

Domestic Politics and Strategic Culture: The 2023 Russian Security Policy Shift on New START

*Moh. Nasir*¹

¹Departement of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia, Nusantara 2 Building, 2nd Floor, Beji, Depok, West Java, 16424

*Corresponding author e-mail: anasmohnasir@gmail.com

Received: Juni 14, 2024; Revised: August 5, 2024; Approved: August 22, 2024

ABSTRACT

Russia and the United States have been in the New START agreement for 13 years. A year before the agreement expired, the two countries agreed to extend the agreement until 2026. However, in early 2023, Russia officially announced that it was temporarily stopping its involvement in the New START agreement. This article uses the neoclassical realism analytical framework from Ripsman et.al. This article was prepared using a qualitative-deductive approach. Supported by primary data sources which include official state documents and statements by state officials and secondary sources in the form of scientific works, expert opinions and sources from third parties. The data is processed based on illustrative analysis. The findings in this article are that Russia's withdrawal from the New START agreement was caused by changes in the security environment caused by the US; Vladimir Putin's aggressive personality; a Russian form of government that gives the president full authority over his foreign policy; and Russia's strategic culture is perceived with threat and superiority. This article recommends internal factors as drivers of a country's foreign policy.

Keywords: Russia; United States; Foreign policy.

INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy has a complex meaning depending on how you look at it. Some academics understand foreign policy as an act of political authority that is influenced by the views of individuals or groups within it. Meanwhile, others see foreign policy as an object that determines cross-border behavior to achieve state interests. To accommodate these two views, foreign policy does not only mean how the country behaves and how to achieve it. However, it also includes how these policies can occur and/or what factors allow countries to determine certain foreign policies (Laura N, 2008).

Russian foreign policy has experienced serious ups and downs in its relations with the US. Russia has gone through a complex period of foreign policy primarily in support of its interests. In a historical context, Russia adopted a soft foreign policy towards the ASS in its first five years of existence (1991-1995). This is proven by the normalization of relations between Western countries such as the US in its agreement to declare a policy of limiting nuclear weapons (START I) and its involvement in international forums and institutions such as the G7, IMF and World Bank. In contrast, in the period 1996-2000 Russia behaved with resilience towards its partner countries in the West. Russia firmly rejects NATO's eastward expansion; voice the CIS Free Trade Area; and building economic cooperation with China and India to compete with the US (Liu, 2022).

In the 2000s, Russia established harmonious relations with the US. This is demonstrated by Russia's participation in fighting terror crimes, becoming an EU partner country (Liu, 2022), and the establishment of an agreement to limit nuclear weapons between the two countries, NEW START (Barkey & Bilefsky, 2010). The agreement was even extended in 2021 (Reif & Bugos, 2021) before Russia finally decided to go on hiatus in the agreement.

In the development of foreign policy discussions, there are a lot of discussions about how a country carries out certain foreign policies. Several discussions that took place resulted in the fact that a country's foreign policy recommendations were influenced by the international system and factors of the country's leadership. However, this variable looks outdated, because there are other factors that influence foreign policy. The following are several reviews of previous articles which are the starting point for this article.

The first article, emphasizes the role of leaders in navigating foreign policy. (Strozier & Terman, 2022) analyzed that Russia's behavior in the international environment is driven by leadership factors and defense capabilities. Putin's leadership is built on his paranoid personality towards Western powers and his sense of nationalism towards his homeland. Putin is

also considered to have high self-confidence because Russia's nuclear supremacy has a deterrent effect on his opponents. The combination of these three things will make it easier for Putin to orient Russia's aggressive foreign policy.

The second article states that a country's foreign policy is a consequence of a security dilemma. (Podvig, 2018) stated that Russia's confidence in its nuclear weapons is the starting point for increasingly sophisticated nuclear development. This nuclear development is Russia's strategy to create balance with other nuclear countries. Thus, Podvig's analysis is limited to international output.

To provide a glimpse of foreign policy theory, it is important to distinguish between foreign policy process and international output. In understanding foreign policy theory, internal state factors are fundamental: the political ideology, the economic system, and the character of the country, and its leaders are the main areas of study for this discourse. Foreign policy theorists such as Gideon Rose emphasizes that international dynamics (*systemic incentives*) is important. However, it cannot analyze state behavior (*international output*), because international dynamics are sometimes responded to differently by countries even though they share the same ideology (Rose, 1998). Despite of high tension in Baltic Sea region that posed by Russia in the early 2000s, amount of Baltic countries such Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania responded by applying NATO membership in 2004. However, another Baltic country those prone to the democratic ideology – particularly Finland dan Sweden – were still out of alliance (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta, 2001).

On the other hand, sometimes countries response similarly to the systemic incentives in the international system even though their ideologies are different (Rose, 1998). Both Russia-authoritarianism and United States liberal-democracy were bound to counter-terrorism in the early 2000s (Cross, 2006). Therefore, foreign policy discourse requires intervening variables –

state ideology, leaders, domestic politics et.al. – which can determine the direction of state policy.

Regarding to the theoretical framework discussed above, this article lies to highlight Russia's participation in the New START. The Treaty has been agreed in 2010 under Obama and Medvedev presidency and entered into force in 2011 for ten years validity. In the 2021, before its expiration, both Russia and United States extended it up to 2026. However, a year after prolonged, Russia decided to halt its participation in the NEW START unilaterally. Russia's decision upon its future on the treaty emanates gap that deserve to explore further.

Understanding a country's foreign policy, especially Russia, will be very complicated in its fluctuation ties with the United States. Therefore, this article will explore to what extent Russian domestic structure could influence the change security policy toward New START. Analyzed by Ripsman's et.al. foreign policy tools, this article will underpin the factors that influence changes in a country's foreign policy on the one hand, and explain what factors support a country to carry out its foreign policy on the other hand.

RESEARCH METHOD

This article uses a qualitative research method with a deductive approach. This method starts from the theory used to analyze the phenomenon to be studied (Bryman, 2012). This approach is characterized by describing the phenomenon being studied, then elaborating on the theory used to determine the data requirements to be used in the research.

Data collection techniques were carried out through literature study (*library research*). This article will be supplemented by primary and secondary data. Primary data will be obtained through national defense books which include white papers; military strategy; the country's foreign policy in a certain period, official statements of state authorities. Meanwhile, secondary data is obtained from third sources such as *think tank*, mass media, and

relevant scientific literature. After the data is collected, the data will be classified based on needs in the research variables. In this research, the data obtained was set for 2021-2023. After that, the data will be analyzed using illustrative analysis (Neuman, 2014).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

LEADER IDEATIONALITY AND THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The leader factor is essential at the first unit-level in foreign policy. Leaders can consist of the President, Prime Minister or Ministers who have functions for defense and foreign policy. Leaders not only have the authority to determine the direction of a country's foreign policy. But in achieving that, leaders also have a series of special information and intelligence data about other countries. Apart from the prerogative rights that a leader has, he is also surrounded by psychological factors that determine him in making a decision. Psychological factors are important in leaders which are useful for processing information into firm policies (Ripsman et al., 2016).

This is clearly visible in Vladimir Putin's personality. As stated by Forsberg and Pursiainen, Putin grew up with a brutal, fighting personality as a child. He himself did not get proper support and love from his parents. This makes him not have adequate emotional expression which leads him to stress and frustration (Forsberg & Pursiainen, 2017). This stems from Putin's childhood personality, his past experience when in disputes tends to use physical force without any consideration. He steadily trained judo during his early school and represented to be a champion in his city (Herspring, 2008). According to Forsberg and Pursiainen, Putin was able to show his childhood character in his political tendencies today, which led him to gain full power in Russia. In his teenage years, Vladimir Putin showed a contrasting personality to before, he had a more firm and calm attitude, which then shaped his future personality in interacting with the public (Forsberg & Pursiainen, 2017). His personality is said to be increasingly humble and no longer so fierce, but much

more calm and confident when facing physical and mental pressure. Putin's personality is interpreted as a process of divergence rather than convergence. This can be seen in the policies it formulates, which tend to be tendentious and are sometimes determined through violence (Gessen, 2013).

The first organization that White joined was the Russian secret agent KGB or now known as the FSB when he was fifteen years old, which not only shaped Putin's psychology but also gave him ideological values. At that time the KGB was led by someone from the Communist Party, Yuri Andropov, from 1967 to 1982. Andropov was known to really emphasize the value of love of country and the values of communism. So the structure that was formed in the KGB at that time was filled with officials who had been indoctrinated by these values. And if there are small groups that are in opposition and propagandize against Kremlin policies, they must be dealt with through legal means and if necessary designated as targets of violence (Applebaum, 2013).

The president's actions as *Foreign Policy Executive* (FPE) is also surrounded by a series of confidential information (*operational codes*) which leads him to determine his foreign policy (Ripsman et al., 2016). *Operational codes* can be understood as a view that is the focus of a leader or group of policy stakeholders. As shown by Nathan Leites when testing *operational codes* Bolsheviks led by Lenin and Stalin. There is a political policy that is total but softer, and is involved in small conflicts (Leites, 1951).

Putin's personalistic drives Russian foreign policy with no restriction based on his vision. This prescription is supported by his dominancy toward another Russian domestic institutions which tends to his favor (Monaghan, 2012). Therefore, Putin strategic position in Russian domestic politics prompts to reformulate its own foreign security agenda.

In connection with Russia's suspension of the New START agreement. Russia has detected threats by the US to Russian national security in several ways. First, US intervention in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was the starting point for Russia's revocation of its commitment (The Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2023). The crisis in Ukraine provides an understanding that the US presence is disrupting Russia's interests in the region. Russian authorities consider this action to demonstrate Russia's power and use nuclear power to intimidate the US from getting too involved in the crisis in Ukraine.

The Ukraine crisis is Russia's response to the West's presence in its region (Pasqa & Gatara, 2023). The US intention is to integrate the former Soviet Union into the arms of the West through NATO and EU expansion (Chotiner, 2022). On the one hand, Russia feels threatened because it has to share direct state borders with an alliance that will complicate Russia's defense from all directions. Because the Russian authorities say that Ukraine is *buffer zone* for Russia's interests in countering US aggressiveness in its environment. On the other hand, in Russia's war with the West, threats always come from that direction. So Russia's efforts to maintain Ukraine under Russian influence will continue to be maintained through various means, including efforts to intervene in Ukraine's domestic politics, annexation of peninsula areas that have cultural affinity with Russia, as well as a large-scale invasion of Ukraine (Götz & Staun, 2022).

Russia accused US involvement as a form of US non-compliance with the New START agreement which has the connotation of destroying trust and agreements between both parties. Second, Russia believes that Western countries are developing anti-Russian speech which has an impact on their nuclear defense posture. Primarily, this statement was made by NATO alliance countries that have nuclear weapons (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2023). US partners such as Britain and France are urging the US to comply with the New START agreement so as not to provide a loophole for Russia to leave the agreement. This will result in the three Western nuclear countries increasingly narrowing Russia's options in maximizing its nuclear arsenal. Third, the US threat to Russia's influence in the region is also a determining factor in the future of the New START agreement.

Overall, Putin's childhood personality factors and his involvement in the KGB formed Putin's character who dared to face risks like other people who avoided them. Psychologically, Putin can be classified as someone who is narcissistic, experiencing psychological deviations in his childhood, and experiences of trauma in his family life also shaped his chaotic emotions. The influence of the views of Russian policymakers (FPE) on the security conditions of their country also provides support for Russia in taking certain policies. At least, Russia's temporary withdrawal from the agreement was influenced by the factor of a firm leader and the condition of the threatened security environment.

RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS

The second variable in neoclassical realism is domestic politics. Formal government models, decision-making processes, and monitoring systems for the implementation of a government are usually regulated and limited by a country's constitution (Ripsman et al., 2016). As a result, they can share the roles of who is in charge of formulating policies, at what stage of the policy process, who implements the policy and who supervises the policy.

The type of Russia's government is democratic-federal. Russia is often known as a country that easily changes its foreign policy because it is supported by a soft parliament (Liu, 2022). In recent developments, under the Vladimir Putin regime which came to power in the 2000s, the Russian government model underwent reform again with several special characteristics (Bacon et al., 2018).

Before Putin took power in 2000, Russian foreign policy was directed to accommodate its national interest through foreign policy adjustment model to western interest. Boris Yeltsin, the former and the first President of Russian Federation, came to power with less stable political and economic system. He saw Western power as a leading-edge of both his necessity (Liu, 2022). Therefore, his presidency was portrayed by embracing a pro-western

democracy through the improvement relationship with western countries and shared the power with parliamentary. The latter gave Yeltsin's regime evidence that could not dominate its role in a domestic arena due to its unpopularity during the Russian election (Seyaz, 2020).

On the contrary, Putin's first term at office spontaneously reformulated Russian domestic political structures through eliminating center-periphery power relation which dominated Russian foreign policy respectively toward centered-foreign policy to Kremlin (Charap, 2007). As of Yeltsin's period, Kremlin had suffered lost control over states due to have respective vision. Executive strength to dominate Russian foreign policy could foresee on how Putin endorsed democracy thought and picked super-presidential system based on his vision (Seyaz, 2020). It could be traced by his rejection on NATO eastward expansion which abandoned by his predecessor (Charap, 2007). The way of how Russian executive institution tends so unimpeded in formulating Russian foreign policy rather than the rest of its institution demonstrates its capability to mobilize state resources. By this mean, Vladimir Putin is essential to formulate Russian foreign policies.

The Russian Constitution, which has been amended, provides a strong mandate for the president and his function as an important role in maintaining state authority. The president is the center and key of Russian foreign policy, he formulates and implements his policies through his government (Monaghan, 2012). So that the government below it responsible to the president, not to parliament (Bowen & Welt, 2021). After declaring itself as a republic on December 12, 1993, the Russian Federation mandated the division of powers separately into executive, legislative and judiciary.

At the executive level, as mentioned above, it influences almost the entire process of control over government. In this case, the President as the holder of the highest government mandate has the authority to appoint officials at the federal level and governors in the states (Oliker et al., 2009).

The highest power in the Russian government system is divided into two, namely the President and the Prime Minister. Uniquely, the President has more dominant powers than the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's power in Russia is only in domestic matters such as social policy, population and bureaucracy in government. The Prime Minister can be classified as vice president after the position was abolished in an amendment to the Russian constitution in 1993.

Meanwhile, the President is tasked with appointing the Prime Minister and Minister of State Security who are approved by the Duma (Legislature). The President's authority guaranteed in the Russian Constitution in Article 90 points 3 and 4 is to deal with matters such as state security, defense and foreign policy (Federation, 2008). The president also has the authority to issue emergency provisions, including those that have extra-constitutional possibilities.

In formulating foreign policy, the two ministries that are considered capable of providing recommendations on Russia's foreign policy are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held by Sergei Lavrov and the Ministry of Defense held by Sergei Shoigu. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for carrying out diplomacy. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense is responsible for Russia's military capabilities which support foreign policy. However, not everyone can answer to these two ministries, only people who President Putin can trust and can carry out these tasks can do so. However, between the two ministries, it still depends on the president's decision to make a decision.

In addition, at the legislative level, the Duma is known as the lower house of parliament which consists of 450 members and is elected through party authority. Duma representatives are not directly elected by the people, but are determined by the party (Oliker et al., 2009). In addition, there is the Federation Council, the higher house of parliament, which has fewer members than the Duma and its determination is based on the number of

commissions from the Russian executive and legislature (Federation, 2008). The election of the Federation Council is more political, because it is appointed directly by the president (Oliker et al., 2009). In summary, the Duma is a lower level parliamentary representative that is not directly elected by the people.

The Duma has the authority to consider foreign policies designed by the President. In the Russian Constitution Article 106 states that the Duma has the right to ratify and annul international treaties established by the Russian Government. Meanwhile the Federation Council approved the President's decree in a state of emergency (Federation, 2008). In various foreign policies set by Russia, the Duma has played a role in smoothing the implementation of the policies and strategies pursued by Russia. For example, in the invasion policy against Ukraine in 2022 (Shang, 2023). The Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, represented by Leonid Stutsky, stated that the Duma had recommended Russia's temporary suspension in New START (Eyugur, 2023). In this case, Russia has no obstacles in determining its foreign policy.

The Russian executive body headed by the President has a very strong significance in determining its foreign policy. Meanwhile, the legislative body has little influence because its membership is determined openly. This allows the executive body to freely design foreign policy without obstacles from the legislative body even though it adheres to a democratic system.

RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE

The following variable in neoclassical realism is adopting strategic culture as instruments that influence foreign policy (Ripsman et al., 2016). In international security discourse, strategic culture is commonly known as general assumptions about an object that is considered a system of symbols. It, on the one hand, consists of basic assumptions about how states should go to war, how to identify opponents and perceive threats, and how weapons are developed and used in an anarchic environment (Johnston, 1995).

Strategic culture is one of the country's general views for developing its defense policy.

Strategic culture plays pivotal role in filtrating state response to international pressure. Statesman, regarding to Kupchan prescription, belongs to be restricted by its strategic culture to undertake strategic responses to the systemic pressures (Kupchan, 1994). In other words, strategic culture could both inspire and limit state behavior to act in the international system. Therefore, Russian foreign policy is involved on his strategic culture which including its status to retain its regional power.

Russian strategic culture has been developed since the nineteenth century. It is built on a sense of fear and threat towards Western powers which increasingly narrows Russia's influence and self-confidence as a major power that influences the region (Götz & Staun, 2022), (Bowen & Welt, 2021). Russia's potential threat is always perceived as coming from the West. This is reinforced by historical experience when the Napoleonic France war occurred in the 19th century with Nazi Germany and Finland in the 20th century.

NATO's expansion eastward to include the Baltic States and increased relations with countries on Russia's borders will further increase threat perceptions and narrow Russia's influence (Chotiner, 2022). These countries, known as the former Soviet Union, are at least in Russia's geostrategic interests as a buffer zone from Western powers and Russia (Götz & Staun, 2022). So it is natural for Russia to protect its interests in the region if it experiences interference from the West, especially the US.

In the last decade, the rivalry between Russia and the US has become increasingly sharp, leading to both countries intervening in the conflict in Syria in 2015 (Bowen & Welt, 2021); Russia's espionage and cyberattacks against the US in 2016 worsened bilateral relations between the two countries, created instability in the Baltic region and developed nuclear weapons unilaterally (Bidgood, 2018).

Apart from Russia's inferiority in the economic and military fields, the issue of nuclear weapons is a bargaining chip for Russia because it is recognized for its sophisticated nuclear arsenal. Therefore, Russia is increasing its efforts to create parity in its defense in protecting its interests (Svobodová, 2024). In characterizing the relationship between the US and Russia in the New START agreement, there is disagreement about the future prospects of the agreement. In the same intonation, Russia still views the US as a superpower rival that could threaten it at any time. It is known that Russia has a high interest in continuing nuclear weapons limitation cooperation with the US (Pavlov & Malygina, 2020).

However, the nuclear weapons restrictions in the treaty are limited to the number of ICBMs; SLBMs and heavy bombers cannot meet Russia's interests. In the Putin era, Russia is now considered to have paid attention to the development of nuclear weapons. Involving asymmetric elements such as technology and information can enhance Russia's nuclear power (Svobodová, 2024). It is known that currently Russia has developed its nuclear capacity in the form of a hypersonic glide vehicle Avangard; the heavy ICBM RS-28 Sarmat; the nuclear-powered cruise missile Burevestnik; and the intercontinental nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo Poseidon (Pavlov & Malygina, 2020) which is not regulated in New START. Disagreements in the development of nuclear weapons limitations weaken opponents' deterrence capabilities, causing the international system to become disorderly. In addition, with the development of technological improvements nuclear weapons that are not covered by New START will be obsolete.

CONCLUSION

Russia and United States had been conceived to the nuclear pact agreement, New START, since 2012 for more ten years. After both states agreed to prolong its participation in the agreement, Russia unilaterally

halted its participation a year after. This article explores the cause of change of Russian security policy in nuclear agreement. Therefore, it finds that Russia' behavior is being supported by the following conditions. First, Vladimir Putin's narcissistic ideational factors shape Russian policy in the context of its relations with the United States. Putin's personality built on his past experiences and his livelihood shaped Putin's view of the United States. Second, the government system that gives authority to the President as a determinant of Russia's foreign policy and security policy gives Putin the freedom to determine Russia's participation in the New START agreement.

Russian strategic culture that adheres to fear and threat and the superiority of its state makes it possible for Russia to act aggressively by withdrawing from the nuclear deal. Russia also has a past trauma from the NATO alliance which has consistently pushed for expanding membership to former member countries of the Warsaw Pact. And Russia's ability to detect potential non-compliance by the United States in the New START agreement is also an indication that Russia is absent from the agreement. Also, the limitations of the New START agreement in accommodating Russia's interests in the nuclear agreement are considered to have expired.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Author expresses gratitude to Mr. Hariyadi Wirawan, Ph.D., as the thesis advisor in the International Relations study at the Postgraduate Program of Universitas Indonesia, for the support and assistance in providing input for this writing.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Applebaum, A. (2013). Putinism: The Ideology. *The London School of Economics and Political Science, Strategic Update 13.2, February*, 14. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/LSE-IDEAS-Putin>

- Barkey, P., & Bilefsky, D. (2010). *Russian and U.S. Sign Nuclear Arms Reduction Pact*. New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/world/europe/09prexy.html>
- Bidgood, S. (2018). US–Russia relations and the future of arms control: How the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty could restore engagement on nuclear issues. *Nonproliferation Review*, 25(3–4), 307–318. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1512203>
- Bowen, A. S., & Welt, C. (2021). *Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations*. Congressional Research Service.
- Bryman, A. (2012). *Social Research Method 4th Edition*. In *Oxford University Press* (4th ed.). Oxford University Press.
- Charap, S. (2007). Inside out: Domestic political change and foreign policy in Vladimir Putin’s first term. *Demokratizatsiya*, 15(3), 335–352. <https://doi.org/10.3200/DEMO.15.3.335-352>
- Chotiner, I. (2022). *Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine*. The New Yorker. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine>
- Cross, S. N. (2006). U.S./NATO-Russia and Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism. *Connections*, 5(4), 1–25.
- Eyugur, B. (2023). *State Duma Committee Recommends to Suspend Russia’s Participation to New START Treaty*. AA. <https://doi.org/https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/state-duma-committee-recommends-to-suspend-russia-s-participation-to-new-start-treaty/2827496>.
- Federation, T. G. of R. (2008). *The Constitution of the Russian Federation*. Russian Government.
- Forsberg, T., & Pursiainen, C. (2017). The Psychological Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy: Putin and the Annexation of Crimea. *Global Society*, 31(2), 220–244. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2016.1274963>
- Forsberg, T., & Pursiainen, C. (2017). The Psychological Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy: Putin and the Annexation of Crimea. *Global Society*, 31(2), 220–244. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2016.1274963>
- Forsberg, T., & Vaahoranta, T. (2001). Inside the EU, outside NATO: Paradoxes of Finland’s and Sweden’s post-neutrality. *European Security*, 10(1), 68–93. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662830108407483>
- Gessen, M. (2013). *The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. In *Trans-pasando Fronteras* (Issue 3). Riverhead Books. <https://doi.org/10.18046/retf.i3.1547>
- Gessen, M. (2013). *The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. In *Trans-pasando Fronteras* (Issue 3). Riverhead Books. <https://doi.org/10.18046/retf.i3.1547>
- Götz, E., & Staun, J. (2022). Why Russia attacked Ukraine: Strategic culture and radicalized narratives. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 43(3), 482–497. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2082633>

- Herspring, D. R. (2008). Vladimir Putin : His Continuing Legacy. *Social Research*, 76(1), 151–175.
- Johnston, A. I. (1995). Thinking about Strategic. *International Security*, 19(4), 32–64.
- Kupchan, C. A. (1994). *The Vulnerability of Empire* Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Cornell University Press.
- Laura N. (2008). The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era. In *Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc* (2nd ed., pp. 1–251). Rowman & Littlefield.
- Leites, N. (1951). *The Operational Codes of the Politburo*. McGraw-Hill.
- Liu, F. (2022). Russia's Foreign Policy Over the Past Three Decades: Change and Continuity. *Chinese Journal of Slavic Studies*, 2(1), 86–99. <https://doi.org/10.1515/cjss-2022-0004>
- Liu, F. (2022). Russia's Foreign Policy Over the Past Three Decades: Change and Continuity. *Chinese Journal of Slavic Studies*, 2(1), 86–99. <https://doi.org/10.1515/cjss-2022-0004>
- Monaghan, A. (2012). The vertikal : power and authority in Russia Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article : The vertikal : power and authority in Russia. *International Affairs*, 88(1), 1–16.
- Monaghan, A. (2012). The vertikal : power and authority in Russia Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article : The vertikal : power and authority in Russia. *International Affairs*, 88(1), 1–16.
- Neuman, W. L. (2014). *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Pearson Ne). Pearson.
- Oliker, O., Crane, K., Schwartz, L. H., & Yusupov, C. (2009). Russian Foreign Policy Source and Implication. In *Distribution*. RAND Corporation. <https://doi.org/RAND>
- Pasqa, M., & Gatara, A. A. S. (2023). Crisis in the Multilateral System: The United Nations Dilemma in the Fallout of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine. *Politicon: Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, 5(2), 227–254.
- Pavlov, A., & Malygina, A. (2020). Russian Perspective; New START and Beyond. *Arms Control Today*, 50(1), 12–15. <https://www-jstor-org.wcsu.idm.oclc.org/stable/26891336>
- Podvig, P. (2018). Russia's Current Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control. *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, 1(2), 256–267. <https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2018.1526629>
- Reif, K., & Bugos, S. (2021). *U.S., Russia Extend New START for Five Years*. Arms Control Association. <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-03/news/us-russia-extend-new-start-five-years>
- Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W., & Lobell, S. E. (2016). *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. *World Politics*, 51(1), 144–172. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100007814>
- Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. *World Politics*, 51(1), 144–172. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100007814>

- Roth, A., & Borger, J. (2023). *Putin Says Russia Will Halt Participation in New Start Nuclear Arms Treaty*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/21/putin-russia-halt-participation-new-start-nuclear-arms-treaty>
- Seyaz, A. (2020). THE EFFECT OF THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL POWER ON THE POLITICAL REGIME : A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF YELTSIN AND PUTIN PERIODS *. August 2018, 305–324.
- Shang, H. (2023). Exploring the Role of Duma in the Power Structure of Contemporary Russia. *Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media*, 21(1), 87–93. <https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-7048/21/20230078>
- Strozier, C. B., & Terman, D. M. (2022). Putin's psychology and nuclear weapons: The fundamentalist mindset. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 78(6), 310–314. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2132736>
- Svobodová, M. (2024). Russia's approach to arms control: caught between asymmetry and the desire for strategic stability. *European Security*, 33(1), 150–168. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2023.2201376>
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2023). Foreign Ministry Statement in Connection with the Russian Federation Suspending the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START). *Foreign Ministry Statement in Connection with the Russian Federation Suspending the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START)*. https://doi.org/https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/1855184/.