

Beyond the Presidential Threshold: How Cebong and Kampret Political Identities Shape Social Media Discourse

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ABSTRACT

The polemic regarding the Presidential Threshold policy has caused conflict in society and hampered Indonesia's political development. This study aims to prove the impact of the Presidential Threshold policy on the political identity of two groups of people who are often referred to as "cebong" and "kampret". The impact of this policy has led to polarization of netizens and heated and uncontrolled communication patterns on social media. This study uses the netnographic method with a critical discourse approach to determine the impact of the policy. The results showed that the Presidential Threshold policy had an impact on the inconsistency of political parties, there were only 2 pairs of candidates in the presidential election, injured small parties because of oligarchic efforts, many negative comments were hostile on social media and researchers found Presidential Threshold policies gave birth to a Political Identity "cebong- kampret, which can cause the Indonesian nation to experience segregation which creates conflict in society and of course triggers national disgrace on social media. With the existence of a Presidential Threshold policy, the government must consider the presentation of 20%, this can reduce the polarization that exists in society.

Keywords: Policy, Presidential Threshold, Politic, Indonesian Politics

INTRODUCTION

The Presidential Threshold policy polemic in Indonesia has creates the impact of segregation of society into two distinct groups known as "cebong" and "kampret". Policies made at the time President Joko Widodo's administration has raised concerns about the occurrence of divisions and conflicts expressed by the two groups the public in political statements against

the candidates for President and Deputy President. In the political contestation ahead of the 2019 Presidential election, the pattern of political communication became very arbitrary and even uncontrolled, satire and blasphemy between the two groups of people became commonplace (Tazri, 2019). The most controversial and prolonged polemic related to the presidential election in 2019 lies at the presidential threshold. The Presidential Threshold is the minimum requirement that must be met by a Presidential candidate based on the acquisition of votes in a valid parliamentary or national vote (We, 2017). This requirement is a minimum threshold that must be met by political parties or coalitions of political parties in determining the candidates for President and Vice President. This phenomenon has created a new political identity, namely "cebong-kampret", It should be noted, "Cebong" is the name for the frog (tadpole) intended for radical supporters of Joko Widodo who is presidential candidate number 01, while "Kampret", is the name for baby bats intended for Prabowo Subianto radical supporters who are presidential candidates' serial number 02. and has sparked conflict and polarization in society as well as influenced patterns of heated communication on social media.

The Presidential Threshold policy raises pros and cons that significantly affect society. A polarization phenomenon arises between supporters of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, which is manifested in the term "Cebong-Kampret" on social media and the social conflicts that arise as a result. This policy aims to simplify the division of parties in parliament, but in practice, this can be detrimental to small parties (Diniyanto, 2018). For example, in the 2014 elections, no political party met the minimum threshold requirements to nominate candidates for President and Vice President. This resulted in negative impacts such as a lack of community participation in casting their voting rights, their apathy and indifference in general elections. The Presidential Threshold policy is

considered discriminatory or detrimental to political parties, because it does not facilitate small parties in nominating candidates for President and Vice President.

According to previous research Abdul Ghoffar (2018) has reported on the issue of presidential threshold, focusing on the Constitutional Court's decision and experiences in other countries. His research has essentially shown that presidential threshold is unnecessary. Another study conducted by Sholahuddin Al-Fatih (2019) explored the legal consequences of the regulation on presidential threshold in legislative and presidential elections. This research also argues that the policy of presidential threshold is not necessary (Sumodiningrat, 2021). In fact, it is difficult to find countries that implement the presidential threshold requirement for determining their presidential candidates, especially in presidential systems such as Indonesia. Our search has revealed that the opposite is true: many countries do not use presidential threshold (Ghoffar, 2018). Quoting J. Mark Payne et al. in their book, *Democracies in Development: Politics and Reform in Latin America*, they explain that presidential threshold in elections refers to the requirement for a presidential candidate to win the presidency, such as in Brazil, where the threshold is 50% plus one. This substantiates the fact that presidential threshold is a requirement for a presidential and vice-presidential candidate to be elected as president, not a requirement for nomination as a presidential or vice-presidential candidate. In presidential systems, the application of a minimum threshold is intended to ensure the eligibility of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates (Ambarwati, 2020). In other words, the context of implementing the presidential threshold policy, if this term is to be used, is not to limit the nomination of presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The holding of general elections in 2019 is evidence of the many issues or polemics that have occurred, ranging from regulations to general and technical implementation. (Diniyanto, 2018). The constitution states that a political

party or a coalition of political parties may nominate a presidential and vice-presidential candidate.

The perspective of the community in favor of the Presidential Threshold policy argues that with many political parties participating in the 2024 elections, there will be a high number of candidates running for President and Vice President. This will create a difficulty in choosing the most suitable candidates for the roles. The debate on the pros and cons of implementing the Presidential Threshold resurfaces as the law on the election of the President and Vice President is being revised (Sinamora, 2019). Currently, the House of Representatives has not reached a consensus on whether to apply the Presidential Threshold in the 2024 elections or to eliminate it altogether. This decision will undoubtedly include the social stigmas attached to the Presidential Threshold system and its impact on the community's perception.

This study aims to reveal the impact of the Presidential Threshold policy on political identity between the two Cebong and Kampret groups. This research wants to prove whether the enactment of the Presidential threshold policy can result in national disintegration in social media and the right solution to overcome the problem is by not implementing the presidential threshold policy.

RESEARCH METHOD

On research "Beyond the Presidential Threshold: How Cebong and Kampret Political Identities Shape Social Media Discourse", We use netnographic methods to research netizens. The type of research we use is qualitative with a critical discourse approach because the problem we want to examine is the phenomenon of the emergence of political identity in social media, especially virtual communities that depend on observations in cyberspace. (Muamar, 2022). This research focuses on studies on social media and understanding social relations on social media. This study conducts social

media analysis and observes phenomena regarding the problem to be researched and collects data using social media (Evelina, 2019). To carry out this research, we collect data by observing texts, comments, videos, images, and news originating from social media user accounts, such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, TikTok, Twitter, and online news that the researchers trusted. We use data sources in the form of books, documents, photos, videos, netizens, and other archives related to the topic under study (Villegas, 2018). In choosing a research method, we consider its relevance to current issues and its suitability in helping to gain a communicative and cultural understanding of netizens' thoughts by mapping netizen comments on social media. The netnographic method is relevant to this research when analyzed in assisting research in obtaining communicative and cultural understanding from embedded understanding through the thought processes of netizens by mapping the comments of netizens on social media.

We used the netnography method, which emphasizes online observation connected through the internet and mediated by computers, to study netizens. Netnographic data includes text data such as postings, online news, and downloaded files (Kulavuzon & Vásquez, 2013). Our observation method involved direct observation of the phenomenon being studied, specifically netizens' comments, which falls under the category of indirect observation. We conducted direct observations by observing and recording in the field to address the research problem. Since this study utilized netnography, the observations were conducted using technology. We obtained data by examining the social media content produced by each subject that pertained to the research topic, which is the impact of the presidential threshold policy on political identities (cebong-kampret). Additionally, we conducted data archiving, which involved copying internet-mediated communication data related to social media usage activities. With this archived data, we focused on data that was relevant to the study and carefully

examined its connection to the research topic. Our documentation for this study included photographs, videos, relevant books related to the study of the presidential threshold policy's impact on political identities on social media. We accessed various social media platforms related to political figures' posts or activities that would undoubtedly influence society. Screenshots were taken, and important keywords were used to create discovery codes. Next, we will provide an explanation and understanding of these posts.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Impact of Presidential Threshold Policy on Society

The Presidential Threshold polemic resurfaced with the ratification of the Indonesian constitution in Law no. 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections. The Presidential Threshold raises pros and cons, the application of the Presidential Threshold policy gives a discriminatory impression of democracy in Indonesia. Applying the Presidential Threshold with a high percentage is the same as limiting the number of candidates which sacrifices the people's right to the choice of candidates. Determination of the Presidential Threshold for presidential and vice-presidential candidate parties in the DPR to obtain votes and seats in the 2019 election reduces democratic values and undermines the realization of the constitutional rights of political parties (especially new parties that did not take part in the previous elections). Therefore, the more candidates, the more options to choose from, resulting in a higher quality of democracy in the presidential election, which stimulates voter participation.



Figure 1 Presidential Threshold Policy Comments

Figure 1 explains comments regarding Presidential Threshold policies that trigger polarization in society and kill the potential of national leadership. The Presidential Threshold requirement of 20 percent of the seats in the DPR causes a sharp polarization. According to the general chairman of the Indonesian Gelora Party, Anis Matta in a Gelora Talk entitled "Measuring the Reform of the Indonesian Political System, Is It Possible to Become a Wave?".

"This system has had the effect of creating a very sharp polarization and has led to advocacy in society whose residue still exists today."

The enactment of the Presidential Threshold on presidential and parliamentary candidates is also seen as hindering the emergence of potential national leadership. Because the success of a democracy is not measured by

threshold conditions. Rather, it is from the participation of the Indonesian people, and it should be remembered that this country was formed from existing organizations within the community, not the other way around. a concrete example of how voter rights and political party rights can be guaranteed and protected in the presidential threshold policy. What to know about serious candidates: Threshold policies can ensure that only candidates with strong voter or party support can run. This prevents voter confusion and gives them an opportunity to focus on the candidate who is likely to win the election. Non-dividing elections: By setting the bar high enough, elections are less likely to be split by multiple candidates without strong backing. This helps secure wider support for the winner and reduces the possibility of post-election conflict. Separation of official parties and single activists: Threshold policies can help separate political parties seriously committed to participating in the formal political process from single activist individuals or groups. It could prevent presidential elections from becoming a single arena without real support from established parties. Focus on critical alternatives: By setting adequate thresholds, parties need to think hard about the candidate they will be running against. This can lead to the selection of well-supported and well-drafted candidates, which in turn increases the quality of political competition and discussion.

With the current reality of social media, we believe that the essence of media on the internet is an arena for competing for the election of presidential and vice-presidential candidates. For this, we observe the growth and consumption of social media by netizens with clear four moments, namely (1) introduction, (2) competition, (3) posts from both camps, (4) ahead of the election which will be interesting to explore, remember, and stimulate our memory I made some reflective notes. Then we saw several posts related to Presidential Threshold policy comments (Lugosi et al., 2018).

As a result of the Presidential Threshold policy, the pairs of presidential

and vice-presidential candidates are very limited. Unfortunately, the presidential and vice-presidential elections from 2014-2019 only produced two pairs of candidates. The sharp polarization impact of netizens (internet citizens) on social media is heating up and communication patterns cannot be controlled, supported by political elites who prioritize polemics and uproar.

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one that researchers do by reading news on the Yahoo News web that we observe. La Nyalla, chairman of the DPD RI reported that he was the keynote speaker at the Islamic Ummah Congress event, saying that it was not surprising that a number of international institutions stated that the democracy index in Indonesia had declined and then gave rise to a phenomenon of the terms cebong, kampret, kadrun, and radikal which are really not good for the political process. in Indonesia.

The existence of an alliance of political parties in nominating the President and Vice President is very vulnerable to an exchange of interests (transactional politics). The implementation of the Presidential Threshold policy will limit political parties that wish to participate in simultaneous elections from being able to form a coalition in determining the candidates for President and Vice President, because they do not yet have the number of seats and votes (parliamentary threshold). Certain political parties feel that the Presidential Threshold violates the Indonesian Constitution.

Worse, the concurrent electoral system still in place for the 2019 election requires a presidential threshold (Presidential Threshold) Submission of

Candidates for President and Vice President based on the number of votes in the legislative election. This problem may become a new phenomenon for the journey of Indonesian democracy. However, the Presidential Cohesion and the Presidential Election System experience such a severe 'gap' to build a purely complex system (Kartiko, 2009). The Presidential Threshold policy by

providing limits on presidential and vice-presidential candidates resulted in various polemics on social media which gave rise to various netizen stigmas from each supporter. This gave birth to various groups of people who are usually called identity politics. This identity politics gives groups A and B (cebong-kampret) so that various buzzers emerge on social media which result in conflict in society.

First, the enactment of the Presidential Threshold policy causes inconsistency in the presidential election because parties will often change direction in carrying the president. In the first election, a political party will support a presidential candidate who, in his opinion, has an advantage for his party. And it was exacerbated by the implementation of simultaneous elections because legislative elections which should be a counterbalance for executive power became unstable. This instability will cause many political parties to choose a president rationally and automatically with a greater potential to win (Arsil, 2017). Therefore, the parliament will be authoritarian because the Presidential Threshold policy that is made is most of the party winning the president. If many parties can enter parliament, it is possible that the dominant party will also get smaller and more fragmented (multipartisan). So, the consensus in the decision-making process is that parliament will be more difficult (once again using the legislative vote).

Second, the nomination of presidential candidates with a Presidential Threshold policy of 20% has an impact that can carry only 2 pairs of candidates, it is undemocratic. This is exacerbated if the majority parties only want to form a coalition with the majority parties, because reaching the 20% threshold is difficult for minority parties. This has made it difficult and impossible for minority parties to put forward candidates for president and vice president. the large number of thresholds makes the election only present two pairs of candidates, the thing that is more worrying is that in the holding of elections only one pair of presidential candidates is filled (Basri, 2015).

Third, losing the participation of minor parties, the presidential threshold figure of 20% proves an attempt by the oligarchs where majority party power is achieved through voting by representatives of parliamentary factions as a presidential threshold keeping minority parties impossible for new parties to enter the presidential election, which is an attempt reinforcement by various groups. Majority parties by putting more pressure on all parties' burden minorities and new parties take advantage of the presidential threshold to maintain their power through party oligarchy. The achievement of oligarchy through political parties is in line with Winters' view that shows that the source of oligarchic power does not only come from material wealth and mobilization.

Fourth, the Presidential Threshold policy gave birth to the political identity of Cebong-Kampret, because there were only two pairs of presidential candidates. Disputes between each of the two fanatical supporters, both Joko Widodo fanatical supporters and Prabowo Subianto fanatical supporters who are feuding on social media. Social media lines show the atrocities of netizens insulting, blaspheming, taking bad actions, posting obscene caricatures of the nation's future leaders and making jokes for the two candidates. This of course makes the Indonesian nation experience segregation which creates conflict in society and of course triggers national disintegration on social media.

History of Presidential Threshold Policy Development

The 2004 general election was recorded as the first general election in Indonesia to use a direct presidential and vice-presidential election system (Shobron, 2013). Scholars note that there are some people who believe that the election of president and vice president through the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) or People's Consultative Assembly better represents the meaning of the 4th principle of Pancasila (Junaidi & Indah, 2020). Furthermore, the aspirations of some Islamic groups as the majority in Indonesia through Islamic political parties to demand sharia law and a Muslim

leader (Faradina et al., 2022).

In Indonesia, the Presidential Threshold policy was first formulated in the Indonesian constitution in Law Number 23 of 2003 concerning the General Election of the President and Vice President. Article 5 section (4) of the Law states, "*Candidate Pairs as referred to in section (1) can only be proposed by political parties or coalitions of political parties which obtain at least 15% (fifteen percent) of the total seats in the DPR or 20% (twenty percent) of the national valid votes in Election of members of the DPR*". In the 2004 election there were 6 pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Meanwhile, in the 2009 election for presidential and vice-presidential candidates, there was a change in the rules. Political parties can carry candidate pairs of at least 20 percent of the total seats in the DPR and 25 percent of the valid votes nationally. These rules are contained in Law Number 42 of 2008 concerning Elections. This rule was also enforced in the 2014 presidential election. As for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates who participated in the 2009 election, there were 3 pairs of candidates. In 2014, the Election Law was not changed, the Presidential Threshold rules remained the same. The threshold for presidential and vice-presidential candidates is 20 percent of DPR seats and 25 percent of national valid votes. There were 2 candidate pairs for president and vice president who participated in the 2014 election. While the elections in 2019, the DPR and the government agreed to revise the Election Law. However, the contents of the article governing the Presidential Threshold policy have not changed. Law number 7 of 2017 governing elections concerning candidate pairs proposed by political parties or coalitions of political parties participating in elections that meet the requirements for obtaining seats of at least 20 percent of the number of DPR members or obtaining 25 percent of national valid votes in the previous election for members of the DPR.

Table 1. Presidential Threshold Since Direct Election of President and Vice President.

No	Year	Legal basis	Presidential Threshold		Information	
			DPR Voice	National Voice	Candidate	Legitimate
1	2004	Number 23 of 2003 concerning the general election of the President and Vice President is contained in Article 5 section (4).	15 %	20 %	6 Candidate Pairs for President and Vice President	Elections are carried out in two stages
2	2009	Law Number 42 of 2008 concerning the General Election of the President and Vice President contains article 9	20 %	25 %	3 Candidate Pairs for President and Vice President	Elections are carried out in two stages
3	2014	Law Number 42 of 2008 concerning the General Election of the President and Vice President contains article 9	20 %	25 %	2 Candidate Pairs for President and Vice President	Elections are carried out in two stages
4	2019	Law number 7 of 2017 General Election of the President and Vice President contains article 222	20 %	25 %	2 Candidate Pairs for President and Vice President	Elections are carried out in two stages

Source: Internet (2022)

Table 1 explains the history of democracy in Indonesia, which regulated the Presidential Threshold from 2004 to 2019 with several changes. According to Saldi Isra, institutionalization lacks seriousness and inconsistency, Presidential Democracy is not only recorded materially or substantively. Legislation often overlaps with one another, but this can be seen in plans for holding elections, especially since the 2004 amendment to the constitution related to the direct election of the president by people began to apply. As we know, the 2004 and 2009 legislative elections were before the presidential and vice-presidential elections, regardless of the direction of constitutional revision was to strengthen the presidential system. Logistically, the presidential system should be presidential elections, elections for legislative elections. Even if not, the holding of presidential elections will at least be

carried out concurrently with the holding of legislative elections, especially the elections for the DPR and DPD (Teguh Santoso Gobel, 2019). BBC News Indonesia Youtube Channel, Journalist Mehulika Sitepu, stated about identity politics,

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“Often getting new nicknames on social media such as Cebong or Kampret is one of the victims of identity politics. Identity such as race or religion as a basis in composition for example a politician who comes from Java will convince people who also come from Java to vote for him because of the association of the same identity. Then what identity is used as the basis for this election? In the presidential election, the two candidate pairs are both trying to win the hearts of Muslim leaders. It reaches around 160 million or around 80% of the total number of voters. Joko Widodo, who since the 2014 election was considered unlikely until the Chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council Ma'ruf Amin became the vice-presidential candidate to attract voters, while Prabowo Subianto used the influence of his closeness to the FPI as well as the support of 5 Ulama to attract.” (<https://youtu.be/KYNu1frjQ0g>)

Jokowi narrowly won the 2014 presidential election. The gap between Jokowi and Prabowo in 2014 was the fiercest in any presidential election since 1998, marking a close battle between the two camps. Prabowo's reluctance to admit defeat in the 2014 presidential election was seen as a trigger for the continuation of political isolation in the 2014-2019 Jokowi government. It didn't take long for the supporters of each camp to find a designation for the opposing camp. The sound of the tadpole and the Sound of the Kampret. Some Prabowo fanatics use the term cebong to refer to Jokowi fanatics.



Figure 2. Online Community and Online Community of Prabowo Supporters of Jokowi Supporters

Figure 2 Describes one of the online communities of Prabowo Subianto supporters. The group above is given a name "BARISAN RAKYAT PENDUKUNG PRABOWO SUBIANTO". Posts uploaded about bad words spoken to Joko Widodo supporters who have no shame because there were many lies during his reign. Meanwhile, Figure 2 describes the online community of Joko Widodo supporters. The group above is named "Jokowi Supporters" The existing post explains that in the past, when the presidential campaign was so intense that the table banged almost to the ground, it turned out that the original was like chicken pieces. Jokowi supporters say one of my Twitter named @Chusnul Ch Timah said.

"The president was insulted, belittled, harassed by his former supporters, he was silent even though he was the president's assistant. The president wants to be removed; he is silent even though he is the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia. The cadre is corrupt, he is silent even though he is the leader. Now that his country is being humiliated, he is silent too. Mr @prabowo is you still alive? "

Therefore, each faction will look for loopholes for each other's mistakes

to create divisions between supporters. The polarization of Cebong and Kampret will continue when the Presidential Threshold policy of 20%.

The labeling theory was first proposed by Edwin M. Lemert in his book *Mind Self and Society* (1934) social context, labeling is related to other people's marks. often, labels have a negative connotation by giving bad predicates to other people (Ahmadi & Nuraini, 2005). As a result, people who are labeled with this title have a bad image and feel insecure in front of the public or society. This labeling is really worrying that in the 2014 election there will be identity politics with the existence of the Presidential Threshold policy which gave rise to the term cebong-kampret. In fact, the labeling continued to develop in the 2019 election and shifted to cebong and kadrun. (Hamid et al., 2018).



Figure 3. posts Joko Widodo supporters (cebong) (Kampret) and posts Prabowo Subianto supporters

Figure 3 explains a post made by one of the accounts (buzzer) or supporters of Joko Widodo (cebong) which states that Prabowo Subianto's supporters (kampret) cheated the votes in the KPU. Meanwhile, in the second picture, one of the supporters of Prabowo Subianto (kampret) clearly shows that cebong is hypocritical and uses inappropriate language to be spoken to a presidential candidate. We deliberately took examples from social media such as Facebook and Twitter. This can compare the two social media analyzes of

language use on social media is very bad.

Consequences of Implementing the Presidential Threshold in the 2024 Election

The enactment of the Presidential Threshold, which was carried out in the 2019 simultaneous elections, is no longer relevant. The Presidential Threshold is seen as reducing the right of the people to get the leader they want to be elected. Due to the enactment of the Presidential Threshold policy, theoretically there can be a maximum of 5 pairs of candidates. However, when we look at the field, implementing 5 pairs of candidates seems impossible. This is because the parties must coalesce to be able to get more than 20 percent support, it cannot be just 20 percent. Only in 2009 could nominate 3 pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates (Sunarso, 2020). The Presidential Threshold of 20% which was implemented in 2019 has proven to have caused the Indonesian nation to experience national disintegration which made the two groups (cebong-Kadrun). Based on comments from Jimly Asshiddiqie, the former chairman of the Constitutional Court stated that he hoped that the 2024 election would be attended by more than two pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Based on Kompas.com/News/National news, Jimly Asshiddiqie stated:

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“If you want to be ideal, there should be no threshold because this is simultaneous. If the most suitable for democracy, yes 0 percent. Besides that, because of the time management, there are changes, simultaneously. Then the most ideal is no more threshold or 0 percent.”

Therefore, the presidential election must be lowered so that the selection of presidential and vice-presidential candidates is more than two pairs of candidates. Political parties that have the effect of tailcoats are only parties that originally nominated the president, not other political parties. So the right policy is to reduce or lower the Presidential Threshold by 5-10% or abolish it (Sunarso, 2020).

Tempo News Com. In a virtual discussion, the Director of the Center for Political Studies of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Firman Noor, stated:

“The threshold (Presidential Threshold) for presidential candidates should be abolished. He thinks there is a seven issue presidential threshold if it remains in force. The problem is that polarization tends to trigger pragmatic negotiations or money politics, reduces the presence of alternative candidates due to barrier rules, and does not comply with the principle of concurrency because it refers to the results of previous elections.”

Another problem is that there is no maturity of political parties because political parties do not have the opportunity to compete and fight and obscure the meaning of strengthening presidentialism. The Presidential Threshold even strengthens the President, not the presidential system (Fitri & Setiadi, 2022). It is unnatural for the Presidential Threshold policy to continue to be maintained in Indonesia not only based on the DPR's vote acquisition which creates a parliamentary tendency, but also based on the practice of elections being held simultaneously. There are two irrelevant reasons if the Presidential Threshold policy is implemented in a simultaneous election regime. First, the election results of the previous five years were used as the basis for the presidential nomination, if you look at the mirror of the 2019 simultaneous elections, then the reference for 20% of the DPR or 25% of the valid national votes for the DPR election is the 2014 election results. Of course, this kind of realization is irrelevant, because the 2014 election results were obtained from the different total voters and 2019 socio-political conditions. The use of previous elections will continue to form the basis for future elections. The 2019 election, which uses the results of the 2014 election, will also be followed by the nomination of presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 2024 election, which of course will use the 2019 election data or results (Restiyani & Isharyanto, 2020). Reality like this will certainly benefit several political parties that have won seats or legislative votes. The profit is used as a prerequisite for nominating the president in the next election. Certainly not

according to principle *one person, one vote, one value* (OPOVOV) from election (Santoso, 2019). Therefore, the conversion of voter votes into seats in elections will continue and will be used to nominate the president and vice president that year (Ansori, 2017).

From May 22 to September 4, researchers conducted research by observing and exploring all social media platforms and looking for various netizen posts and comments related to the impact if the Presidential Threshold policy is implemented in 2024.




Figure 4. Collection of Citizen Comments on Social Media Regarding Presidential Threshold Year 2024

Figure 4 describes a collection of posts and comments by netizens regarding their disapproval of the Presidential Threshold policy which will be implemented in the 2024 election. One of the posts observed by researchers was on May 22, 2022, as explained in Rafly Harun's tweet on his Twitter account, which said that the Presidential Threshold is the base community issues have been split into two major groups over the last 5 years: Cebongers

and Kampreters. The political oligarchy bought up all political parties, leaving only one candidate for the presidential election to take place. Look at the excerpts from the study in the image above:

“As long as there is no change in the Presidential Threshold for Presidential Candidacy, it looks like the 2024 Election will not be interesting and "just the same" as so far, the results will be rather disappointing” . 07 December 2021

“According to Rocky Gerung, whoever will appear in the 2024 election as a presidential candidate, if there is still a presidential threshold of 20 percent, it will be difficult to avoid oligarchic power” . 14 June 2021

“The Presidential Threshold (PT) is the source of the problem that society has split into two major groups over the past 5 years: Cebongers and Kampretes. The political oligarchs bought up all political parties so that only one candidate was left so that the Presidential Election would continue.....to” . 29 June 2019

“With PT, 20% of the candidates will be from that camp alone. not much choice for the people. In fact, the people hope that there will be many clean and credible presidential candidates who can bring about changes for the better. With PT 20% of the people are trapped in an endless vicious circle” . 19 September 2022

“Parliament must be dissolved through a Perpu and carry out legislative elections as soon as possible before the 2024 presidential election. The presidential threshold is removed. Political parties that succeed in holding parliamentary seats have the right to nominate their own presidential and vice-presidential candidates” . 10 April 2018

“Rejections about the presidential nomination threshold or Presidential Threshold are busy again. This time the one who refused was KPK chairman Firli Bahuri. Actually, why? This Presidential Threshold is often rejected?

“Potential to cause corruption to finance electoral politics.”

“It has the potential to cause polarization in society.” 22 October 2022

“The Presidential Threshold is 20%; Reselling failed 2019 products that expire in 2024. Would you like to be injected with expired vaccines or drink expired paracetamol? Indonesia Lost its sense of reason (better tomorrow). And are poisoning themselves.” 20 June 2022

One of the moments that we took was by watching on a television broadcast (28 August 2022) related to observing the Presidential Threshold problem. We note several opinions by a political observer, Rocky Gerung, saying that the Presidential Threshold undermines the democratic order and insults people's sovereignty. The Presidential Threshold of 20% is a place for oligarchs to spread. The reason is that with a high threshold, it is very easy for oligarchs to play a political role in it. On KompasTV's YouTube channel, Rocky Gerung criticized the Presidential Threshold policy which confined political parties.

"I decided that the Constitutional Court must listen to the voice of democracy, the voice of the people. So, if the Constitutional Court insists that all who come to the Court have no legal standing, then what is the legal standing of the Court? The party was rejected, he rejected everything. Then what is the use of the Court if he doesn't think, The Court should have thought that there is public disquiet about PT, which I said is a breeding ground for oligarchs."

Young influencer, Sherly Annavita said the Presidential Threshold made young people apathetic. He gave a response that there are several dynamic points regarding the Presidential Thresholds policy. The first point is about the democratic system in Indonesia.

"It's hard for us to say that we live in a democratic country when we see the opportunity, the opportunity to bring up alternative leaders is getting smaller. Or maybe even proposing in this case the public to vote for the candidates who are elected or trusted even less chance."

The second point of the Presidential Threshold, both directly and indirectly, is that only candidates who can run are candidates who have capital. A presidential candidate must clearly have received capital, but inevitably must have a close relationship with KKN. A system like this will make the practice of KKN or corruption even greater in the future.

"Because it can be said that it is very unlikely that a candidate can capitalize on his candidacy. And this is what makes young people so apathetic about politics, seeing the social dynamics that are happening. This means a transaction, if it's for the people, that's fine, what if it's for the individual".

Graph of Choice of Political Parties Ahead of the 2024 Election




Figure 5. Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI)

Figure 5 explains the major parties that have occupied the above, PDIP received the most support, namely 26.6%, then followed by the Golkar party which received support of 11.7%, followed by Gerindra party 9.9%, Democrats 8, 7%, PKB, 6.6%, PKS 6%, PPP 4.2%, and while the lowest party is Nasdem 4%. This means that it is clear regarding the Presidential Threshold requirements, if the party does not meet the minimum threshold of 20% percent, the political party cannot nominate itself as a candidate for president and vice president.

The presidential threshold policy polemic brought a lot of feud between citizens on social media. The dynamics seen in various comments from netizens make competition containing these interests occur with the Presidential Threshold policy of 20% to produce two different groups or groups and have mutual interests continuing into the contest for the 2024 presidential election. After competing in determining the Presidential

Threshold in the realm of legislation that occurred at the meeting of the

Bill on Election Organizing, the two groups will return to fight in the democratic party, namely the 2024 presidential election contestation which aims to occupy power in the realm of government in the 2024-2029 period. The determination of the Presidential Threshold has a very competitive intensity between the two coalition groups, a high-intensity competition has been formed which will cause conflict and affect social conflict in society (Anggara, 2019). The Presidential Threshold of 20% for presidential candidates to be promoted provides a logical result that can only bring two pairs of candidates. Losing the participation of small parties, seeing the large Presidential Threshold figure of 20% proves an oligarchic attempt in which majority political party power is achieved through voting by representatives of parliamentary factions (Munawarman & Novita, 2022). The achievement of oligarchy through political parties is in line with Winters' view that the source of power for oligarchy does not only come from material wealth. These four things must be concentrated and exclusive will produce political elites (Hidayat, 2018).

In fact, the research results of Djayadi Hanan (2017) show that most countries in Latin America adhere to a model with a multi-party presidential system, such as Indonesia, which does not recognize the Presidential

Threshold at all when nominating the president and vice president (Djayadi Hanan, 2017). In a presidential system like Indonesia, it is not easy to find examples of countries that apply a threshold in implementing the Presidential Threshold. In fact, there are 48 countries that adhere to the presidential policy, these countries do not recognize the Presidential Threshold policy (Sultoni Fikri, 2019).

One country that uses a presidential system is France, since 2002 France has implemented direct presidential elections. The French state does not recognize the Presidential Threshold policy. Every political party, even new parties that have not yet won a vote in parliament, can run for president

and vice president. the fact is that in 2017, there were 11 presidential candidates from 11 different political parties (Sandra, 2020). One country that does not recognize the Presidential Threshold is Brazil. The main requirement to become a presidential candidate is to at least have a political party. Presidential election system in Brazil is direct election, the candidate who has 50% of the vote will win. From 2002 until the last one in 2018, the election always took two rounds. In 2018 there were 13 presidential candidates (Munawarman & Novita, 2022)

Avoiding Conflict: Presidential Threshold Policy Strategies

The Presidential Threshold policy with various polemics, both the pros and cons among the public, is related to the Presidential Threshold rules. Efforts are made to minimize conflict by considering the advantages and disadvantages of all aspects. Aspects that can be seen from the principles of democracy, the presidential system, the constitutional rights of citizens, and the constitutional rights of political parties. Efforts that can be made by the

Presidential Threshold policy by reconsidering the magnitude of the current Presidential Threshold figure, because with a figure of 20% of the votes for the DPR or 25% of the valid national votes, many members of the public and political parties feel that their constitutional rights have been harmed and discriminated against. So, the efforts made can reduce the Presidential Threshold figure with a small number, namely the range of 5% to 10% of the votes in the DPR or even be abolished. The abolition of the Presidential Threshold provides benefits for all groups. Starting from the public to political parties, so that this will open up the widest possible space for political parties to be able to propose pairs of presidential candidates. Of course, the public can choose and weigh from various pairs of candidates. Therefore, the elimination of the Presidential Threshold in the upcoming 2024 election will provide advantages and benefits to small parties and the public. First, restore the constitutional rights of citizens. It has been explained

textually that the 1945 Constitution does not specifically regulate the Presidential Threshold. Presidential Threshold regulations are purely born from the legal political process that takes place in parliament, where the dominance of the winning political party will benefit from the Presidential Threshold. Second, it provides citizens with several options for selecting leaders. With the abolition of the Presidential Threshold, giving every citizen the opportunity to run for president through a certain political party, that is, each political party can nominate its own president (Ansori, 2017). This is very beneficial for the people, because in the future there will be a new presidential candidate, not the old one. The more candidates, the more selective in choosing leaders, so that the biodata and achievements of a presidential candidate will be very influential. Third, reduce the intensity of social electoral conflict. As with elections in developing countries, the intensity of conflict during elections is unavoidable. The abolition of the Presidential Threshold has paved the way for small political parties. Fourth, reducing the number of white groups (abstentions). As the number of candidates to be elected increases, the number of voters automatically increases. One of the factors causing many abstentions so far is the limited number of presidential candidates offered in the general election. Fifth, time efficiency. The abolition of the Presidential Threshold allows presidential and legislative elections to be held simultaneously. This can shorten the duration of the election (Armia et al., 2016). Transactional politics is terrible for a lot of people. The president's prerogative seems to be mortgaged by politics like this. In some cases, ministers may be more amenable to party decisions than to directives from the president.

Reducing or lowering and even eliminating the 20% Presidential Threshold to avoid political contestation for the 2024 election which narrows down to the cebong versus the kampret group. Political polarization on social media since the previous election has spread to the present. In the future, by preventing conflicts that continue to occur between the two camps, there must

be a bridge that mediates the polarized pros and cons of the two camps. This bridge is attempted in the form of a movement involving figures and influencers from both camps. The figures chosen to be the bridge must be able to speak to both sides well. Of course, you have to provide understanding in social media or the digital world (Mustofa, 2014). By abolishing the Presidential Threshold policy, it will not give birth to shrews and shrews. Because with the existence of the Presidential Threshold, many polarizations are influenced by elite behavior. Herding new issues while maintaining divisions through political issues. The buzzer is filled with words and utterances of hatred from every supporter which of course results in national disintegration in Indonesia (Ardipandanto, 2020).

There are several ways to overcome the conflict caused by the presidential threshold:

1. Consider revising or abolishing the presidential threshold: The presidential threshold could be reduced or removed completely to make it easier for minor parties to be represented at this level of government.
2. Upholding democratic principles: Governments and security institutions must ensure that the rights of voters and political parties are accepted and protected, and that identity-based conflicts are handled in a fair and peaceful manner.
3. Education and dialogue: Education and dialogue programs can be developed to help people understand and accept differences and overcome identity-based differences and conflicts.

Promote political inclusion: Political parties and leaders must promote political inclusion and ensure that all identity groups have equal opportunities to be represented and influence public policy.

CONCLUSION

First, the enactment of the Presidential Threshold policy causes

inconsistency in the presidential election because parties will often change direction in carrying the president. Second, the nomination of presidential candidates with a Presidential Threshold policy of 20% has an impact that can carry only 2 pairs of candidates, this is not democratic. Third, losing the participation of small parties, the presidential threshold figure of 20% proves the efforts of the oligarchs. Fourth, the Presidential Threshold Policy gave birth to the political identity of Cebong-Kampret, because there were only two pairs of presidential candidates. There are two irrelevant reasons if the Presidential Threshold policy is implemented in a simultaneous election regime. First, the election results of the previous five years which were used as the basis for the presidential nomination, if you look at the mirror of the 2019 simultaneous elections, then the reference for 20% of the DPR or 25% of the valid national votes for the DPR election is the result of the 2014 election. Of course, this realization is irrelevant, because the results of the 2014 election were obtained from the different total voters and 2019 socio-political conditions. The use of previous elections will continue to form the basis for future elections. The 2019 election, which uses the results of the 2014 election, will also be followed by the nomination of presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 2024 election, which of course will use the 2019 election data or results. Of course, many netizens do not agree with the presidential threshold policy which will take effect in the 2024 elections. Therefore, removing the Presidential Threshold can benefit small parties and the Indonesian people. Restore citizens' constitutional rights, give citizens the right to elect several leaders, reduce the intensity of social electoral conflicts, reduce the number of white groups (abstentions), and save time and eliminate identity politics which gave birth to the political identities of the two groups of cebongs and bastards on social media.

Apart from that, this policy also gave birth to the political identity of Cebong-Kampret because only two pairs of presidential candidates could be

nominated. Even though this policy is applied in simultaneous elections, the results of the previous election are irrelevant as a basis for determining the Presidential Threshold in the next election. Therefore, abolishing the Presidential Threshold can restore citizens' constitutional rights, give citizens the right to elect several leaders, reduce social electoral conflicts, reduce abstentions, and eliminate identity politics which gave birth to the political identities of the two cebong and kampret groups on social media.

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