

The Failure of the Islamic Party in Indonesia to Winning the 2004-2019 Direct General Elections

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ABSTRACT

This research aims to describe the evidence of the failure of Islamic political parties to encourage their best cadres to become national leaders (president and vice president) in direct presidential election contests from 2004-2019. Over the course of the past four election cycles, candidates affiliated with Islamic political parties have been notably absent, instead opting to form coalitions in support of candidates from other political factions. A political anomaly, where the majority of the population adheres to the Islamic faith, yet candidates from Islamic political parties are conspicuously absent. The research was conducted using the literature study method and analyzed using John Dewey's pragmatism theory approach which was strengthened by Hanna Pitkin's representation theory. Data findings are corroborated by factor analysis of the failure of Islamic political parties using NVIVO 12Plus. Data were obtained from credible offline and online sources. The main findings of this research show four key pieces of evidence. Firstly, an overview of the electoral support landscape for Islamic political parties in direct presidential elections over the four periods highlights their dominance only in the 2004 elections, followed by subsequent declines. Second, the map of the coalition of Islamic political parties in every direct election underscores their diminished influence and inability to construct an Islamic polar coalition. Third, mapping the votes of support for Islamic political parties in every election which results in stagnation of support for Islamic political parties with no more than 32%. Lastly, the study identifies the contributing factors to the failure of Islamic political parties. Islamic political parties need to formulate a comprehensive cadre system to produce cadres who are competent and have high electability to win the presidential election.

Keywords: Failure, Islamic Party, General Election, Politics, Communication Politics

INTRODUCTION

The failure of Islamic political parties to encourage their cadres to

contest the direct presidential and vice-presidential election has persisted over the last four election cycles. Since the 2004 election, no cadres from Islamic political parties have stepped forward as candidates in these paramount democratic contests. This condition becomes a political anomaly where Islamic political parties in countries with a Muslim majority actually only become parties supporting coalitions that carry cadres from nationalist parties. The inability of Islamic parties to nurture capable cadres signals a breakdown in their cadre system. In the future, if this situation does not get a solution, there will be a de-existence of Islamic political parties because there are no young leaders who have the popularity and electability to gain public support (Fernando et al. 2023). No-show of Islamic political parties can also occur due to the inability of Islamic political parties to deal with changes in the political system.

Islamic political parties have struggled to find a middle ground in establishing an Islamic polar coalition, largely due to sectarian politics (Herdiansah, Djuyandi, and Sumadinata 2019). The coalitions they have formed were not founded on ideological principles but rather driven by pragmatic motives to secure political advantages and positions of power (Chalik 2021). Furthermore, according to Fox (2022) in his analysis, the exclusivity exhibited by Islamic parties during electoral competition has hindered their ability to garner support from the nationalist public (Fox and Menchik 2022; Nurjaman, Suprpto, and Masmuh 2018)

Indonesia's political system has shifted from an authoritarian system that lasted 32 years to a democratic political system. These changes were due to the 1998 reforms that overthrew the New Order regime (Nordholt 2012). The established political parties during the time responded positively to the euphoria, which is a common response considering that previously, the public was forced to accept state regulations that limited 3 parties (Masykur Hakim 2016). During the early reform period, 184 parties were established, with 141

parties obtaining approval from the government. Of this number, only 48 political parties met the requirements to be able to take part in the 1999 elections. This number increased in 2004 with political parties that stood at no less than 200 parties, and only 50 were legal entities, leaving 24 parties that could participate in general elections (Romli 2011).

The political parties born in that period also represented various groups of the Islamic ummah with various ideological backgrounds. NU gave birth to several parties, including the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Nahdlatul Ummat Party, and PKPNU. What is left today is only PKB. One of Indonesia's largest Islamic mass organizations, Muhammadiyah, is affiliated with the founding of the National Mandate Party and resonates with Muhammadiyah's voice in political contestation (Hicks 2012). Of the many Islamic political parties born and participating in Indonesian democracy today, only four parties passed the parliamentary threshold in the 2019 elections: PKB, PKS, PAN and PPP. The failure of Islamic political parties to encourage their best cadres in every presidential and vice presidential election contest since the direct election era is a painful phenomenon and fact. As a country with a majority of Muslims but its political parties do not get massive support, it must recognize the superiority of nationalist parties (Nurjaman, Suprpto, and Masmuh 2018).

This research will present facts showing the failure of Islamic political parties to encourage their cadres in contestation. The failure does not represent cadres and the dull courage of Islamic political parties to submit their cadres even though the voting conditions are met if they are willing to build a coalition. Nevertheless, Islamic political parties prefer to support the candidates put forward by nationalist parties because they have a higher winning potential.

Judging from the actual number of votes accumulatively, Islamic political parties, if they are willing to build a coalition, nominate candidates

from their best cadres, build a coalition together, and find similarities to go hand in hand without showing friction between them Islamic political parties, they may reach victory. However, it still feels impossible since they are sect politics (Herdiansah, Djuyandi, and Sumadinata 2019). Grassroots friction is the driving force to foster cadre loyalty to the party and mass organizations behind it. Of course, Islamic political parties find it hard to be at least able to produce qualified cadres and are eyed by other parties to advance as candidates for national leadership.

Literature Review

Islamic Political Parties

The dualism of the New Order's political attitudes towards the Muslim Ummah is reflected in government policies. The Muslim community is given the widest possible freedom to worship. On the other hand, political attitudes are quarantined in a limited party system with 3 political parties (M Hakim 2016; Nakamura 1999). The political party system and democracy in Indonesia are still looking for an ideal form after the 1998 reform. The political system shifted from an authoritarian based on limited political parties to a democratic system with no restrictions on establishing political parties (Rosidi 2022; Tan 2006). An established political party must comply with the mechanism regulated by law to be able to take part in general elections. The problem of Indonesian democracy does not only extend to a large number of political parties but also the problem of the too large portion owned by the parliament session at the beginning of the reform period (Morishita 2007; Rosidi 2022).

Despite having room for maneuver, Islamic political parties in Indonesia have not displayed significant progress. The acquisition of votes by these parties has tended to remain stagnant, with some even experiencing a decline. The lack of growth in vote acquisition can be attributed to various factors such as Islamophobia and the adoption of repressive measures

concerning native issues. These matters, over the past decade, have transformed into instruments for political gain (Chen 2022; Syarif, Mughni, and Hannan 2020). The forthcoming challenge for Islamic political parties involves countering dynastic political practices, largely driven by their affiliations with specific mass organizations that serve as ideological foundations (Brown 2019; Muslikhah, Hajri, and Santoso 2019; Sila 2020).

Direct Elections

The shift of power from parliament back to the hands of the people was marked by direct elections in 2004 (Morishita 2007). The initial period is the most dynamic phase for Islamic political parties because the representation of Islamic party cadres dominates the presidential and vice-presidential election contests (Chalik 2021). After that, Islamic parties' condition became stagnant and weakened in encouraging its cadres. The contestation was dominated by cadres of nationalist parties and placed Islamic political parties as part of the coalition (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata 2005).

The stagnation of Islamic political parties can be analyzed from the support of similar constituents, called the Islamic Ummah. Party behavior and strategies in approaching constituents also tend to be similar. There is almost no striking difference between one Islamic party and another except for the differences in the mass organizations that are its big house. The campaign strategy of proposing the idea of inclusive nationalism and Islamic exclusivity is used by all Islamic political parties (Fox and Menchik, 2022). PKS carries out the differentiating factor with an exclusive approach to its main cadres. Therefore, the PKS vote tends to be more stable in every 5-year contest (Haris et al. 2020; Nurdin 2019).

Political Pragmatism

John Dewey's pragmatism says that humans are inherently free, independent, creative, and dynamic beings (Fiore 2022; Ramazzotto 2022).

Pragmatism also believes that humans have reasonable abilities so they are able to overcome problems that are stressful and harmful to the environment (Taye 2021). According to Hadinatha (2018) pragmatism itself is a theoretical framework that teaches everything that is believed to be the truth and can be achieved practically and with benefits is a truth (Hadinatha 2018). When pragmatism intersects with politics, a shift occurs wherein political parties' roles in democratic contests and power struggles are rooted not only in ideology and ethical principles but also in practical advantages perceived as truths.

The pragmatist ideas of Dewey have been extensively studied and utilized as a foundation for shaping policy decisions within political pragmatism (Ralston 2012). Incorporating Dewey's thoughts into democracy is believed to offer a solution to the rigidity that gives rise to policies solely rooted in constitutional regulations, disregarding societal realities. Dewey's concepts are frequently intertwined with deliberative democracy, which provides a space for the development of political policies grounded in the collective interests of society (Pappas 2012). According to Escobar's viewpoint (2017), it is noted that the pragmatism of Dewey and James has a positive contribution in constructing a dynamic democratic ecology and embracing pluralism as a logical consequence of democracy (Escobar 2017).

RESEARCH METHOD

Islamic political parties in this study were limited to political parties with the support of mass Islamic organizations and had representation in parliament in the 2019 election. The National Awakening Party and PPP have a mass base for the Nahdlatul Ulama Ormas, PAN has a mass base for Muhammadiyah organizations, and PKS has a mass base known as campus Islam affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt. Restrictions were needed because Islamic political parties are large, but they failed to meet the parliamentary threshold.

This research used a qualitative analysis literature study (Harahap 2019). Documents were collected from various credible and accountable sources online or offline. Then, the data reduction was done by sorting the data obtained and adjusting to research needs. Unnecessary data would be removed, and the necessary data would be processed to see and find updates in the analysis.

In addition, NVIVO 12 plus tools helped to see the results of research in the last 5 years related to the failure of Islamic political parties and the factors behind them. The data obtained is used as material for conducting in-depth analysis. The data triangulation process was done by cross-checking various literature sources to ensure data validity and that the data obtained and used as the basis for analysis was highly valid.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Results

Islamic political parties' contestation in Indonesian democracy is nothing new. Muslim community's contribution to producing leaders had even been long before independence. Mass organizations with an Islamic style have colored the dynamics of the struggle together with the birth of Boedi Oetomo, which is believed to be the first modern mass organization in Indonesia. Muslim community and Islamic political parties' participation has started since the first general election in Indonesia (Fogg 2019; Reid 2005; Sarwoto 2018).

Before the Reformation, the Islamic Ummah was accommodated by the Pancasila Development Party (PPP), a fusion of various Islamic ideological political parties during the New Order era. After the Reformation, the political passions of Islamic political figures were unstoppable, so many parties with Islamic ideology were born with their movement preferences. Right-leaning Islam, banned during the New Order era, found a political oasis to grow and

develop (M Hakim 2016).

However, the euphoria of Islamic political parties did not last long. Many figures and parties have failed to develop sails in navigating the Ocean of democracy. Their position was blown due to low electability and not having a sufficient number of constituents to place their representatives in Parliament. In addition, Islamic political parties compete with each other in the same mass niche and cannot offer a differentiating factor which is a concrete characteristic and direction of struggle (Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata 2005).

Islam Presidential Candidate Pair and Support Map of Islamic Political Parties

The 2004 General Election

The 2004 Indonesian general election for president and vice president was a democratic contest that involved the most candidates or pairs of candidates. Six candidates for official candidate pairs registered themselves as contestants to fight for the people's vote. It was the first time the people had directly held presidential and vice presidential elections. Several interesting facts from this contestation are the massive support of each political party in nominating its best cadre.

With their driving figures who claimed to have contributed to reform, political parties competed with other candidates. The euphoria of the Muslim Ummah was felt in this election with the support of three pairs from three different parties. Gus Dur or Abdurrahman Wahid was promoted by the National Awakening Party (PKB), Hamzah Haz was supported by the United Development Party (PPP) and Amin Rais was supported by the National Mandate Party (PAN). In addition, some names were close to Islam because of their prominent figures, such as Hasyim Muzadi, the general chairman of PBNU, who accompanied Megawati Soekarno Putri. Salahuddin Wahid, who incidentally is the younger brother of Abdurrahman Wahid, was paired with Wiranto, whom the Hanura Party promoted (Appendix No. 1).

The Islamic elements' victory is related to contestation in the 1999 presidential election in a parliamentary session. The center axis coalition initiated by Amin Rais pushed Gus Dur to become president, defeating Megawati, supported by PDIP, as the winner of the most votes in parliament. Gus Dur from the PKB, an impeached former president, confidently ran again in the 2004 election. Amin Rais also ran as a candidate from PAN with capital as a political "kingmaker" at the beginning of reform. See table 1.

Table 1. Candidates for President and Vice President in the 2004 General Election

No.	Candidate Pair	Supporting Parties	Status
1	Wiranto-Ir, Salahuddin Wahid	Golkar, PDK, Patriot, PPNU	Passed as a candidate
2	Megawati Soekarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi	PDIP, PDS	Passed as a candidate
3	Dr. Amin Rais-Dr. Ir. Siswono Yudho Husodo	PAN, PKS, PBR, PNBK, PNIM, PPDI, Sarikat Buruh	Passed as a candidate
4	Dr. Susilo Bambang Y-Drs. Jusuf Kalla	Demokrat, PBB and PKPI	Passed as a candidate
5	Dr. Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar, M.Sc	PPP	Passed as a candidate
6	Abduraahman Wahid-Marwah Daud	PKB	Not Passing Health Test

Many competing candidates are due to the euphoria of the Muslim community, which contributed to the three main candidates. The rules are lax as a condition for submitting candidates. Based on Article 5 paragraph (4) of Law Number 23 of 2003 concerning the Presidential Election regulates the presidential threshold, it reads: "The pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates can be proposed by a political party or coalition of political parties that obtain at least - at least 15% of the total number of seats in the DPR or 20% of the valid national votes in the election for members of the DPR." (Appendix No. 2).

Candidates who obtain more than 50% of the total valid votes with at least 20% of the votes in each province spread over 50% of the total number of provinces in Indonesia will be sworn in as the elected president and vice president. If not, a second round will take the two candidates with the most votes. From the description above, the 2004 presidential and vice-presidential election was the first and last time Islamic political parties dared to put

forward their best cadres to compete in the national leader contest. After that, candidates from the best cadres of Islamic political parties do not appear in the next general election, let alone win the contest. Islamic political parties only act as part of a coalition of candidates from the best cadres of other nationalist parties (Appendix No. 3).

The direct presidential election in 2004 marked a moment of triumph for Islamic political ideologies in the political arena. This ideological victory manifested through the numerous Islamic figures who stood as presidential or vice-presidential candidates, nominated by various coalitions. Notably, Megawati had to form an alliance with Hasyim Muzadi, despite not being in the same coalition as PKB, in order to secure support from the Islamic masses affiliated with NU. Assessing the capacity and determination of Islamic political parties in promoting their members, the political landscape of 2004 emerged as the pinnacle year for the cadres of Islamic political parties.

The 2009 General Election

The 2009 general election for president and vice president is a unique phase in Islamic political parties. A political anomaly occurred with all Islamic political parties gathering to support incumbent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who ran for Return by cooperating with Boediono. The National Awakening Party (PKB), the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the United Development Party (PPP) agreed to become coalition partners carrying the incumbent.

The presidential threshold was increased to 20 percent of the seats in the DPR or 25 percent of the votes for the legislative elections (pileg) as Article 9 of Law 42/2008 concerning Presidential Elections, which reads: "The pair of presidential and vice presidential candidates are carried by a political party or a coalition of political parties. Election participants who meet the requirements for obtaining at least 20% of the total number of seats in the DPR or obtaining 25% of the national valid votes in the election for members of the

DPR before the implementation of the general election for President and Vice President” (Appendix No. 4).

Tragically the four votes of Islamic political parties that passed the electoral threshold of 2.5% of the national vote under Article 202 of Law number 10 of 2008, when combined, cannot be used to nominate their candidates. PKS won 7.88%, PAN got 6.01 votes, PPP got 5.32% votes, and PKB got 4.94% votes. The total number of votes for the four Islamic political parties was 24.11%, still below the 25% threshold for legislative votes. However, consider using alternative conditions, at least 20% of the total seats in the DPR. In that case, the combined number of seats is sufficient to nominate candidates from Islamic parties. The acquisition of PKS seats recorded 57 seats, PAN recorded 45 seats, PPP had 35 seats, and PKB had 31 seats, so the total is 168 or equivalent to 30% of the total seats in the DPR total 560 seats (Appendix No. 5).

Table 2. The 2009 Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates

No.	Candidate Pair	Supporting Parties	Status
1	Susilo Bambang Y-Boediono	Demokrat, PKS, PAN, PPP, PKB	Passed as a candidate
2	Megawati Soekarnoputri-Prabowo Subianto	PDIP and Gerindra	Passed as a candidate
3	Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto	Golkar and Hanura	Passed as a candidate

Based on Table 2, Islamic political parties should be able to build their coalition based on Islamic ideology and, based on the votes of the Islamic Ummah, be able to carry their representative candidates. However, political calculations and the interest in power dominate more than fighting. The interests of individuals and groups far exceed the interests of the Muslim community. SBY's potential for victory as an incumbent and the power distribution as it has been in the previous period seems more attractive than nominating a candidate himself. Or maybe political parties adhere to the adage, “If you can't beat them, join them”.

The 2009 presidential and vice-presidential elections marked the onset of Islamic political pragmatism and posed a setback for the cadres of Islamic political parties. The shortcomings of Islamic political parties became evident

in the extensive support garnered by the incumbent SBY, who was backed by the Democratic Party. Political pragmatism guided the elites towards choosing the "comfort zone," aligning themselves with the avenue that held greater potential to grasp power. This support is presumed to have stemmed not from ideological affinity, but rather from a political transaction in the form of power consolidation.

The 2014 General Election

The 2014 presidential election contest offered a different portrait from the two previous periods. If, in the previous period, the power of Islamic political parties in parliament were compact in one line, then the strength of Islamic parties was divided into two camps. The National Mandate Party, supported by PPP, PKS and PBB, supported Prabowo Subianto, who took Hatta Rajasa as his deputy. Meanwhile, PKB supported Jokowi and Jusuf Kalla even though there was no representation of the pair's PKB cadres.

The confidence of Islamic political parties in presenting their best cadres in political contestation is decreasing. In the 2014 presidential election, the PKB party had 9.04% of the votes in parliament, PKS had 6.79%, PAN had 7.59%, and PPP had 6.53% of the votes (Appendix No. 6). The strength of an Islamic party if the total number of votes combined is equivalent to 29.95 % of the total valid national vote. Based on Law Number 42 of 2008, a party can nominate a presidential candidate if a candidate has a minimum of 25% of the national vote (Appendix No. 7).

If seen from the acquisition of seats in parliament, the total number of seats for Islamic political parties is 175, equivalent to 31.25% of the total number of parliamentary seats. PAN contributed 49 seats, PKB had 47 seats, PKS 40 seats, and PPP had 39 seats in parliament. With these powers, communication and agreements between Islamic political parties should be fostered to encourage one of its best cadres to fight in the 2014 election contestation. Based on regulations, the law only requires a minimum of 25%

of parliamentary seats to be able to nominate a presidential candidate (Appendix No. 8).

Table 3. The 2014 Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates

Candidate Name	Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa	Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla
Coalition Name	<i>Koalisi Merah Putih</i>	<i>Koalisi Indonesia Hebat</i>
Supporting Party	Gerindra, PAN, PPP, PKS, PBB and Golkar	PDIP, PKB, Nasdem, Hanura and PKPI
	Partai Demokrat Netral	

In 2014, the landscape of Islamic political parties was divided into two coalition factions, both comprising members from nationalist parties. The faltering efforts of Islamic political parties in galvanizing their members were impeded by pragmatic interests. The PKB had initiated a discourse around its chairman, Muhaimin Iskandar, as a contender for the vice presidency. However, this proposition faltered as he couldn't match the popularity and electability of Jusuf Kalla. This failure becomes evident in the number of votes acquired by Islamic political parties, which, had they formed a coalition, would have been adequate to propel their own cadre members into candidacy.

The 2019 General Election

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Table 4. The 2019 Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates

Candidate Name	Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin	Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno
Coalition Name	<i>Koalisi Adil Sejahtera</i>	<i>Koalisi Indonesia Kerja</i>
Supporting Party	PDIP, PKB, PPP, Nasdem, Hanura, Golkar	Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, PKS

All Islamic political parties originally supported Prabowo's coalition, except for PKB, which consistently supported Jokowi and shifted their support to the incumbent. PPP led by Romy Romahurmuzy also shifted party support

to Jokowi. Thus, Islamic political parties were split in two, two parties supporting Jokowi and two parties supporting Prabowo. Even so, the two contesting candidates did not represent the best cadres of Islamic political parties.

With similar regulations, Islamic political parties can nominate the best candidate from their cadres because the cumulative votes of Islamic political parties that pass parliament with a score above 4% according to the parliamentary threshold in the 2019 period amounted to 29.26% of the legitimate vote. However, Four Islamic political parties again dared not push their cadres to advance in the presidential election contest (Appendix No. 9).

Results of the Election of Presidential Candidates, Maps of Support for Islamic Political Parties and Coalition Maps

The 2004 General Election

The first direct election for president and vice president was held in 2004. Islamic political parties placed pairs of candidates from their respective parties. In the same boat as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, only PBB emerged victorious with the most votes in the second round. Under the rules, there would be two rounds if no one got the 50% support vote in the first round.

Candidate pairs from Islamic political parties all fell in the first round. Amien Rais, with the largest vote power from PAN, must admit the superiority of other candidates by only getting 17,392,931 public support or equivalent to 14.66% of the vote. Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar also lost in the first round after only gaining 3,569,861 votes, or the equivalent of 3.01%. PKB's votes were predicted to pile up with Wiranto and Salahuddin Wahid with 22.15% due to Abdurrahman Wahid's failure in the health test. See table 5

Table 5. Vote Acquisition for the 2004 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections

No.	Candidate Pairs	Total Votes	Percentage
1.	Wiranto Salahuddin Wahid	26.286.788	22,15%
2.	Megawati Soekarnoputri Hasyim Muzadi	31.569.104	26,61%
3.	Amien Rais Siswono Yudo Husodo	17.392.931	14,66%
4.	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	39.838.184	33,57%
5.	Hamzah Haz Agum Gumelar	3.569.861	3,01%

Second Round of the 2004 Presidential Election

The second round of elections was held on 20 September 2004 and was attended by 2 pairs of candidates with the most votes in the previous round. Megawati, as the incumbent, was confident in getting additional votes from the Islamic political party PPP. It was nothing new that PPP had close relations with PDIP at that time. Previously, they felt political repression during the New Order era, so it seemed they had an emotional bond as fellow victims of Suharto's political games.

PKB and PAN, which previously supported Salahuddin Wahid and Amien Rais, shifted their support to SBY and Jusuf Kalla. By supporting the other two candidates due to the previous defeat, the best cadres from Islamic parties failed to become national leaders. In the end, the contestation of Islamic political party cadres was only limited to being Ministers and officials equal to that in government. See table 6.

Table 6. Results of the 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections

No.	Candidate Pairs	Total Votes	Percentage
2.	Megawati Soekarnoputri Hasyim Muzadi	44.990.704	39,38%
4.	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Muhammad Jusuf Kalla	69.266.350	60,62%

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla outperformed the incumbent Megawati Soekarnoputri in the second round with 60.62% to 36.38% of the votes. The political position of Islamic parties has decreased along with the failure to deliver its cadres to become national leaders. The failure of Islamic

figures in the direct presidential election likely inflicted profound trauma upon Islamic political parties. Among all the contenders featuring Islamic figures as candidates, each one was vanquished by the SBY-Jusuf Kalla tandem. This analysis is supported by the fact that all Islamic parties aligned themselves with SBY in the 2009 elections.

The 2009 General Election

The massive support of Islamic political parties in the stronghold of the incumbent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono paid off handsomely because the candidates they carried succeeded in dominating the votes in the 2009 presidential and vice-presidential elections. It was recorded in the KPU report that the SBY-Budiono pair gathered public support of 73,874,652 votes, equivalent to 60.8% of the vote, with a total voter turnout of 127,983,655. This result far outperformed the other two candidates, Megawati-Prabowo, with 26.79% of the vote and Jusuf Kalla-Wiranto, who only received 12.41%.

Islamic party, as the main supporter, gets the power distribution with the Minister's share in several important posts according to the level of party contribution. Muhaimin Iskandar as general chairman of PKB got the position of Minister of Manpower and Transmigration, Suryadharma Ali as chairman of PPP, got a seat as Minister of Religion, PKS placed Salim Juffri As Segaf as Minister of Social Affairs, and PAN placed Hatta Rajasa as Minister of the economy.

Table 7. Results of the 2009 Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections

Voter presence				127.983.655 (72,56%)
				
Candidate	<u>Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono</u>	<u>Megawati Sukarnoputri</u>	<u>Jusuf Kalla</u>	
Companion	<u>Boediono</u>	<u>Prabowo Subianto</u>	<u>Wiranto</u>	
Votes	73.874.562	32.548.105	15.081.814	
Percentage	60,8%	26,79%	12,41%	

It is unfortunate if Islamic political parties with their best cadres are only limited to being Ministers and several positions in government but do not have the leading authority in determining the direction of the nation's vision and mission. As parties with a mass base and the same ideology, with the power of Islam, they can sit together and determine a joint commitment in the struggle for the people. The failure of Islamic political parties can be seen from the powerlessness of the elites in influencing the coalition to take cadres of Islamic political parties as SBY's vice presidential candidate. Instead, the coalition reached a consensus to nominate Boediono, who was actively serving as the Governor of Bank Indonesia at the time. Despite the substantial coalition that included four Islamic parties, they failed to exhibit significant bargaining power to promote their own cadre members.

The 2014 and 2019 General Election

During the 2014 and 2019 presidential and vice presidential elections, Islamic political parties' positions were not much different. Jokowi and Prabowo Subianto became the main figures in the last two periods, where Jokowi won both contests. Islamic political parties remained a supporting element for the two candidates and failed to position themselves as alternative coalitions amidst the stagnation of the two contestants. In the first period of 2014, Jokowi, who was partnered with Jusuf Kalla, outperformed Prabowo with a narrow advantage of 53.15% (Appendix No. 10).

The only Islamic political party supporting Jokowi was PKB, while the rest supported Prabowo. During this period, Muhaimin actively offered himself as a candidate for president or vice president but did not get much response from other political parties, especially Islamic political parties. Other parties, such as PAN, offered Hatta Rajasa as a presidential candidate in 2014 (Appendix No. 11). A bravery that should be appreciated, but unfortunately, it was not well received by other Islamic parties. So then Hatta Rajasa was proposed by Prabowo to become a vice presidential candidate with Gerindra.

Jokowi's victory based on Islamic political support only from PKB made the power distribution from Islamic political parties not many positions as ministers in Jokowi's cabinet. Hanif Dhakiri was plotted as Minister of Manpower, Khofifah Indar Parawansa as Minister of Social Affairs, Imam Nahrawi as Minister of Youth and Sports and Marwan Ja'far as Minister of PDT and Transmigration (Appendix No. 12). In the 2014 presidential election, PPP, which originally supported Prabowo, joined *Koalisi Indonesia Hebat* and won a ministerial position, the Minister of Religion, which Lukman Hakim Saefuddin filled (Appendix No. 13).




Figure 1. Results of the 2014 Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections

Figure 1 show The 2019 political event in the race for the presidential seat was only like a “home and away” party in a football match. The two candidates changed Prabowo to number two after, previously, in the 2014 election, he received number 1. The incumbent partnered with Ma’ruf Amin as a religious representation and as a strategy to co-opt the Islamic community. Meanwhile, Prabowo partnered with Sandiaga Uno, who successfully defeated Ahok in the DKI Pilkada with issues almost the same as national political issues.

The map of Islamic political parties has not shifted far. PKS and PAN consistently opposed the government and joined Gerindra in the just and prosperous Indonesian coalition. At the same time, PKB consistently

supported Jokowi in the working Indonesian coalition barracks. The defection of the PPP, which received the Minister of Religion's share, was passed on to realsupportin 2019 with an earlier declaration of support for Jokowi (Appendix No. 14).

Table 8. Results of the 2019 Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections

Calon	Joko Widodo-Ma,ruf Amin	Prabowo Subianto - Sandiaga Uno
Partai	PDI-P	Gerindra
Aliansi	<i>Koalisi Indonesia Kerja</i>	<i>Koalisi Adil dan Sejahtera</i>
	PDI-P, Golkar, PKB, PPP, Nasdem, Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, PKS, Hanura, PKPI, PBB, PSI, Perindo	Berkarya
Suara rakyat	85,607,362	68,650,239
Persentase	55.50%	44.50%

Table 8 show Islamic political parties are only supporting the government. Their position is not as a major player. PKB, the owner of the largest vote, got 3 ministers who placed Ida Fauziyah as the Minister of Manpower, the Minister of Trade filled by Agus Suparmanto and Muhaimin Iskandar's older brother, Abdul Halim Iskandar, plotted as the Minister of PDT and Transmigration. Even though PPP was the initial supporter, it had an insignificant vote, only winning one seat, the Minister of National Development Planning/Head of Bappenas, filled by Suharso Monoarfa.

In the political year of 2014, Islamic political parties were granted a favorable turn of events as a coalition formed by Gerindra, in collaboration with PAN, effectively persuaded the larger coalition that PAN's chairman, Hatta Rajasa, possessed the competence to be nominated for the position of vice president. The successful selection of Islamic political party cadres underscores accomplished political maneuvering and illustrates that Islamic figures retain the potential for contention. Nonetheless, the failure to secure victory in the 2014 contest once again relegated Islamic political parties to a supportive role within coalitions, championing candidates from other parties. The Working Indonesia Coalition, encompassing PKB and PPP, found itself unable to assert a prominent voice and had to acknowledge the reality of

Ma'ruf Amin, a professional Muslim representative, emerging as the vice presidential candidate. Similarly, the Just and Prosperous Indonesia coalition appointed Sandiaga Uno as Prabowo's companion.

Islamic Political Parties and Public Support

Reform brought a cool breeze for the birth of many political parties in Indonesia. After 32 years of the New Order regime carrying out political repression and simplifying parties to only 3, PPP, Golkar and PDI, the momentum for reform became the momentum for the growth and development of political parties. Of the many parties born, few could survive and exist until they had representatives at the parliamentary level. Implementing the parliamentary threshold becomes a filter to filter out incompetent parties to gather public support.

Islamic political parties also experienced ups and downs and difficult political dynamics. PBB, for example, as a party that carries the ideology of the masses and bears the big name of the masses, has failed to maintain its existence in parliament. The 2014 and 2019 UN periods were not even included in the parliamentary threshold, so they did not have representatives in parliament.




Figure 2. Islamic Political Party Votes for Acquisition

Figure 2 show only four Islamic political parties still exist and can maintain parliamentary votes: PKB, PKS, PAN and PPP. The long journey of the

four parties can be seen in Figure 2. In the 2004 election, PKB got the most votes with 10.56%, and PAN was in the lowest position with 6.44%. Interestingly, the gap is not too far. The mass base is evenly distributed according to their ideologies.

PKB's 2009 contest experienced a significant decline along with the weakening of the bargaining position of Islamic political parties. The vote decline occurred for all Islamic political parties, where PKS became the leader with 7.89%. PKB experienced its lowest phase, falling to a public support rate of only 4.95% due to the impact of internal friction between Gus Dur and Muhaimin Iskandar. PAN showed a stable movement trend in each period, with average public support of 6%.

In 2014, all Islamic political parties experienced a trend of increasing votes. PKB rose and took the lead with a vote of 9.04% and remained stable until the 2019 election with almost the same vote. PKS showed the solidity of its cadres by consistently being around the average support rate of 8%. PKS and PAN had a mass base that was well coordinated and had good solidity. Meanwhile, PKB and PPP had the same NU mass market niche, so increasing PKB votes would reduce PPP votes. Therefore, the trend of decreasing PPP votes is significant when viewed from the period 2004 to 2019. PPP votes eroded from 8.15% to only 4.52% in the 2019 election and barely passed the parliamentary threshold playing at 4%.




Figure 3. Acquisition of Chairs of Islamic Political Parties

Figure 3 show the accumulation of votes for Islamic political parties has also stagnated from the 2004 to 2019 elections. The accumulation of votes for the four parties was in the highest range of 32% in the 2004 election and 29% in the last two elections. This reality is certainly tough homework for Islamic political parties to convince the Muslim community to provide support. With a Muslim majority population but public support for Islamic political parties only at the highest rate of 30%, it is a political anomaly and a hard awakening for the political elite of Islamic political parties.

The accumulated votes of Islamic political parties can be a force capable of influencing the map of Indonesian democracy. Accumulated votes surpassing the presidential threshold regulations should serve as the foundation for constructing a robust Islamic coalition (Muslimin, Fadoliy, and Munawar 2021). Nevertheless, the pragmatism of political elites and their aspirations for power have prevailed over the ideals of Islamic ideology. Political parties and elites opt to leverage their influence and negotiation leverage by affiliating themselves with coalitions poised for victory and a share of power. Transactional politics characterizes the pragmatic approach of Indonesian Islamic parties, spanning from the 2009 election to the most recent one in 2019. Party votes are transacted with certain positions offered by the grand coalition if they win the election.

Failure Factors of Islamic Political Parties in Elections




Figure 4: Failure Factors of Islamic Political Parties in Elections

Figure 4 shows the factors causing the failure of the Islamic party in the 2019 General Election. They include vote struggles, patronage clientelism, money politics, identity politics and figures. From the analysis using Nvivo 12 Plus, the character is the highest. The Patronage Clientelism and Money Politics indicators have the lowest percentage. The Figure here explains that Islamic parties lack figures who can be supported in candidacy for general elections. So Islamic parties in Indonesia prefer to join a coalition of other parties with cadres that will win. Then Identity Politics means that the Indonesian people have started to leave Islamic parties because Islamic parties in Indonesia are thick with the nuances of identity politics. The narrative of the attachment of identity politics to Islamic parties influences society in determining their political choices.

Furthermore, the vote scramble indicator here is that one of the causes of the failure of the Islamic party in the 2019 General Election was the fight over the votes between fellow Islamic parties fighting in the election. Crushing each other's votes reduced the votes of each party. Then the Patronage Clientelism Indicator shows that the failure of the Islamic party in the General Election is a corrupt practice carried out by Islamic party cadres. The party, which should be an example because it is based on Islam, is also considered to have participated in many corruption cases and practices in Indonesia. It caused disappointment in the community. The money politics indicator explains that Islamic parties in Indonesia are considered involved in money politics in the general election process. The political style of Islamic parties has become transactional politics and has led to pragmatism politics.

Discussion

The power of Islamic political parties has a high potential for change if you want to relax the egoism of each elite and find a common interest that can cover the interests of all Islamic political parties. During the 4 general elections, the accumulated votes of the four Islamic political parties were at

the lowest point at 24% and the highest point at 32% and consistently at 29% in the last two elections. Parties that won the election received 19.3% support, then the political power of Islam could surpass it (Appendix No. 15).

The accumulative vote acquisition of 30% of all Islamic political parties can also be interpreted as the failure of political parties to co-opt the votes of the Muslim community. The support of the ummah is only limited to 30%, which means a gap exists between the expectations of the ummah and the performance of political elites and Islamic political parties (Sakai and Fauzia 2014). They need to go back to the community, communicate and ask what the Indonesian Muslim community wants so they can convince the community to hand over the mandate to them. Maybe now there is a considerable distance between the political elite and constituents, let alone the “floating mass” society, so that they are considered to come down and know the ummah when it is periodic 5 years (Jatmiko, Hartiwiningsih, and Handayani 2019).

Islamic political parties are still thick with partial interests and group identity nuances kyai (Nelwan 2022). PKB and PPP strengthened their identity as representatives of Nahdlatul Ulama so that their political policies and strategies aligned with NU’s interests, likewise with PAN, which represents Muhammadiyah with all its interests so that the masses of these two mass organizations often clash. PKS also has an exclusive ideological mass line on campus Islamic movements that have a preference for the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt (Herdiansah, Djuyandi, and Sumadinata 2019; Nurdin 2019). This pattern of support movements often creates friction at the grassroots level. Friction between PKS and PKB supporters often occurs in society. The anatomical similarity between Islamic political parties can also be an elementary strength and weakness (Yunanto and Hamid 2013). The straightest claim among the ideologies between parties also opens up conflict. It becomes the strongest factor preventing us from being able to sit together in a coalition.

Islamic political parties find themselves ensnared in the practice of political pragmatism, wherein power becomes a primary political objective (Mietzner and Muhtadi 2018). Ideally, as institutions nurturing the nation's foremost elites, political parties are also tasked with ideals of regeneration (Fossati et al. 2020). Relying solely on coalition partnerships for acquired power may yield short-term effectiveness, but in the long term, the party must establish its presence independently by fostering its own growth and empowering its cadre members to attain authority. Through the acquisition of power, the party can translate its political agenda into action and manifest the noble values that constitute its foundational strength.

If Islamic political parties want to be able to say a lot in the contestation of democracy in Indonesia and not only become secondary players or only supporters, then they must close ranks. Elites must formulate intersection points between ideologies and the interests of each party so that they can make collective agreements and move together. It has been proven that when Islamic political parties formed a coalition, they were able to win over their cadres in 2004. This success should be “ibroh” that what is needed today is to find “similarities and forget about differences” so that they can seize power for the national elite.

Enhancing the cadre system and recruiting skilled members require significant focus for organizing the party structure (Haris et al. 2020). Islamic political parties must undertake a comprehensive reform of their cadre system, considering various indicators. Firstly, cadres must possess strong political competence and capacity (skills), rendering them dependable in guiding constituents. The subsequent criterion entails high levels of integrity and loyalty to the party, coupled with an understanding of the party's ideology and its direction of struggle. Lastly, the cadre recruitment process should exhibit transparency and accountability, ensuring that the production of cadres yields high-quality individuals who can garner public trust.

CONCLUSION

First, the enactment of the Presidential Threshold policy causes inconsistency in the presidential election because parties will often change direction in carrying the president. Second, the nomination of presidential candidates with a Presidential Threshold policy of 20% has an impact that can carry only 2 pairs of candidates, this is not democratic. Third, losing the participation of small parties, the presidential threshold figure of 20% proves the efforts of the oligarchs. Fourth, the Presidential Threshold Policy gave birth to the political identity of Cebong-Kampret, because there were only two pairs of presidential candidates. There are two irrelevant reasons if the Presidential Threshold policy is implemented in a simultaneous election regime. First, the election results of the previous five years which were used as the basis for the presidential nomination, if you look at the mirror of the 2019 simultaneous elections, then the reference for 20% of the DPR or 25% of the valid national votes for the DPR election is the result of the 2014 election. Of course, this realization is irrelevant, because the results of the 2014 election were obtained from the different total voters and 2019 socio-political conditions. The use of previous elections will continue to form the basis for future elections. The 2019 election, which uses the results of the 2014 election, will also be followed by the nomination of presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 2024 election, which of course will use the 2019 election data or results. Of course, many netizens do not agree with the presidential threshold policy which will take effect in the 2024 elections. Therefore, removing the Presidential Threshold can benefit small parties and the Indonesian people. Restore citizens' constitutional rights, give citizens the right to elect several leaders, reduce the intensity of social electoral conflicts, reduce the number of white groups (abstentions), and save time and eliminate identity politics which gave birth to the political identities of the two groups of cebongs and bastards on social media.

Apart from that, this policy also gave birth to the political identity of

Cebong-Kampret because only two pairs of presidential candidates could be nominated. Even though this policy is applied in simultaneous elections, the results of the previous election are irrelevant as a basis for determining the Presidential Threshold in the next election. Therefore, abolishing the Presidential Threshold can restore citizens' constitutional rights, give citizens the right to elect several leaders, reduce social electoral conflicts, reduce abstentions, and eliminate identity politics which gave birth to the political identities of the two cebong and kampret groups on social media.

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