality and quantity of human resources in the Prevention Sector needed more strengthening. Meanwhile, another obstacle to funding resources is the limited ability of the state to provide funds. This can be seen in the following excerpts from the interviews:

"Human resources, we are a new institution. We still need a source of strengthening, both in terms of quality and quantity, for this quantity is too classic; the state's capacity is limited, and in terms of our budget, it is not enough, but that is not the main reason. To do that."

Another obstacle that cannot be separated from the existing reality, where BNPT is a relatively new agency and is different from the realm of other government agencies such as the economy, education, or health, can be seen in the following interview results:

"Terrorism is a new issue if we talk about the economy, business, it has been around for a long time, terrorism is a new issue if Indonesia has DI/TII experience, but for this it is a new global nature, meaning no one learns specifically to tackle this, it is different when we talk about the Ministry of Health, there has always been, if this is a new education, that is why there is data on the Densus 88 cement, the BNPT is new which still needs people who need strengthening, although I think it is like in the Densus Alhamdulillah, it has been ten years here now, I can run and hopefully it will get better."

Furthermore, regarding the human resources available at Duta Damai, the resource persons explained the obstacles and shortcomings in the human resource capacity of Duta Damai as follows:

"All the resources of Duta Damai are capable of constructing ideas, in terms of such capabilities we are capable, but back to personal commitment, Duta Damai are not aware of important issues, they can construct ideas, but this is because they are volunteers, not paid, while they have personal affairs which pay more. Therefore Duta Damai must have personal values/personal expectations."

Meanwhile, Carter. A. Wilson (2019) states that a policy will fail when the objectives of the policy are ambiguous, sufficient resources are unavailable, or the agency has other priorities. Based on the data presented, BNPT has a shortage of both financial and human resources, which can potentially be fatal enough to the implementation of this counter-radicalization performance (Wilson, 2019).

So based on the explanation above, the researcher can conclude that the operational support from BNPT and the Media Damai Center can be sufficient. However, the obstacle often faced is the existing human resources in the prevention unit and at the Duta Damai itself, for which only a few members are willing to commit to their responsibilities. This is caused by several things, such as pragmatic and personal interests owned by each Duta Damai member. The researcher also considers that the resources used in preventing radicalism have several obstacles and shortcomings.

CONCLUSION

Based on the results of observations as described previously, the researchers concluded that the measurement of the implementation of this counter-narrative policy had not run optimally, both offline and online. The Interest affected policy content, which includes the extent to which the interests of the target group in the policy indicate that the interests of the target group are still unclear. This can be seen from the presence of people who negatively perceive the counter-radicalization program. This means that this policy does not cover the entire community's Interest in counter-radicalization, so this becomes one of the external obstacles to realizing the program.

Furthermore, on the indicator of the extent of change or changes that have been achieved, there is a discrepancy between the desired achievements between the policy drafters and policy implementers. This desire is not stated in the blueprint or implementation instructions and technical instructions. Furthermore, in the Resources committed indicator, there are still shortcomings in terms of budget and talented and committed human resources, so the available resources are only voluntary and pragmatic motivation. Meanwhile, in the policy context, the drawback lies in the characteristics of the regime in power. The central Government has given priority and full support, but in terms of local governments, they tend to have still characteristics that are lacking in responding to radical ideas that are spread in their regions.

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